(OK folks, I need some help with this one. This chapter was up to date when it was written in the early 90's, and I've added some stuff to it over the past few days, but I still would like some more info on current US chemical protective equipment. So if you've been deployed lately and/or have been recently trained in NBC protection, I'd like to hear from you. What protective equipment were you given, what detection and warning devices did you get, how did they work, and how well? Any info is appreciated.)
In my previous life as a freelance writer, back in the 80's and early 90's, I did a lot of magazine articles on chemical weapons, particularly about the "binary nerve gas" controversy during the Reagan Administration, and the proliferation of chemical weapons in the 1980's to countries like Syria, Libya, Iraq, Thailand, and others. I had a couple sources in the Pentagon and in disarmament groups like SIPRI. I started work on a book manuscript on the subject, but in 1993, when the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed, interest in chemical weapons plummeted, and I never finished it. I stored it on a floppy disk and left it in a drawer.
Well, today, given the renewed interest in chemical weapons, I decided to look for it, and found it. So I spent the day today reading through it, doing some research to update the parts that need updating, and preparing it to be published.
So what I am going to do is post the entire rough draft manuscript here, in a series of diaries. I hope it will provide some useful background info on CBW that people can keep in mind when reading about the situation in Syria. And I'd also like to recruit some editors--I'd appreciate any feedback from folks, especially about parts that might not be clear or are hard to understand.
Previous parts of manuscript here:
Introduction
http://www.dailykos.com/...
One: The History of CBW
http://www.dailykos.com/...
Two: The Debate Over Binary Chemical Weapons
http://www.dailykos.com/...
Three: Genetic Engineering and CBW
http://www.dailykos.com/...
Four: CBW Proliferation
http://www.dailykos.com/...
(c) copyright 2013 by Lenny Flank. All rights reserved.
FIVE
CBW Defenses
There are two parts to any chemical or biological warfare research program. The first of these is the development of offensive weapons, either for use in direct attacks or as a means to force an attacker to operate encumbered by bulky CBW protective equipment. The second part of any CBW program is the development of protective equipment which allows troops to withstand a chemical attack and continue their tasks. In reality, much more resources have been poured into developing new weapons than in developing better defenses against them.
In the US, the level of protection against CBW attack is known as MOPP (Mission-Oriented Protective Posture). This has four graduated levels of protection, from MOPP 0 (no chemical gear at all) to MOPP 4 (full protective CBW suits and gear). For the most part, the equipment used to protect troops against chemical weapons has not changed very much since the First World War.
The first defensive measures against chemical attack were utilized by the French and British against German chlorine and phosgene attacks. These relatively ineffective gases could be rendered harmless simply by soaking a rag in ordinary baking soda (sodium bicarbonate) and tying it over the nose and mouth. This crude measure was replaced by the “Black Veil” gas mask and respirator developed by the British. The Black Veil was itself later replaced by a rubber hood that fit completely over the head. Clear acetate eyeholes allowed limited vision, and a wad of chemically-treated cotton in the mouthpiece gave protection against the inhalation of gas.
Later, the British gas mask was improved by attaching the mouthpiece of the mask to a filter canister with a length of hose. The canister was usually worn on the back, and it filtered and purified the air before passing it on to the mouthpiece.
This basic design did not change much in the next eight decades, and modern gas masks are not much of an improvement over the World War I mask. The Russian ShM gas mask, still in use by many countries, uses the same hose and canister arrangement as its 1917 predecessor, and allows this hose to dangle in front like an elephant’s trunk, where it is often damaged. The clear eyeholes of the Russian mask limit vision and lack corrective lenses for distortion, making tasks such as firing a rifle awkward. Only officer’s versions of the ShM carried a built-in voice transmitter, making communications difficult. The mask also contains no openings through which the infantryman may eat or drink without taking off the mask.
American gas masks presented similar problems. US-supplied troops used to carry the old M-17A1 gas mask, which was designed in the 1950’s. It was unventilated, hot and uncomfortable, and restricts the soldier’s vision and hearing.
To replace the old M-17 series, the Army began investigating a new mask designated M-30. Research and development on the mask was well underway when it was discovered that the soft lenses used in the M-30 tended to quickly become fogged in use, obscuring the soldier’s vision. As a result, the Pentagon withdrew its plans for the new mask, modified it to use hard lenses and redesignated it the M-40.
