UPDATE: I didn't give enough details to satisfy everyone, apparently. The Gonzales case involved home-grown medicinal marijuana. Which I figured was clear from the wheat case. Point remains the same. And, I wish the nitpickers would read the goddamn points of these things, rather than just jumping up and down and insulting people when they think they have found a mistake. The issue here is the constitutional problems of this decision re: the commerce clause as it relates to other cases. Or did the nitpickers not even read the cited material?
It is the reality of court opinions -- a court cannot apply the principles of a constitutional judgment solely to the facts of the case before it. They tried in Bush v. Gore, and as an excellent diary noted the other day, even when the Supremes specifically say "don't apply this to other cases" it gets applied.
So, what has Judge "I am so conflicted I should have recused myself" done? Despite his protestations to the contrary, he has ruled against the case of Gonzales v. Raich, which allowed for the federal government to overrule state governments on medicinal marijuana laws (California wanted it, feds said no.)
How does Judge Doofus deal with that reality? By making up a standard that does not exist.
The ruling in Gonzales says that the commerce clause is quite expansive, and can...well, I don't need to summarize. Here is the finding:
Our case law firmly establishes Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic "class of activities" that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e. g., Perez, 402 U. S., at 151; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 128-129 (1942). As we stated in Wickard, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id., at 125. We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude. When Congress decides that the "`total incidence'" of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class. See Perez, 402 U. S., at 154-155 (quoting Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256, 259 (1927) ("`[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented it may do so'")). In this vein, we have reiterated that when "`a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.'" E. g., Lopez, 514 U. S., at 558 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968)).
The standards are this: (When it says new era, it is talking about the evolving meaning of the commerce clause)
Cases decided during that "new era," which now spans more than a century, have identified three general categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce power. First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150 (1971). Second, Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate 17*17 commerce. Ibid. Third, Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Ibid.; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 37 (1937). Only the third category is implicated in the case at hand.
This regulation can take place even when it creates a financial burden on an individual. In the Wickard case cited by the court in Gonzales, it states:
The effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."
All of this is pretty settled law. So, along comes Judge Doofus. He recognizes that, if he is going to strike down HCR mandates, he is in turn opening up the inability of Congress to impose federal drug laws that trump state laws. How does he deal with that? By making shit up:
(I can't cut and paste this, so here is the link.)
But the summary is this: Because growing marijuana or wheat is voluntary, this is not covered by the commerce clause. And, not doing something is not an effect on commerce, so congress is regulating something that has nothing to do with commerce.
First -- on the topic of voluntary. There is absolutely nothing in the case law about this standard. Judge McGoo is just making it up. In fact, his argument redefines Gonzales in ways that do not conform with the original decision.
Second, he has excluded all voluntary economic activity from the interstate commerce laws. Yup, growing wheat and marijuana is voluntary. So is selling hamburgers (McDonald's) Or transporting material from Canada to the United States (auto parts for Detroit) and on and on and on.
The reality here is that Judge Doofus has done backflips to rules this unconstitutional. And sure, let him be upheld. Then throw out years of case law. And California should take another swing at legalizing medicinal marijuana.