"Every problem is 85% management."
-- a truism from W. Edwards Deming
So here's a name for you:
Qassim Suleimani.
In Persian/Farsi that's written قاسم سلیمانی. He has commanded troops at war steadily since the early 1980s. One tough problem after another. It is safe to say that among ground combat officers, he is respected as one of the best of their profession and a man of personal bravery. He builds army units on a wide range of models and he uses them effectively.
Suleimani, 57, holds rank as Major General in the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard. His job in this life is that he leads Qods, which is the unit that handles operations outside Iran.
Today Qassim Suleimani is in Baghdad.
He has been leading troops in combat since his 20s. He rose during the Iran-Iraq War to command a sector of the war front. His reach today extends to the Lebanese Hizb Allah and his own 10,000 Iranians fighting to maintain the Shi'ia government in Syria. He has snuffed drug operations and opposed the Sunni Taliban in a number of actions. He has an office in Damascus.
General Suleimani fielded most of the Shi'ia commando forces spread across Syria. He is damned for his work there by the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, the United States as a terrorist!, and by Switzerland. Apparently these worthies prefer the prisoner-executing "rebel" friends of the Saudis, his opponents in Syria.
Why the United States tagged him a "terrorist" is unclear. The Saudis likely want him assassinated, so that's a cover for it. CIA doing Saudi murders is nothing to surprise anyone.
By reputation Suleimani is incorruptible, hard working, politically inventive. In several respects he is Iran's General Giap.
The PR story coming out of Baghdad has General Suleimani "organizing a defense for the capital." There is possibly some truth to that.
What we can observe is that he is replicating an old Qods effort in Lebanon. That is, he has organized a recruiting drive that is putting Shi'ia men into militias and consolidating these units to one Army of God. This will be a permanent multi-tribal Iraqi Hizb Allah. These units owe primary loyalty to their army and to their religion's Supreme Leader and to his designees, not to their tribes.
Over the rest of this summer General Suleimani, Qods, and his Iraqi Shi'ia allies will be building a massive army to exterminate the rag-tag crew of pickup truck bandits called ISIS/ISIL. Come early fall this year, Suleimaini's new Hizb Allah will have 500,000+ reasonably trained militiamen, to which will be added 200,000+ reliable Iraqi army and 50,000 Qods shock troops.
Plus tanks. Tanks vs. Pickup Trucks. That's the fight once General Suleimani gets things organized.
That will be the start: cleaning out northwest Iraq. Kill the 8,000 to 15,000 bandits. From there, look at the map.
Distance from Baghdad to Damascus: 754 kilometers, 469 miles. A long day's drive by armored column, if General Suleimani didn't intend to kill every Sunni fighter in the country along the way.
He has at least 10,000 Qods officers and commandos in Syria now, plus parts of the Lebanese Hizb Allah, so throwing 250,000 men with full modern weaponry up there to end that fight will be the Keep It Simple Stupid opportunity.
For more on who, what, when, the Shi'ia Crescent, and how and why follow BTF.......
There was a time when Clausewitz called Napoleon the "god of war." And no one argued. From 1796 to 1809, Bonaparte fought battles at all odds, on all terrains, under every shade of weather and beat everyone. He understood everything.
What is about to happen with General Suleimani may well rival anything that the French Emperor achieved, plus setting in historical concrete the resulting religious and political changes.
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Accounts vary on how many Qods combat troops Suleimani has brought with him. Iraqi sources say it's 500. Wire services had it at 2,000 last week. Needs be, Suleimani has 50,000 experienced troops he can pull over to Baghdad in at most three days.
Meanwhile, for whatever reason and on whoever's orders, the Iraqi army has pulled back from the northern part of their country. The tanks were not deployed. Same for armored cars and motorized artillery. Local infantry were not supported. No counterattack was launched. ISIS pickup trucks are roaming free through the area, looting and murdering at will. There's all of 8,000 to 15,000 of them with shoulder-set RPGs for heavy weapons.
ISIS/ISIL is not a combat army. Despite what you read they are bandits, dreaming it's 622-632 AD -- first years of the Hajira -- and they're pillaging for The Prophet. Salafi madness using formerly unemployed mercenaries.
First step to respond, back in Baghdad, General Suleimani is organizing an Iraqi Hizb Allah. These Shi'ia militias are getting small arms and ammunition provided by Iran, mostly the ubiquitous Russian AKs. Going forward they will not be fighting each other or bothering with the local Sunni tribes. Assuming that this is going to work like Lebanon, they will be able to function as part of a real army.
In sum, Qassim Suleimani is at the point of using the ISIS/ISIL crisis to rewrite history; he is changing the ending of the 1980s Iran-Iraq War. Took him a while. Took short-sighted blunders from his opponents.