The new mask was an improvement over the old M-17. The M-40 contains a side transmitter and microphone to allow the wearer to communicate by telephone or radio, and also is equipped with a quick change “screw-on” filter which can be replaced without removing the mask. (The older US masks must be removed in order to change the filter.)
The M40 was introduced in the early 1990’s; a few years later it was itself being phased out in favor of the MCU-2/P mask. Both of these, however, had a flaw—the silicone seals were vulnerable to corrosion by mustard or lewisite gas. The Pentagon tried to correct the problem by adding a “second skin” of silicone, but both masks were replaced in 2009 by the new M50 gas mask, which does not have this problem.
With the introduction of the vesicant gases and the nerve agents, the gas mask ceased to provide full protection. To defend against these weapons, the infantryman must now be completely encased in a protective anti-contamination suit. No effective CBW suit was available during the First World War, and while the crude gas masks protected the eyes and lungs, nothing prevented the vesicants from attacking exposed skin. As a result, most of the war’s gas casualties consisted of painful and debilitating skin burns. Fatalities usually resulted only if a soldier mistakenly took his mask off too early and inhaled a lethal dose.
The most widely-produced of the anti-contamination suits was the British Mark III, which was in use by most NATO forces throughout the Cold War. The Mark III is constructed of a latex-bonded nylon that has been coated with a liquid fluorocarbon. The inner layer of the suit is impregnated with activated charcoal to filter out chemicals and to kill lethal microbes. The suit has a shelf life of about five years, and the charcoal filter lasts for about 24 hours of exposure. After that time, a fresh suit must be put on.
The US Army developed a new CBW suit during the 1980’s, called the Battle Dress Overgarment. The outer layer of the BDO consists of an air-permeable bonded material covered with a coating of polyox foam. The inner layer consists of polyurethane foam impregnated with activated charcoal. Butyl rubber gloves and overboots complete the outfit. Each suit, along with an M-40 mask, weighs about ten pounds.
The standard Soviet-designed CBW suit known as the OP-l, still used by Russia today, is made of butyl rubber with a chemically-treated undergarment. The rubber barrier keeps gas and microbes out, but also keeps body heat in. In temperatures of 70 degrees or more, it can only be worn for a half an hour before heat stress causes the wearer to pass out. In cooler temperatures, the suit is safe for up to four hours.
The air-permeable US suits, by contrast, allow the body heat to escape more easily, and can be worn for up to an hour even in temperatures of 75 or 80 degrees. In cooler temperatures, the suit can be worn for almost two weeks. When worn for this length of time, however, the suit presents an awkward problem—it has no provisions for the safe elimination of body wastes.
Other problems with American CBW suits were far more serious. The butyl rubber gloves provided with some suits are highly flammable, making them a severe danger to aircraft maintenance crews. The gloves also limit manual dexterity, making it difficult to operate a computer terminal or other electronic equipment (upon which modern armies are growing more and more dependent). The boots take fifteen minutes to put on, making them useless in the event of a surprise or pre-emptive chemical attack. The foam inner layer of the garment also tends to deteriorate quickly when worn.
In the event of an all-out chemical war, moreover, these CBW suits will probably not have been available in the quantities that would be needed. Throughout the 1980’s, US forces in Europe routinely faced shortages of CBW suits, alarms, detectors, treatment packs, gloves and boots. Troops complained to the GAO that their “limited ability to resupply required amounts of chemical defense equipment was an impediment to sustaining combat operations in a contaminated environment.”
To defend themselves against a possible Iraqi chemical attack, US troops in Desert Storm were issued three CBW suits and one gas mask each. In the event of a sustained Iraqi chemical attack, however, these would not have lasted more than a few days, and new suits would have been necessary nearly every day.
In 1997, the US began using the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JLIST) as its standard chemical protective suit, phasing out the BDO. It replaces the polyurethane foam with a bonded layer of carbon spheres, making it more durable, and has an air-permeable outer layer, making it more effective at dissipating sweat and body heat. It can reportedly be worn between 45 days and 120 days, and its charcoal filters can provide up to 24 hours protection in a contaminated environment.
