She says it best right here:
...but you're not allowed to document it. Like your "special secret"with the "Inappropriate Uncle" division of the federal government, that you're not allowed to share with other grown-ups (they'd just accuse you of lying and trying to get attention anyway).Look at that hardened criminal!
I feel violated but it's obvious my daughter brought it on herself. I mean, look at her all dressing like a potential terrorist/drug trafficker. People who roll in on hot pink wheelchairs, wearing a gingerbread coat and clutching a stuffed baby lamb, are just begging to be harassed.
The Transportation Security Administration is just like most law enforcement in the United States, yes I am aware they do not fit a specific definition, a group of employees fed distrust and paranoia on a daily basis. So them terrifying children under the guise of 'following orders' is not unexpected yet still quite disappointing.
So as of at least 2010 the TSA had still not managed to figure out what many other countries customs services had discovered long ago. Screen the passengers selectively. But the TSA started by Bush cronies still hasn't discovered others problem solve humanely.
(PDF)In May 2010, GAO issued a report titled ‘‘Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger
Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges’’ in response to a Con-
gressional request to review the SPOT program. In preparing the report, GAO ana-
lyzed ‘‘(1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment,
(2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s
effect on aviation security.’’
GAO issued the following findings associated with its review:
Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the process of vali-
dating some aspects of the SPOT program, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide
without first validating the scientific basis for identifying suspicious passengers
in an airport environment. A scientific consensus does not exist on whether be-
havior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes,
according to the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences. According to TSA, no other large-scale security screening program
based on behavioral indicators has ever been rigorously scientifically validated.
DHS plans to review aspects of SPOT, such as whether the program is more
effective at identifying threats than random screening. Nonetheless, DHS’s cur-
rent plan to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether behavior de-
tection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment
who pose a security risk. For example, factors such as the length of time BDOs
can observe passengers without becoming fatigued are not part of the plan and
could provide additional information on the extent to which SPOT can be effec-
tively implemented. Prior GAO work has found that independent expert review
panels can provide comprehensive, objective reviews of complex issues. Use of
such a panel to review DHS’s methodology could help ensure a rigorous, sci-
entific validation of SPOT, helping provide more assurance that SPOT is ful-
filling its mission to strengthen aviation security.
Additionally, GAO found issues relating to performance metrics, data integrity,
and reach-back capabilities as well.
TSA is experiencing implementation challenges, including not fully utilizing the
resources it has available to systematically collect and analyze the information
obtained by BDOs on passengers who may pose a threat to the aviation system.
TSA’s Transportation System Operations Center has the resources to investigate
aviation threats but generally does not check all law enforcement and intel-
ligence databases available to it to identify persons referred by BDOs. Utilizing
existing resources would enhance TSA’s ability to quickly verify passenger iden-
tity and could help TSA to more reliably ‘‘connect the dots.’’ Further, most
BDOs lack a mechanism to input data on suspicious passengers into a database
used by TSA analysts and also lack a means to obtain information from the
Transportation System Operations Center on a timely basis. TSA states that it
is in the process of providing input capabilities, but does not have a time frame
for when this will occur at all SPOT airports. Providing BDOs, or other TSA
personnel, with these capabilities could help TSA ‘‘connect the dots’’ to identify
Although TSA has some performance measures related to SPOT, it lacks out-
come-oriented measures to evaluate the program’s progress toward reaching its
goals. Establishing a plan to develop these measures could better position TSA
to determine if SPOT is contributing to TSA’s strategic goals for aviation secu-
rity. TSA is planning to enhance its evaluation capabilities in 2010 to more
readily assess the program’s effectiveness by conducting statistical analysis of
data related to SPOT referrals to law enforcement and associated arrests.