From a modern day perspective, the US airplane sprang up in the Wright Brother's bicycle shop, and came into its own over European battlefields a decade later. And that's reasonably accurate with one caveat: most of the iconic biplanes that dueled above the muddy trenches of WW1 weren't made in the USA. In 1914 the Europeans had already mass produced thousands of aircraft while only about a hundred hand-made prototypes existed in the US1. American manpower made a big difference in the outcome of the war, but US airpower arrived too little and too late.
After the war domestic aircraft production continued to lag. Alarmed by the slow pace of progress and now well aware of the military and commercial potential of airplanes, the US government stepped in with the Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925 which allowed the US post office to hire private pilots to carry mail. It saved a ton of money and time: if the government had to design and build their own aircraft, it would take years before airmail was available. The true price, at least as far as taxpayers were concerned, would have been the development, acquisition, maintenance, and operating cost of the planes divided by the number of parcels/pounds delivered. By hiring private owners the cost was much lower and airmail service could begin immediately.
US aircraft companies that had been struggling saw demand tick up. Just two years later Charles Lindbergh flew the Spirit of St Louis into the pages of history, and US aircraft manufacturing, aided by investment capital flowing from Wall Street to main street, exploded. The 1930s, a decade otherwise marked by mass unemployment and a slow faltering recovery, is considered the golden age of aviation. Aircraft design enjoyed the largest peace-time burst of progress in history and employed thousands of people. Howard Hughes and Amelia Earhart became household names. Mass production took hold, larger, reliable monoplanes with retractable landing gear and even pressurized cabins began rolling off assembly lines. And none too soon.
Without that golden age of innovation, America's influence in WW2, from the lend-lease of aircraft that served in the Battle of Britain to the D-day invasion, might have been reduced. How that would have affected the war is anyone's guess, but it's a good bet it would have lasted longer and millions more might have died. Instead, because of US air superiority, not only did the allies prevail faster, the spin offs in science, materials, electronics, and even progressive social changes like women in the workforce are today the stuff of legends.
No analogy is perfect, and I have grossly simplified this one despite suggestions from expert sources. But the similarities to NASA's proposed commercial crew program are striking. After the shuttle program ends, foreign manufacturers will once again be ahead of us and US astronauts will have to catch rides on Russian rockets. Just as the post office avoided enormous development costs and years of delay by capitalizing on domestic aircraft, NASA could get people and instruments to space way sooner using new spacecraft made by smaller emerging companies without paying the billions in development costs. Just as the US now leads the world in aerospace and employs hundreds of thousands of people who actually build things rather than trade paper for banks and insurance companies, the US space industry could lead in this field. And just as wealthy railroad barons and their army of political lackeys bitterly opposed competition and lobbied against the Kelly Act, powerful interests are working against commercial space: about 85% of NASA's current budget goes to the aerospace wing of the military-industrial complex and the defense industry is eager to keep that goose laying big fat golden eggs.
Something like the Kelly Act for the space-age will be up for a vote in September, along side legislation that would effectively kill it. The first bill in the Senate (S.3729) provides modest incentives to smaller, emerging spacecraft manufacturers who already have vehicles flying. The latter bill offered by the House (H. R. 5781) all but kills commercial space development in favor of a token version of George Bush's defunct Constellation program. HR 5781 as written would charge US taxpayers tens of billions for traditional aerospace contractors to develop new rockets that may not fly until 2020, if ever. I'll have some ideas about how to steer Congress in the right direction soon.