Until the First Gulf War, the training of US troops in the use of chemical defense techniques had been lax. In late 1983 and 1981, the Marines and the Navy carried out a joint exercise to simulate an enemy’s use of nerve gas to prevent an amphibious landing. The GAO reported:
“The Marine Corps Personnel were found to be knowledgeable about defense procedures and doctrine, but they had not been trained under full protective conditions for extended periods of time. Navy personnel demonstrated a notable lack of mission performance experience under simulated chemical warfare conditions. Medical decontamination procedures were not properly accomplished, because medical and damage control personnel and litter bearers did not understand chemical defense procedures or the requirements for handling casualties in chemical warfare.”
The exercise was such a disaster that the Navy was forced to make a “major recommendation to increase training individual and organizational CW defenses.”
The US Army’s standard chemical-proof shelter from the Cold War, the M-5l, was designed to be used as a medical shelter in forward areas. It is small and difficult to set up, however, and can only hold twelve people at a time. The Pentagon designed the shelter to be mobile, but never had any veicle that was designed to move it. The US army in Europe, the GAO reported, “found the M-51 so deficient that it stopped putting it in the field, despite the fact that there are no other overpressure shelters in the Army’s inventory.”
In the late 80’s, the Pentagon began producing a larger version of the M-5l that could hold 40 people and have twice the storage capacity. Another shelter, known as the M-20, consisted of a large inflatable plastic liner that could convert an existing building into an overpressure CBW shelter.
The Russians provided full CBW protection to their armored fighting vehicles. All tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles made by the Soviet Union had a system of filters and seals to protect against chemical attack. When the vehicle is “buttoned up”, an overpressure system prevents chemical agents from entering, allowing crews to operate without their bulky CBW suits.
Most British and German tanks and IFVs had a similar overpressure system. Until the 1980’s, however, US armored vehicles relied solely on the system that had been designed for World War II. Each vehicle contained a central filter through which air was passed before channeling it to four ventilated faceplates for the crew.
In 1986, the Army began to produce M1A1 tanks with overpressure systems and seals, which allow the crew to operate in a “shirtsleeves” environment as long as the tank is buttoned up. NATO tactics, however, called for the tank commander to survey the battlefield through the open hatch of the tank. This ruined the effectiveness of the overpressure seals and, therefore, while in combat, the tank crew would still rely on the ventilated faceplates.
The early M1A1 used a central filter to draw air from the tank’s turbine and purify it before passing it on to the crew members. To combat heat stress, the US CBW system pumped cooled air from the tank turbine and circulated it through the crew member’s suit. Tank crews could operate for long periods using this system. However, the central filter had to be changed after each exposure, and the tank had no on-board room for storing replacement filters. Any disruption in the resupply of filters made the entire system useless.
Chemical and biological attacks are silent, invisible and difficult to detect, and may be lethal in as little as one minute. A sensitive and reliable early warning system was, therefore, crucial to any CBW defense.
The early detection equipment at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where chemical weapons were stored, included several cages of live rabbits. When the rabbits began to drool or go into spasms, workers at the arsenal knew there was a gas leak and hurried for their masks. The detector used by the Defense Department through the 1980’s, the M-8, was less crude but no more trustworthy than the rabbits. It worked by passing an electric current through a vapor containing the enzyme cholinesterase. In the presence of nerve gas, the current was altered, triggering the alarm. The M-8 was not very reliable, however, and has been known to mistake truck exhaust for lethal chemical weapons. It also required servicing every twelve hours to have its expensive wet chemistry system replaced.
To combat these problems, the Pentagon replaced the M-8 with the M-43 detector. The M-43 worked by passing samples of air over a radioactive source to ionize the molecules. If the device detects ions of chemical agents, it triggers an automatic alarm. The system was capable of functioning unattended for longer periods than the M-8 and did not need the refill kit. The M-43 was, however, radioactive, and could not be used in an enclosed area or inside a building.
To try to develop a biological detection system, the Pentagon worked throughout the 1960’s on a device known as FIREFLY. This apparatus used the chemicals luciferin and luciferase (the chemicals used by lightning bugs) to test for the presence of the organic compound adenisone tri-phosphate (ATP). If ATP was present, in the form of biological pathogens, it reacted with FIREFLY to produce a flash of light. The device was originally developed by NASA to test for life in outer space. The system was dropped when it proved to be unable to distinguish between lethal BW agents and the myriads of harmless bacteria in the atmosphere. In addition, researchers realized, a large number of potential BW agents were viruses, which do not contain ATP and would not register on FIREFLY.
