Every second, as each gallon of oil gushes from the seafloor, the greatest environmental catastrophe in American history only grows worse. Environmental and other advocacy groups are already aggressively using this horrific disaster to raise money and to advocate an end to America’s addiction to oil.
As well-intentioned as these efforts may be, neither of them will, in a timely manner, mitigate the systemic failures that led to this disaster, and without systemic reforms, another similar disaster is inevitable.
In particular, consider the federal government’s feckless efforts to regulate offshore oil development, as well as the oil industry’s own efforts to subvert and cripple that regulatory effort.
As Robert Kennedy Jr. has clearly documented in his striking piece in the Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/... the Mineral Management Service (MMS) at the Department of Interior during the Bush Administration was a cesspool of corporate influence, shady dealings, and compromised government officials.
The widely reported decadent activities of employees at the Minerals Management Service that took place during the Bush years may have been remedied by the slap on the wrist, i.e. "ethical training", which the MMS employee participants were required to complete. But I seriously doubt it.
Still, some observers knew, like I did, well before the explosion of Deepwater Horizon, that MMS needed vastly more profound reforms than a lame slap on the wrist. In fact, use of drugs and sex by MMS employees and their "client" oil companies was indeed only the small tip of a giant iceberg of corruption that undermined nearly every aspect of this failed federal bureaucracy.
One would further suppose, as I did, that a new progressive administration that came into office with the strong backing of environmental groups would have on its agenda the reform of such a blatantly corrupt agency. And to an extent, the Obama Administration did know of the past problems at MMS. The new Secretary of the Interior personally announced to MMS employees in Denver that "there’s a new sheriff in town". But addressing the deep systemic problems seemed to have stopped there.
The recent admission by the White House that the problems at MMS were not even on the agenda when expansion of OCS oil development was discussed and decided indicates a real lack of commitment to serious reform and a lack of understanding of the systemic corruption at MMS. If these issues had been addressed effectively, it is possible that expedited tough reforms in 2009 could possibly have stopped some of the regulatory ass kissing that has been a regular part of the MMS/industry relationship. It was this dysfunctional culture that enabled the oil industry to regularly skirt regulatory requirements and obviously contributed to, if not caused the failures that led directly to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
One of the reasons why reform is so difficult and why MMS is so resistant to change was clearly demonstrated to me during a personal job search last year. I was laid off in 2008 as an environmental geologist. With the contraction of the private sector, I focused on the government as the preferred employer. Last summer, I applied, and was selected as a finalist, for a key Environmental Protection Specialist position at MMS Office of Offshore Energy and Minerals Management.
The salary for this GS-13 position ranged from $87k-$113k/year. Subsequently, I was interviewed by the chief of the Environmental Assessment Branch of MMS. My MMS interview was one of the most exasperating and unprofessional experiences of my long career.
From the moment I entered the building in Herndon, Virginia, where much of MMS is located, I was surprised. First of all, nearly all of the many offices of federal agencies I’ve ever visited proudly present the agency’s logo, activities, mission and/or accomplishments in a display in the lobby. And of course, a large photo of the current President always looks down on everyone entering the lobby. No such things were there.
From all appearances, one did not know which agency, if any, was housed in the building. Beyond that, my entrance was only slightly atypical. It took the security guard about 15 minutes to finally find my interviewer’s phone number, and then for him to come and escort me upstairs for the interview.
At the outset, I was told I had to be out of the building within the hour (closing time) so I prepared mentally for a shortened interview. I noted on the interviewer’s "me wall" graduate degrees in public policy and IT, but no environmental background. Not good, I thought.
In the course of answering the interviewer’s questions, I related my experience and qualifications, which, after all, had earned me a "100" rating in the initial paper evaluation. I tried hard to make direct eye contact with the interviewer, who seemed slightly ill at ease at my directness.
In discussing the functions of the office, the interviewer told me that "this office has always been an oil and gas office", which I thought was a little strange, as if the new major initiative from the White House to develop offshore wind resources was simply not their job. Then at a critical juncture where it seemed I had established my professional qualifications, the interviewer asked me, "You're not a strong personality, are you?"
I found that question bizarre and unprofessional, but nonetheless I tried to answer it directly. In short I said, "I can be a strong personality at times, but I have a strong commitment to professionalism, teamwork and doing a job the best I can." His immediate reaction and body language demonstrated my answer was not what he wanted to hear. He quickly tried to conclude the interview, but in the few minutes remaining I insisted on walking him through my professional portfolio, which documents my solid experience and expertise in environmental management.
It was not easy maintaining his attention for just a few more minutes, especially while sensing in the back of my mind that I had already struck out! Finally, I was escorted downstairs, we shook hands, and I left the building. As is common in federal hiring, I received an unsigned e-mail notice three months later stating that I had not been selected for the position. I guess it took them awhile to find an applicant who wasn’t a strong personality!
In retrospect, besides the obvious issues highlighted by my interview at MMS, it is amazing to me that the MMS environmental office had so few, if any, environmental professionals in its senior ranks. My interviewer, chief of the Environmental Branch, and all of his superiors at that time had negligible training or experience in environmental science and stewardship, an almost unbelievable scenario for any environmental office, (a.k.a. "oil and gas office"). The lack of trained environmental professionals at the upper levels of MMS is only one of the organizational and cultural obstacles that must be addressed through effective reform.
Consider for a moment how MMS hires field inspectors. It’s easy to imagine how these inspectors work for a few years and are then hired by the oil companies they were regulating. Offshore inspectors are required to have at least one year of offshore experience, which means, in effect, a successful applicant must have oil industry experience. Further, current hiring announcements give the salary range as $38,790-$84,137. Thus, an entry-level inspector makes less than many recent college graduates, and far less than any other worker on an offshore rig. Such a low salary level only encourages turnover and re-hiring of inspectors by the industry they are supposed to regulate, which is a common practice.
Finally, of all the outcomes the American people might expect from the Gulf oil catastrophe, we must demand government accountability. While some can use this disaster for the furtherance of important political causes like climate change or fund-raising, we, the American people, deserve to have a competent, honest and effective government agency protecting our natural resources.
Many will press for the end of America’s oil addiction, the take-over of BP, jailing of the offenders, (in this case both corporate and government miscreants) and the payment by BP of all losses and liabilities. All these things may be necessary and good, and were among the things many advocated after the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
But what is most essential is the re-establishment of trust and credibility at the federal agency regulating offshore oil development. The complete reform of that agency’s oily culture is an essential precondition, a sine qua non, of reform. Until that happens, the American people will justifiably be disillusioned with their government. What’s worse is that until MMS is thoroughly reformed and re-invented, another catastrophe is just a matter of time.