The al-Shaheed Memorial stands, of course, commemorating 350,000 Iraqis who died in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. But now that 1980s Iraq has disappeared. What exists for Shi'ia Iraqis is the ISIS/ISIL crisis. Slaughters have returned its Shi'ia citizens to sect and tribe.
Add 200,000+ reliable Shi'ia troops from the Iraqi army. Add 50,000 Qods shock troops. Iraqi Shi'ia officers will play strong roles, but you know who is going to run the show. That is an army.
Where they are headed, eventually, is Syria.
And just in passing, Persia has not controlled Iraq since 627 and the Battle of Ninevah in northern Iraq. The professionals speak Farsi and Arabic, but it's just the professional class. Look for that to change.
Wiping out ISIS/ISIL in Iraq is going to be a light tune up for Suleimani's army. Pencil that in for fall of 2014. The bandits get to wreck things for a couple of months. Then they are just robbers riding around in pickup trucks. The big tactical problem for Suleimani will be to close off the Syrian border so he can kill every last one of them using his main force.
At 57, Suleimani has years going forward. He can establish momentum conquering Northwest Iraq in 2015, drive on into central Syria with at least half of his mixed Iranian-Iraqi force, kill the ISIS/ISIL Sunni irregulars in Syria to the man for retaliation through the rest of 2015 and 2016, and link up with his own Lebanese Hizb Allah and the Assad forces at Damascus in early 2017.
No surprise if Qassim Suleimani ends up ruling Greater Syria by 2018. (Bashar Assad is an eye doctor. At best.) Suleimani is a field combat officer, he will have obtained Just Retaliation, and these are Islamic cultures top to bottom.
Religion matters. I'm not saying they're going to do this, just that they can do it. They have the power. After conquering central and western Syria, Suleiman can then work with Tehran to forcibly convert the 80% of the country that is Sunni over to Shi'ia. It is even possible to generate a mix of Shi'ia and Sunni -- anything to break ties with the Sunni Salafi mad men in Saudi Arabia.
Tehran can do anything they want after killing these Sunni irregulars. Not to say they will. But they can.
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The West insists on tagging these Sunni irregulars as "al Qaeda connected." There is no al Qaeda. There was once a War on Terror as sloganized by the Bush propagandists, but Obama won that one decisively. There's a few CIA web sites claiming to be al Qaeda.
America has suffered all of 10 real terrorist killings in the last 5 years. 3 at Boston, 3 in Algeria, 4 at Benghazi, Libya. Obama has won that war. That's against Reagan with 675 dead, Clinton with 444, and Bush43 with 3,206.
Yeah, Obama has destroyed al Qaeda. There's phony stats out there claiming terrorism is on the rise worldwide. They're taken to counting local war casualties and genocide deaths, which is a major change to the body count rules. Plainly the Muslim inflicted genocides in Africa are genocide, not al Q terrorism.
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Suleimani has an opportunity looking at the current situation in Iraq to change the map of the Middle East for ever. Thing is, he is also the best man to match this opportunity. For minds such as Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei and His Eminence Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, he may be seen to be God's gift to punish the unrighteous.
And from Tehran, even well outside religious circles, a deep "Thank you!" is due the Saudis for their blunder joining forces with Israel after 9/11 to get America to destroy Saddam Hussein.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia got what they wanted from 2002 on. KSA eliminated their greatest Sunni rival. Saddam was hanged. Death came to 1,961,000 other Muslims, but from the Saudi point of view these people were mostly Shi'ia. In sum, Operation Iraqi Freedom destroyed what was best of Iraqi society.
So now -- with Qassim Suleimani as their opponent, not the paranoid Saddam Hussein -- KSA is at the point of seeing Iraq go over to Shi'ia government with Iranian military on site permanently.
The Saudis thought they were big, big winners getting rid of the modernizing Ba'athists.
(How was that bottle of champagne, guys ??)
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Now if the Greater Syria concept settles in, the Shi'ia in Tehran will have a new area, a Shi'ia Crescent as wide as Turkey to rule as they please.
As rich lazy people, Saudis do not care. Charity to Iraq has been minimal. One thing Saudi money does do is generating suicide bombings with an emphasis on the Shi'ia pilgrimages and Holy Days.
The name for Suleimani's organization translates as "Jerusalem Force." Considering his achievements so far, maybe it's well that he has identified other goals. Changing the Shi'ia/Sunni balance, at worst, could slow Islam's modernization.
Lastly, in this reading of the military tea leaves, the Salafi bandits called ISIS/ISIL go straight to Hell. There's that.
Any new comments ???
P.S.
1. “CENTCOM in 2010: Views from General David H. Petraeus,” Institute for the Study of War, www.understandingwar.org/press-media/webcast/centcom-2010-views-general-david-h-petraeus-video (accessed January 4, 2011).