At about the same time, the Pentagon began to investigate the possibility of detecting biological agents using fluorescent antibodies. When they are bombarded with a specific chemical anti-serum, certain elements of biological organisms glow under ultraviolet light. Using experimental models of this device, researchers were able to find and identify the presence of Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis organisms within four hours of dissemination, and tularemia organisms were found in less than three minutes. Later research focused on using genetically-produced monoclonal antibodies in this device.
After the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention outlawing BW weapons was signed, attention on BW detection was allowed to lag. Research programs focused on chemical detection, with nerve gases receiving the most attention.
In the late 1960’s, the Pentagon began work on a project known as LOPAIR, which used a thin beam of infrared energy to detect the presence of chemical weapons. The energy beam was reflected from a mirror into a detector, which measured the intensity of the beam. Since CBW agents absorb infrared energy, changes in the beam intensity would indicate the presence of chemical weapons. Later, researchers modified this system to use laser beams instead of infrared, and the Navy installed these systems on its ships in the late 1980’s.
The Army, at the same time, introduced a new detector called the M-256. The detector uses various coded chemicals in a series of vials. Each vial is broken and examined, with a change in color indicating the presence of a specific chemical agent. The Defense Department had high hopes for the new device, but it proved to be too slow and too insensitive.
Another system, the M-22, used a ground probe to test soil and exposed surfaces for chemical contamination, an ability which is crucial in determining when troops may safely remove their protective equipment. During Desert Storm, the US borrowed ten Fox CBW reconnaissance vehicles from Germany to carry out these tasks, and afterwards purchased a supply of small handheld probes known as the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) from the British.
Research is currently being done on a new CW detection system using a “laser photo-acoustic spectrograph (LPAS)”. In this system, a laser beam connected to a microphone detects the tiny changes in acoustics caused by the presence of even extremely dilute chemical-laden air.
Individual US and NATO soldiers in the 1980’s were provided with the BxICAD detector, which used sophisticated electronics to test the air for chemicals and beeped an alarm when it finds them. The device was about the size of a pack of cigarettes and could detect several different agents. Individual troops were also issued the “Dutch Button”, a small device that was pressed against the filter of a gas mask. Different colors indicated the presence of chemical agents, and also let the soldier know when it was safe to remove his mask.
In the late 1960’s, individual NATO troops were provided with specially-treated patches that were sewn onto their uniforms. These were designed to change color in the presence of chemical agents. In 1990, US troops in the Persian Gulf were provided with treated tape that changed colors when chemical agents contacted it. Small detector kits known as TRAINS would then be used to determine which particular agent was being encountered. Neither of these pieces of equipment, however, could detect biological agents.
Today, US troops use the M4A1 Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD), a battery-operated device that can be hung on a belt or pocket, and provides up to 75 hours of monitoring. US armed forces also now have the M93 reconnaissance vehicle, introduced in 1998, which is the US version of the European Fox vehicle. It uses several different sensors to monitor for the presence of chemical agents.
The only certain protection against biological agents is the inoculation of the population with vaccines. In the 1960’s, the Defense Department developed a vaccine gun capable of treating 700 people an hour, but the logistical problems of vaccinating 250 million people are as insurmountable today as they were then. And, researchers realized, there are such a wide variety of potential biological agents available that it would be impossible to vaccinate the population against every one of them.
One of the focus of genetic engineering research in the 1980's was to attempt to develop and mass-produce vaccines using monoclonal antibodies, and hope to be able to mass-produce vaccines. Between 1981 and 1990, the US spent over $370 million on vaccines for potential biological weapons. During the First Gulf War, US officials, believing Iraq to possess stocks of botulin toxin and anthrax spores, vaccinated all of their forces in the Gulf against these agents. The botulin vaccine used, however, was an old one utilized primarily by lab workers, and was known not to be 100% effective. The anthrax vaccine also required a number of separate treatments to give immunity, and caused harmful side effects.
