In light of Trump’s statement that the US is going to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with the stated reason that the Russians have been in violation of the treaty for several years, I searched for the Democratic position on this issue. I found two Senate Bills that are of interest, one Democratic and one Republican. Neither bill has progressed beyond the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The two bills are:
S.1476: Sponsor: Sen. Cardin, Benjamin L. [D-MD] (Introduced 06/29/2017) (read the text here)
S.430: Sponsor: Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR] (Introduced 02/16/2017) (read the text here)
I’m reproducing some of the text below the fold, for those who find the bills tl;dr, and highlighting some text.
The Democratic Bill: S.1476:
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The INF Treaty, which entered into force on June 1, 1988, banned the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from possessing ground-launched nuclear and conventional missiles and launchers retaining ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (km).
(2) Implementation of the INF Treaty led to the dismantlement of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles between the United States and the USSR, representing a major reduction in both nuclear arsenals and evidencing key efforts to safeguard the United States and its allies from nuclear weapons.
(3) Since concerns regarding a noncompliant ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) were first raised in 2008, the Russian Federation has developed and tested a GLCM (currently designated “SSC–8”) that has a range violating the fundamental stipulations of the INF Treaty.
(4) In 2014, the United States labeled the Russian Federation to be “in violation” of the INF Treaty in the Department of State Report entitled, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”, and has maintained Russia’s noncompliant status in each subsequent report due to the development and testing of the SSC–8.
(5) During a March 2017 hearing at the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Paul Selva, asserted that “we believe that the Russians have deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty” and that such a system poses “a threat to NATO and to facilities within the NATO area of responsibility.”
(6) When examining the response options at the United States disposal, the Department of Defense stated in its 2016 Plan for Military Response Options to Russian Federation Violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that “Russia’s return to compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty remains the preferable outcome.”
(7) United States allies in Europe do not currently have sufficient defensive articles and material to properly defend against the Russian Federation’s new GLCM.
(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) protect the United States interests and assets abroad and our allies from the burgeoning threat stemming from Russia’s development of a new GLCM that violates the INF Treaty;
(2) promote and expand cooperation and mutual defense with European and Asian allies through—
(A) strengthening the United States offensive posture and defensive infrastructure on the European continent; and
(B) enhancing military to military coordination with key allies in Europe and Asia;
(3) pressure the Russian Federation to abide by its commitments regarding the INF Treaty and discontinue engaging in hostile activities regarding its missile program by—
(A) diplomatically engaging the Russian Federation within the Special Verification Commission;
(B) articulating that the Russian Federation is in material breach of the INF Treaty; and
(C) communicating to the Russian Federation that if they remain in non-compliance with the INF Treaty by January 1, 2019, the United States will—
(i) take military actions to improve our European deterrence and defense capabilities, including the development of a conventional variant of the Long Range Stand-off system (LRSO);
(ii) assist United States allies in improving their air- and sea-launched conventional strike capabilities by facilitating sales of the extended-range variant of the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM–ER) and sea-based Tomahawk cruise missile; and
(iii) deploy limited defenses against cruise missiles to protect key alliance assets; and
(4) not precipitously withdraw from the INF Treaty without fully consulting and coordinating with European allies.
(a) In general.—Except as provided under subsection (b), no funds may be made available or expended for any action that effects the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty.
(b) Exception.—The restriction in subsection (a) shall not apply—
(1) after Congress has received the report required by section 4(a); and
(2) 90 days after the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty is in the vital national security interests of the United States, including the reasons for such certification and an explanation of how the INF Treaty would prohibit the President's intended actions.
The Republican Bill, S.430
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of State reports entitled, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”, all stated that the United States has determined that “the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles”.
(2) The 2016 report also noted that “the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty”.
(3) Potential consistency and compliance concerns regarding the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM have existed since 2008, were not officially raised with the Russian Federation until 2013, and were not briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until January 2014.
(4) The United States Government is aware of other consistency and compliance concerns regarding Russia actions vis-à-vis its INF Treaty obligations.
(5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, including the President, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have raised Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty to their counterparts, but no progress has been made in bringing the Russian Federation back into compliance with the INF Treaty.
(6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, correctly stated, “A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with … It can’t go unanswered.”.
(7) The Department of Defense, in its September 2013 report, Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that it has multiple validated military requirement gaps due to the prohibitions imposed on the United States as a result of its compliance with the INF Treaty.
(8) It is not in the national security interests of the United States to be legally prohibited from developing dual-capable ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, while Russia makes advances in developing and fielding this class of weapon systems.
(9) A material breach of the INF Treaty by the Russian Federation affords the United States the right to invoke such breach as grounds for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part.
SEC. 4. Compliance enforcement regarding Russian violations of the INF Treaty.
(a) Statement of united states policy.—It is the policy of the United States as follows:
(1) The actions undertaken by the Russian Federation in violation of the INF Treaty constitute a material breach of the treaty.
(2) In light of the Russian Federation's material breach of the INF Treaty, the United States is legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or in part for so long as the Russian Federation continues to be in material breach.
(3) For so long as the Russian Federation remains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the United States should take actions to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance, including—
(A) providing additional funds to the activities and systems identified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1062);
(B) the establishment of a program of record for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a maximum range of 5,500 kilometers; and
(C) aggressively seeking additional missile defense assets in the European theater to protect United States and NATO forces from the Russian INF Treaty noncompliant Ground Launch Cruise Missile.
(c) United States actions.—If the determination of the President contained in the report required to be submitted under subsection (b) is that the Russian Federation has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of any missile described in subsection (b) during each of the periods described in subsection (b), the President shall—
(1) suspend the application of the INF Treaty with respect to the United States; and
(2) notify the other state parties to the INF Treaty that the Russian Federation is in material breach of the INF Treaty and of the decision of the United States to suspend the application of the INF Treaty with respect to the United States.
PS:
- Non-compliance/abrogation of a nuclear treaty is extremely serious; a threat to the future of humanity just as deadly as climate change.
- In the absence of other input, I assume that the US policy responses to Russian violation of the INF treaty lie between the actions outlined in the Democratic and Republican bills above.
- If Trump does what the Democratic bill says — “certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty is in the vital national security interests of the United States, including the reasons for such certification and an explanation of how the INF Treaty would prohibit the President's intended actions” — then I will take it that he is acting in accordance with the national interest, even though he is Trump.