Fool's errand (a.k.a. Israel/Palestine Peace Plan).

For easier permanent reference and discussion I'm including this peace plan, from the "Breaking the Rules, Making the Rules", thread.

Davinci suggested I post it as a diary entry for easier reference. So here it is.

Along with it I'm including some comments made of it, and my replies, in the form of a FAQ.

Some more detalis have been added here, as well.

I wrote the first, much shorter version, originally on Tacitus. Consider this version 0.3. Comments and flames of all kinds are welcome. Any real peace deal will have to absorb much worse than that. I will try to answer good-faith critics and ignore the rest. Remember this is written in the spirit of a set of ideas. I am in no position to do otherwise, and I understand there is foolishness in even attempting to write such a proposal.

But ideas do pop into my head for reasons beyond me, and in any case I don't feel anybody else is doing much better. It seems to me that people who throw rocks at tanks or who build 20-foor high walls have been out of ideas for a long time.

The Plan

Final Status

1. Form a Commonwealth of two states, with common currency, tariffs, external trade agreements, banking system, several major holidays, airspace, etc. Very roughly, an EU level of integration. Currency notes and other Commonwealth symbols would make no reference to religion or historical figures, and the Commonwealth should be secular by definition. As with the EU, each state would have their own seat at the UN, flag, capital, etc.
2. The highest authority of the commonwealth would be a seven-member council, made up of two representatives each from Israel, two from "Palestine", one from the US, one from the EU, and one from the Arab League. The Palestinians and Israelis have veto power over all decisions. The international members would not have veto power either individually or as a block, hence ultimate sovereign authority resides with Israelis and Palestinians acting together.
3. Israel's government would remain the same as now. Its council members would be appointed however they choose to work it out. The main difference would be that Israel would cede control of airspace, the central bank, and international customs and border control (which is not the same as military monitoring) to the Commonwealth authority (remember they have veto power over it). Most local laws in Israel proper would not be affected.
4. Palestine's government would presumably be an offshoot of the Palestinian authority, with a similar structure. Appointment method of Commonwealth Council reps by whatever method suits them.
5. All new Council members must be unanimously approved by the existing body (i.e. no Sharon or Arafat to muck things up). They are meant to be low-key ambassadors of their respective countries, not major political figures.
6. Israeli territory would be equivalent in land area from the 1967 "green-line" borders, except for Old Jerusalem (East and West) and some other key spots, which would become Commonwealth areas (sort of like Federal Districts). At first, a UN or NATO security force would be put in place in these zones, and eventually a Commonwealth security force would be formed, perhaps 5 to 30 years down the line. Local police would first operate by neighborhood ethnicity, and eventually mix. Jerusalem could be the Commonwealth's capital, but not Israel or Palestine's.
7. Egypt would cede or sell 1500 to 5000 square km to Palestine (0,1% to 0,5% of its total land area, or at most 7% of the Sinai Peninsula. The West bank has 5,600 sq. km.), adjacent to Gaza. Existing (small) populations wishing to move would be amply compensated, as would Egypt (maybe Egypt could hold the Arab League's spot on the council, hence reducing some unpredictability) with cash, trade benefits, debt relief, technology, etc. This would decompress existing Palestinian population densities, and particularly Gaza crowding. For better border or road geometry/topography, some land swaps with Israel could be arranged.
8. Three sets of laws would the exist: Commonwealth (think Federal or EU), Israeli Local, and Palestinian Local. Local laws would be subject to Commonwealth approval or Commonwealth "constitutionality".
9. Automatic right of return to any point in the Commonwealth to all original Palestinian refugees and first-generation descendants, as well as later generation descendants that can show at least 50% Palestinian lineage (or either a patrilineal or matrilineal line of descent. Conversely, there would be automatic right of settlement to all Jews to any point in the Commonwealth.
10. Citizenship, and hence voting, is by lineage rather than birth, regardless of where you live in the Commonwealth (not much different from Europe, except there would be no choice). Only people born to mixed parents could choose citizenship when they become adults. People born to parents with no Jewish or Palestinian heritage would inherit their parent's citizenship. Anybody may apply for either Palestinian or Israeli citizenship, to be granted at the discretion of either country. Income-based taxes would be paid based to the government you are a citizen of, sales or VAT taxes, municipal, property, and car taxes would be paid to the place of residence.
11. Each nation retains the right to manage its own armed forces, based only in national territories. Palestine would have a 50-year waiting period before having armed forces beyond police level, with maximum parameters established in the Commonwealth founding treaty in a disarmament section. Palestine would be a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, bioweapons treaties, and others (landmine treaty, etc.), as a prerequisite.