On the Cold War battlefield, Soviet-supplied troops carried the MSP-18 treatment pack, which contained antidotes to several nerve agents, blood gases and vesicants. NATO and US-supplied troops carried small injectors loaded with atropine, the only known antidote for nerve gas poisoning. Atropine is itself a deadly poison; it is the active ingredient in poison hemlock and in nightshade. The drug works by lowering the amount of acetylcholine in the body, and thus counters the effects of the cholinesterase inhibitors. Soldiers who accidentally inject themselves with atropine, during a false alarm for instance, run the risk of dying from their mistake. Even those who successfully combat nerve gas poisoning with atropine will take at least a week to recover.
After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, American researchers found quantities of Soviet-made Egyptian nerve gas antidote that had apparently been improved by the Russians. The Egyptian injectors contained the chemicals trimedoxime, atropine and benactyzene. Believing the Soviet formula to be more effective than plain atropine, the US copied it and provided “TAB” injectors to its troops. By 1980, however, the Pentagon found that, although it worked well against G and V agents, the TAB formula was hallucinogenic and produced “severe neuro-behavioral side effects”. The US dropped the TAB formula.
The Department of Defense then turned to the treatment of nerve gas victims with oximes, which seemed to improve the effects of the atropine antidote. In the 1980’s, the Army began to add the drug 2-PAM-chloride to its atropine. This seemed to improve the effects of the atropine, but it was found that both Tabun and Soman are resistant to oxime treatment.
In the mid-1980’s, British researchers uncovered the drug pyridostigmine which, when used as a pre-treatment before possible exposure, proved to be effective in increasing the action of atropine and oximes against all of the known nerve agents. US troops in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm were provided with pyridostigmine tablets to protect them against possible Iraqi nerve gas attacks. The use of pyridostigmine, however, requires a high dosage (three tablets per day) and may produce undesirable side effects, including crippling intestinal cramps.
The final problem to be overcome in CBW defense is the decontamination of attacked terrain, vehicles and equipment. While nonpersistent agents such as GB or botulin toxin dissipate after a few hours, persistent chemicals and biological pathogens remain lethal for long periods of time, and contaminated surfaces must be detoxified if they are to remain safe and usable.
The Soviet Union developed a number of methods for sanitizing contaminated trucks or armored vehicles. The most widely used was the TMS-65 decontamination vehicle, which consisted of an old jet aircraft engine mounted on a five ton truck. The hot exhaust of the jet engine is used to spray decontamination fluid onto attacked equipment and vehicles. The US had a similar vehicle known as JEDSS, which used a small jet engine to spray a decontamination solution onto contaminated surfaces.
For decontaminating small pieces of equipment, the US used the M-11 handheld spray tank, which holds a little over a quart of decontaminating solution. Another portable device designated M-13 pumped water from a source such as a river or a swimming pool and sprayed it at 100 pounds per square inch and 120 degrees Celsius.
These small sprayers used the Defense Department’s Decontaminating Solution Two (DS-2). Navy versions use a solution of hypochlorite. The primary solution used by the Army was a concoction known laconically as Super Tropical Bleach (STP). STP was used in the M-12 decontamination vehicle. The replacement for STP was a German emulsion known as C8. C8 was not as difficult to work with as the Bleach, but it still required large amounts of water for use. It took approximately 320 pounds of decontaminating solution to clean one tank or armored vehicle.
All of these decontaminating solutions, moreover, were harsh and corrosive. They would strip the paint from any vehicle, and could not be used to clean vehicle interiors or any apparatus containing electronic equipment.
In the late 1970’s, researchers at the Illinois Institute of Technology purified an enzyme from squid flesh which had uses in CW decontamination. The enzyme reacts with water to hydrolyze the compound diisopropyl phosphoro flouridate, which is a component of both GB and Soman nerve gas, breaking it into harmless chemicals. The enzyme is not used up during the hydrolization process, and can be recycled and re-used.
The M-15 system was intended to use hot air to clean delicate equipment which might be damaged by water-based cleaning solutions, but technical troubles caused the program to be cancelled. The Air Force investigated the possibility of avoiding water by using using freon gas as a decontaminant for electronic equipment.
Today, individuals and small pieces of equipment are decontaminated using an absorbent powder made from chloride of lime and magnesium oxide.