The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Two crucial determinants as to whether good intentions lead you to the road to hell is who you are on the road with, and what the intentions of those you are on the road with are.
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From the summer of 2011 to the fall of 2012 Syrian rebel forces were able to achieve a degree of military success on the ground in Syria, and this was extensively covered in the media.
What was generally not covered though were the problems that existed and were developing in the Syrian opposition and rebel forces.
The Western recognized political opposition, the Syrian National Council (SNC), was rapidly losing its shine.
Domination of the organization by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and wealthy exiles who often had questionable motives, constant infighting and jockeying for position and for the patronage of countries and groups who provided financial support, and the inability and/or unwillingness to become a broad-based organization which included the multiple and dissimilar opposition groups located both outside and inside Syria were causing many to question its legitimacy and effectiveness.
It was also becoming obvious that the FSA had minimal real control over the various rebel groups in Syria.
The money, supplies and weapons which were being provided to forces which were directly commanded by the FSA were, at the SNC's insistence, being distributed by the SNC, which often made it difficult for the FSA command to exert effective command and control over its forces.
While at the same time large amounts of money and weapons were also being provided by various donors directly to rebel groups. Some were part of the FSA, some were affiliated with the FSA, some were affiliated with the FSA in name only, and some were completely independent of the FSA. FSA membership or affiliation didn't matter because the money and weapons went directly to whichever rebel groups each donor favored.
This made it possible for many independent radical Islamic rebel groups to be formed. Several of them were able to become quite powerful because they had access to significant amounts of money and weapons and because they were accountable only to those who provided the money and weapons. They cooperated with other rebel groups but only when, where, and how they wanted to.
There are assertions that radical Islamic rebel groups were able to become the largest rebel groups because the West did not supply arms to the SNC and FSA.
This is not true.
Rebel groups which were to become the nucleus of the FSA when it was established in July, 2011 began operating in Syria in May, 2011, and the FSA began cooperating with the SNC only in December, 2011.
The SNC did not begin requesting that arms be supplied by Western government to the FSA until April, 2012 and even then the SNC was split on this subject.
It was also in May, 2011 that radical Islamic fighters, both Syrian and non-Syrian, began to be noticed. In September, 2011 radical Islamic rebel groups began to attract notice and in December, 2011 they began making public announcements.
It is also important to note that FSA rebel groups, which were generally formed and commanded by deserters from the Syrian army, were often more selective in who they allowed to join them. While the radical Islamic rebel groups would accept, and encourage, essentially anyone who came to join.
There was also one more factor which caused radical Islamic rebel groups to grow more quickly and larger than other rebel groups. Much of the secular, liberal Syrian opposition support a peaceful negotiated resolution, so generally those who support the secular, liberal Syrian opposition did not join armed rebel groups.
So by the spring of 2012 large powerful radical Islamic rebel groups already existed.
In the summer of 2012 it was also becoming apparent that conditions in many of the areas which the rebels controlled were deteriorating rapidly. Each rebel group had holds over different areas. Those in control changed from village to village and in towns and cities from neighborhood to neighborhood or even from street to street.
This not only made it difficult for the local residents, it also made it extremely difficult to distribute humanitarian assistance, and the need for this assistance was growing quickly as agriculture, the local economies, and healthcare systems collapsed.
It was also becoming evident that some rebel groups were more interested in conquering than in liberating as they imposed their own views on the areas under their control and often seized whatever they wanted.
As the SNC was losing its legitimacy, and as the FSA was growing more and more irrelevant, and as conditions in areas under rebel control were deteriorating to potentially disastrous levels, the Friends of Syria Group began to insist that a new broad-based opposition group be formed, and that a new effective military command be established, and that a system to administer the areas under rebel control be developed.
After months of difficult negotiations the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NOC) was established on November 11, 2012. In spite of all the fanfare it has turned out to be a slightly more broad-based SNC, or SNC version 1.1.
Then on December 7, 2012 the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was created. Since most of the rebel groups who are affiliated with the FSA have a distinct Islamic orientation the SMC is dominated by the SNC and Islamic members, but it does have secular commanders whose main purpose seems to be that of being an acceptable face which can be presented to the media and Western politicians.
At the insistence of Western countries much of the money, supplies and weapons being supplied to rebel groups now has to go through the SMC. The idea was that by controlling the supply of money, supplies and weapons a centralized command structure could be imposed and that radicalization could be checked. After a short period of some success early this year things began to fall apart.
It seems that some of the donors who had grown used to supplying whatever they wanted to whomever they wanted are not happy with the new system and have picked up their marbles and gone home. Many rebel groups who are also used to doing whatever they want have also decided that they would rather go it alone.
The US is trying to keep the SMC alive with $125 million worth of non-lethal aid, and France and Britain are talking about sending military supplies and weapons this month or next month, but France is notorious for talking big and giving little.
Donor fatigue also seems to be developing. Donors who believed promises of quick easy victory but now receive increasingly frequent pleas for ever-increasing amounts of money are growing weary.
In March, 2013 the NOC announced that the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) had been established to administer the areas in Syria under rebel control with the Sharia legal code which the SNC/NOC have been preparing. During the negotiations for the establishment of the NOC, the SNC was allowed to prepare this legal code as part of the deal to get them to agree.
So far the SIG seems to have done very little if anything and problems within the NOC will probably prevent much from happening for at least some time.
One thing that the SIG might be useful for is to be the front for the sale of oil by the Syrian opposition (in reality by rebel groups), which some EU countries have decided to allow.
The oil is controlled by the Syrian Kurdish groups and by radical Islamic rebel groups (primarily al-Nusrah) and the income from the sales might be used as an inducement to keep al-Nusrah placated, although how well that will work out is very questionable.
Now almost one year later we have:
a new but not improved Western recognized political opposition with which the Friends of Syria Group is saddled even though the groups efforts to establish a better organization were constantly thwarted and outmaneuvered,
a new but unpalatable military command with which the Friends of Syria Group is also saddled - unpalatable to the West because most of its members are people who Western leaders would not want to be seen in the same room with, and unpalatable to many donors and rebel groups because one of its main purposes is to unify and centralize command and control and to keep radicalization in check,
an in-name-only interim government for which the Friends of Syria Group now has only indirect responsibility, but the Sharia legal code which has been prepared for this interim government, with Western support, may become a political liability for Western governments in the future,
a generally secular and liberal opposition in Syria with which the Friends of Syria Group continues to refuse to establish a dialogue, and
a growing number of people in Syria who have seen what the Western recognized political opposition and the rebel groups have done and are doing and are saying "Thanks, but no thanks."