2. “Tashkil-e Sepah-e Quds” [Establishment of the Quds Force], Payam-e Enghelab (Tehran), December 12, 1981, 3. Before this date, the Quds Force was known as the Unit of the Liberation Movements of the IRGC. See, for example, “Zarourat-e Tashkil-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami” [The Necessity of Establishing the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps], Payam-e Enghelab (Tehran), February 16, 1981.
3. “Iran’s Efforts in Iraqi Electoral Politics,” Embassy of the United States (Baghdad), November 13, 2009, http://46.4.48.8/... (accessed January 12, 2011).
4. Kimberly Kagan, Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War and The Weekly Standard, May 2006-August 20, 2007), 3, www.understandingwar.org/files/reports/IraqReport06 .pdf (accessed January 13, 2011).
5. “Iranian ‘Interference’ in Iraqi Political Affairs Reported,” Al-Nahdah (Baghdad), March 9, 2004, quoted in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts on March 12, 2004.
6. UN Security Council, Resolution 1747, March 24, 2007, www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf (accessed January 4, 2011).
7. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” news release, October 25, 2007, http://web.archive.org/... .state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm (accessed December 9, 2010).
8. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism.”
9. Majid Malek, “Aya Ostoureh-ye Ma Bar Bad Rafteh?” [Is Our Myth Busted?] Inja Kerman Blog, October 15, 2009, http://injakerman3.persianblog.ir/... (accessed December 9, 2010); and Mohammad-Hadi Shojaee, “Ganjan, Avallin Rousta-ye Shahid-dadeh-ye Kerman” [Ganjan, the First Village in Kerman with a Martyr], Kerman Khabar, May 17, 2010, www.kermankhabar.com/archives/blogpost-1778-20.html (accessed December 9, 2010).
10. For more on the sociology of Qom, see Mehdi Khalaji, Natani [Without Corpus] (Berlin: Nashr-e Gardun, 2004).
11. Yahya Safavi, Moghadammeh-I Bar Joghrafia-ye Nezami-ye Iran [An Introduction to Iran’s Military Geography], vol. 3 (Tehran: Sazeman-e Joghrafia-ye Nirouha-ye Mossallah, 2001), 181-82.
12. “Ilat va Ashayer-e Ostan-e Kerman” [Tribes and Nomads of Kerman Province], Niksalehi, www.forum.niksalehi.com/showthread.php?t=45762 (accessed December 9, 2010).
13. “Suleimani, Ahmad--Khaterat,” Defae-e Moghaddas, April 8, 2007, www.sajed.ir/new/commandant/373-1388-10-24-08-59-36/3289.html?start=2 (accessed January 14, 2011).
14. “Sardar-e Shahid Ahmad-e Suleimani” [Martyred Commander Ahmad Suleimani], Defae Moghaddas-e Ostan-e Kerman, June 21, 2010, http://kerman.sajed.ir/... (accessed January 18, 2011).
15. “Suleimani, Ahmad--Khaterat.”
16. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs], Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Tehran), June 7, 2005, www .jomhourieslami.com/1384/13840317/13840317_jomhori_islami_10_jebheh_va_jang.HTML#matlab_ (accessed December 9, 2010).
17. Majid Malek, “Aya Ostoureh-ye Ma Bar Bad Rafteh?” [Is Our Myth Busted?]
18. “Zheneral-e That-e Ta’ghib-e Amrika va Esrail” [General Wanted by the United States and Israel], Central Clubs, December 6, 2010, www.centralclubs.com/topic-t73819.html (accessed December 9, 2010).
19. Ibid.
20. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs].
21. Hossein Fatemi, “Shahid Seyyed Reza Kamyab” [Martyr Seyyed Reza Kamyab], Gonabad Noor, April 4, 2009, www.gonabadnoor.com/ax-news/item/295-%D8%B4% D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8% B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%A7% D9%85%DB% 8C%D8%A7%D8%A8.html (accessed December 9, 2010).
22. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs].
23. “Elamiyeh-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami” [Announcement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps], Kayhan (Tehran), May 29, 1979, quoted in Hossein Yekta, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran Va Eragh [Iran/Iraq War Chronology], vol. 1 (Tehran: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, Markaz-e Motaleat Va Tahghighat-e Jang, 1999), 336.
24. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs].
25. Majid Malek, “Aya Ostoureh-ye Ma Bar Bad Rafteh?” [Is Our Myth Busted?]
26. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs].
27. “Khaterat-e Shahid Ali-Reza Mohammad-Hosseini Az Avvalin Hozourash Dar Mahabad” [Martyr Ali-Reza Mohammad-Hosseini’s Memoirs from His First Time in Mahabad], Akbar 313 Blog, December 31, 2007, http://akbar313.ir/... (accessed December 9, 2010).
28. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs].
29. Fatemeh Hosseini, “Tarikhcheh-ye Lashkar-e 41 Sarallah” [History of the Forty-First Sarallah Division], Asr-e Khoun, March 28, 2009, http://asrekhoun.blogfa.com/... (accessed December 17, 2010). See also “Khaterat-e Shahid Ali-Reza Mohammad-Hosseini Az Avvalin Hozourash Dar Mahabad” [Martyr Ali-Reza Mohammad-Hosseini’s Memoirs from His First Time in Mahabad].
30. Hadi Nokhi and Hossein Yekta, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran Va Eragh [Iran/Iraq War Chronology], vol. 1 (Tehran: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 1996), 164.
31. Ibid. 722.
32. Hossein Behzad and Ali Golbabayi, Hampa-ye Saegheh [Along with the Thunderbolt] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Soureh-ye Mehr, 2008), 772.
33. “Sardar Qassemi: Gomnami Khasteh-ye Shahidan-e Ma Boud” [Commander Qassemi: Being Unknown Was the Wish of Our Martyrs].
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Majid Malek, “Aya Ostoureh-ye Ma Bar Bad Rafteh?” [Is Our Myth Busted?]
37. Hossein Ardestani, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh [Iran/Iraq War Chronology], vol. 52 (Tehran: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 2003), 257.
38. “Zheneral-e Taht-e Ta’ghib-e Amrika va Esrail” [General Wanted by the United States and Israel].
39. “Iran Measures to Combat Drug Trafficking and Addiction,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) (Tehran), December 27, 1988, quoted by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts on December 29, 1988.
40. “Zheneral-e Taht-e Ta’ghib-e Amrika va Esrail” [General Wanted by the United States and Israel].
41. “Taghdir-e Farmandeh-ye Sepah Az Amaliat-e Lashgar-e Tharallah Dar Moghabeleh Ba Ashrar” [The Guards Chief Thanks Tharallah Division’s Operation against the Highwaymen], news release, November 23, 1994, www.rezaee.ir/vdcf .jdeiw6dtcgiaw.html (accessed January 2, 2011).
42. “Sepah Bad Az Jang” [The Guards after the War], Aftab News (Tehran), August 24, 2008, www.aftab.ir/articles/view/politics/iran/c1c1219558369_sepah_p1.php/%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7% D8%B2-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF (accessed January 2, 2011).
43. “Drug Smuggling Gang Broken Up, Weapons and Other Material Seized,” IRNA (Tehran), November 20, 1994.
44. “Nagofteh-ha-ye Rahim-e Safavi Az 10 Sal Farmandehi-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran” [Rahim Safavi’s Untold Stories from Ten Years as Revolutionary Guards Chief], Islamic Revolution’s Documents Center, January 11, 2010, www.irdc.ir/fa/content/8583/default.aspx (accessed December 19, 2010).
45. “Entesab-e Sardar-e Sartip Rahim-e Safavi Be Darajeh-ye Sarlashkari Va Farmandehi-ye Koll-e Sepah” [Promotion of Brigadier General Rahim Safavi to Major General and Chief of the Guards], http://farsi.khamenei.ir/... (accessed December 19, 2010).
46. John R. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007), 131-42. See also Rezai’s call for the deployment of Muslim forces in Bosnia: “Muslim Volunteer Forces Should Be Deployed in Bosnia,” Tehran Times, April 21, 1994. For a Turkish account of the Shia/Sunni rivalry in Bosnia, see Yayya Konuk, Cihad’in Mahrem Hikayesi/Bosna’dan Afganistan’a [Secret Account of the Jihad/From Bosnia to Afghanistan] (Istanbul: Elestyay, 2007), 84-86.
47. Tschanguiz Pahlavan, Afghanestan--Asr-e Mojahedin va Baramadan-e Taleban [The Era of the Mujahedin and the Rise of the Taliban] (Tehran: Ghatreh Publishing House, 1999), 29.
48. “Jang-e Ma Ba Teleban Barandeh-i Nakhahad Dasht” [Our War with the Taliban Will Not Have Any Winner], Tous (Tehran), September 2, 1998, quoted in Sadegh Zibakalam, Aks-ha-ye Yadegari Ba Jameeh-ye Madani [Memorial Photos with Civil Society] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Rowzaneh, 1999), 261.
49. Douglas Jehl, “Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for 9 Diplomats’ Death,” New York Times, September 11, 1998.
50. Ibid.
51. “Iran Army Forces Parade near Afghan Border,” CNN, November 1, 1998.
52. “Iran, Tajikistan Review Expansion of Defense Cooperation,” IRNA (Tehran), January 21, 1999.
(Forgive us, Father Alfoneh, for we know not from footnotes.)