Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters in Afghanistan
(Photo by U.S. Army)
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union developed the Mi-17, a new transport helicopter that could also operate as a gunship specifically for use in Afghanistan. U.S. Stinger missiles passed along to the Afghan mujahideen, some of whom later became Taliban, brought down unknown numbers of these helicopters during the 1980s. Since the breakup of the U.S.S.R., Russia has produced the Mi-17 for export. One
client: the United States and NATO. Some Mi-17s were bought for use in Iraq. The Pentagon spent $648 million restoring 31 old Mi-17s for the Afghan National Army. And now, despite significant congressional complaints that the U.S. military-industrial complex ought to be getting any helicopter contracts, it's
agreed to terms on a $321.5 million deal for 21 new Mi-17s.
Meanwhile, on the ground, the Pentagon continues steadily adding to the number of elite special forces it has in Afghanistan ahead of the limited withdrawal of troops slated to begin in July. Another 100 Army Rangers, whose role is to hunt and kill specific members of the Taliban:
Although it is rarely discussed in Washington, the Afghan conflict has morphed into a shadow war that pits small teams of so-called “hunter-killers” from the Rangers, the Army’s Operational Detachment-Delta, the Navy’s Seal Team Six, and other secretive U.S. units against plain-clothed militants from the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other Islamist fighting organizations.
“We have stepped up the tempo of precise, intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders,” Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in late March. “In a typical 90-day period, precision operations by U.S. special-mission units and their Afghan partners alone kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders.”
Maj. Wesley Ticer, a spokesman for the military’s Special Operations Command, said there were roughly 7,000 Special Operations troops currently operating in Afghanistan, up more than 50 percent from a couple of years earlier. A senior military official said small numbers of Special Operations personnel would continue to flow into Afghanistan even after the surge troops began leaving this summer.
Petraeus's view, and that of retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal with whom Petraeus is said to maintain constant contact, is that he can crush the Taliban with the help of these targeted attacks on its leadership at all levels. The problem is that the evidence from the field has not agreed.
Last year was supposed to mark the beginning of a new era in the 10-year-old U.S. war in Afghanistan. And it was. More Americans were killed there than in any previous year. Civilian casualties rose 66 percent. The reach of the insurgents, which had once been confined mostly to the south and east, spread into most of the rest of the country, with Taliban shadow governors operating in 33 or the 34 provinces. There were more roadside bomb attacks. Washington's fractious relationship with Hamid Karzai reached a new low. In December, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that its access for providing humanitarian aid in Afghanistan was the worst it had been in 30 years.
Three weeks ago the ICRC reported that "life for ordinary Afghans has become untenable ... with security seriously deteriorating in the first two months of the year due to a surge in Taliban attacks and accidental NATO strikes on civilians."
Putting hopes for success on more Russian helicopters and more elite soldiers is the same kind of approach adopted by all the outsiders who have ever thought they could reshape Afghanistan. It's called magical thinking.