Today is the eve of the first of two days of voting in the runoff election for the presidency of Egypt between Ahmed Shafiq and Mohammed Morsi. While not officially endorsed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF, the military junta which has ruled Egypt since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak), Shafiq is nonetheless SCAF's candidate, a remnant (feloul) of the ancien régime. Morsi is the candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, the conservative political wing of Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood). Despite claims to the contrary, neither candidate substantively represents the political or social interests of the revolutionary coalition of reform-minded Egyptian liberals and leftists; rather, the candidates are representative of a lengthy and deep pre-revolutionary struggle between what Robert Springborg has termed “the mongoose” (SCAF's authoritarian military-security state, characteristic of Egyptian power since formal decolonization) and “the cobra” (the Ikhwan's vision of a civilian state rooted in the mass-politics of moderate Islamism.) In this sense, the names and personalities of the individual candidates, Shafiq and Morsi, hardly matter. The issues involved in this runoff election are considerably deeper than personality, considerably more existential. In either result, the liberalizing impulses amongst the revolutionaries have been deferred; we merely await the fallout from the lingering pre-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle between the military-security state and the Ikhwan.
Anyone who has followed this intermittent "Egyptian Elections" series will likely note a change of tone and style. I have striven to this point not to introduce too much of my own perspective on these elections, but rather provide variously detailed background information and updates on the electoral process, the candidates, polling data, results et cetera. Events and legal decisions of the past several days (documented by campionrules in a diary yesterday) have however pushed me past my own tipping-point, and so I ask your forgiveness for the uncharacteristic editorialization.
TWO RULINGS, ONE DECREE: THREE NAILS IN THE COFFIN OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) yesterday issued two rulings which together have thrown these elections, Parliament and the Constituent Assembly (charged with drafting the new constitution) into complete disarray. First, the SCC ruled that the Political Isolation Law banning former high-ranking officials from Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) from seeking office for ten years is unconstitutional. This ruling was not unexpected: the law was essentially crafted in a post facto manner to eliminate one particular candidate, Omar Suleiman, and the law effectively stripped political rights absent criminal charges or judicial process. There were, of course, idle hopes that the law, if ruled constitutional, could be applied to nullify the candidacy of Ahmed Shafiq.
Second, the SCC ruled that the portion of the Parliamentary Election Law (as amended in September 2011) related to the election of ~ 1/3 of parliamentarians by individual candidacies is unconstitutional. In a nutshell, the SCC found that the system discriminated against independent candidates. Again, the ruling was not entirely unexpected or unprecedented. The impact of this ruling, however, is all-encompassing. If the elections resulting in the current composition of Parliament are unconstitutional, then Parliament will be dissolved; if Parliament is dissolved, then the Constituent Assembly negotiated by parliamentarians to draft the new constitution has no standing; if Parliament is dissolved and if the Constituent Assembly has no standing, then legislative powers and the authority to issue a constitutional declaration governing the formation of a new Constituent Assembly revert to SCAF.
The third decision made public on Wednesday was not an SCC ruling, but a decree from the Ministry of Justice giving extraordinary search, seizure, arrest and judicial powers over civilians to military officers, military police, members of various military intelligence services and military courts. Though promised by the Minister to be temporary, intended to apply only until a new constitution is ratified, this decree marks clearly the reestablishment of the "State of Emergency" laws which were only lifted on 31 May.
WHAT IT MEANS
Let's boil this down, shall we? SCAF's military-security state now controls the executive, the legislative, the authority to draft the new constitution and it has been afforded extraordinary powers to surveil, arrest and punish their opposition.
It is, to quote from Full Metal Jacket, "a world of shit."
There has been a flurry of accusations of collusion between SCAF and the SCC over the past 36 hours or so. Personally, I'm not convinced. The SCC rulings do in their own ways make sense, and do operate from precedent, but the timing of these rulings on the penultimate day before the runoff certainly favor SCAF in effect, if not intent. As for the decree from the Ministry of Justice expanding military powers over the civilian population, tantamount to a declaration of martial law, let us not be naïve. I do not know whether SCAF feels so assured of Shafiq's victory that they are playing their hand early, or whether they feel that their collective back is up against the wall of a potential Morsi victory, but this decree is an aggressive defense of the military-security state status quo as it has existed since 1967 and, arguably, since 1952.
WHAT OF THE IKHWAN?
The probing question over the last month or so, since it became clear that the runoff election would pit Shafiq against Morsi, has been whether SCAF and the Ikhwan have been working in smoke-filled backrooms behind the staged political appearances to come to some form of power-sharing arrangement. Issandr el-Amrani, whose writings at The Arabist and Egypt Independent (and elsewhere) on both the deep structures and mundane political events since last February are an absolute must-read, takes a long-view of the relationship between the Ikhwan and Egypt's military leadership, past and present. El-Amrani wrote this yesterday, before the SCC announcements:
All of this confirms my take on the Morsi-Shafiq runoff: it's an existential crisis for the felool — the remnants of the NDP, establishment power networks, parts of the security services — which stand to lose all access and be subject to further judicial reckoning if Morsi wins. But it's not as much as an existential crisis for the MB if Shafiq wins, because they don't believe Shafiq will institute a crackdown against them (others will suffer first), because they think they will retain control of parliament, and because they think ultimately they can deal with Shafiq and SCAF. I think that's a miscalculation, but it's coherent with their past behavior and deal-making inclinations.
I certainly agree with el-Amrani that the Ikhwan, through their Freedom and Justice Party, has been seeking political accommodation and reform rather than confrontation and revolution. That has been their
modus operandi for generations. My inclination is to believe that the cumulative effect of the SCC rulings (dissolving the FJP plurality in Parliament and on the Constituent Assembly) together with the Ministry of Justice decree is to void whatever deal was struck. With el-Amrani, I see a strategic miscalculation here on the part of the Ikhwan.
Robert Springborg, also taking the long-view on this relationship, sees the potential for role-reversal by which, given time, the "soft" political, social and economic power of the Ikhwan might defeat the "hard" power of the security-state.
The present cohabitation of the military and the Brotherhood, based as it is on the transient supremacy of the former, is therefore inherently unstable. A preemptive strike by the generals, or even by a colonel, as was done in the past, would be unlikely to succeed this time around. And failing such a strike, time is on the side of the Brothers. This time, they will be the victorious mongoose and the military the defeated cobra. Egypt is thus at a historic turning point as profound as when the republican era replaced the colonial one.
In time? perhaps. In this present election? Doubtful. Security interests are likely to prevail and even if Morsi wins it is now abundantly apparent that SCAF has the tools at their disposal to neuter said victory.
WHAT OF THE REVOLUTION?
I've been rooting for the liberalizing and democratizing efforts of the noble souls of the revolution since this began last February, I really have. Yet through all of this I've also not forgotten the unresolved historic tension in Egyptian political society between the military-security state and the mass-politics of the Ikhwan.
The Tahrir Revolution, as such, is moribund.
The existential conflict between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood must play itself out first. Whether the game will be long (the cobra and the mongoose) or short (the cat and the mouse) is the only real question at this point.
My thoughts and prayers are with my Egyptian friends and colleagues.