In exchange, Israel would commit to joining all these treaties within 50 years. However, Israel could obtain 10-year waivers from the Nuclear treaty under certain pre-defined circumstances. To guard against the case that those circumstances might arise after Israel disarmed, Israel could hold some weapons partly disassembled in a "trust" in the US or other verifiable and trusted party, and hence re-arm in an emergency. the waiver circumstances could basically be that a hostile Middle-Eastern power has acquired nuclear weapons or has left the Non-Proliferation treaty.

12. Interstate crimes or legal conflicts between citizens and host states would be subject to Commonwealth law and judiciary, usually on appeal from the local legal system.
Commonwealth law would guarantee human rights as defined by the UN charter and related conventions and treaties (no hand-chopping, stoning, etc.), which both states would fully subscribe to as a prerequisite to the agreement. Both countries would be ICC (International Criminal Court)members.
13. Neither state could leave the Commonwealth without unanimous approval from the council (which would then dissolve itself). Unilateral withdrawal would be equivalent to a declaration of war.

The Reasoning

Except for point 11 (Military) the scheme is absolutely symmetrical on paper. A basic requirement for a treaty to be seen and sold as fair.
In practice, the Commonwealth Council would frequently break 2 + 1 vs. 2 + 1, with the deciding vote being the EU, which stands somewhat in the middle but is, after all, a part of the West and hence can be expected to support basic Western values such as democracy, human rights, a degree of economic freedom, etc. However, the Semites could also block the foreigners by joining forces at 2 + 2, something that may eventually happen and be much-celebrated if it ever does.

To tighten things up a bit, the EU and Arab League votes could be held by specifically approved countries, for instance France for the EU (as the UK would be seen as a mere proxy for the US), and Egypt or maybe Jordan for the League (as both have peace treaties with Israel).

In this scheme, no amount of population growth by either side changes local government structure or composition of the council. Hence, right of return is not a threat to the state of Israel. Not only that, but enshrining the principle of right of return actually affirms the very right of Jews to settle in the entire Commonwealth.

This said, it is evident that a large influx of Palestinians to Israel could cause political friction and many practical problems. This is unlikely to be severe in a practical implementation. Most Palestinian descendants would in fact not return to Israel, as migration is not such a simple thing and there would be strong financial incentives for them to settle in Palestine. This requires proper investment in Palestine be made. Nevertheless, a significant number would, and would have the right to do so. The right to live in one's homeland is a basic and universal human right. So much so that it is the founding principle of Israel itself; the idea that every Jew has a "right to return", no matter how many thousands of years have passed.

Other aspects of Palestinian (particularly in the early years) behavior, would also be subject to economic incentive, rather than legal coercion or prohibition. Israel would also have substantial initial advantages running things like the currency or the air space, though nominally in Commonwealth control, because it has the largest economy by far, and the right professionals to run things. Nevertheless, In time, true integration of Commonwealth activities would increase, but Israel would always hold its veto power to keep its interest protected. Palestinian veto use would likely be costly economically, and hence limited in the early years to extreme cases. As the arrangement matures, veto use by either side should be infrequent and mostly symbolic (but I would expect most politicians to go through the Council to exercise the veto once or twice just to prove their credentials as tough negotiators, etc.).

Assumptions:

1. There is/are one or more very large money donors to the process. Obviously the US, but the EU should match it, and some Arab states should cough up too. A lot of money has to go around to Egypt for the land, to Palestine to get them to a decent standard of living quickly (which would also slow their population growth, a potential problem even beyond the citizenship issue as the country is small by any standard), to returning refugees for settlement and incentives to settle in Palestine. Still, it should be cheaper than just one year of the Iraq war, and spread over more time ($10B a year for 10 years?).
2. Extremely favorable trade conditions are given to the Commonwealth by both North American and EU trade blocks, and others willing to participate, to fuel employment and growth, and hence political stability. People with jobs, kids, and car payments don't usually blow things up, even if the thought crosses their head, as it certainly will.
3. Both sides understand that terror attacks will continue for years, at a decreasing rate but painful nonetheless. It is likely that extreme Jewish terror groups would appear, as well. They killed Rabin for his peace efforts, they will probably try again. There is no reason to believe the more extreme Islamic fundamentalists will quit either.
4. Palestinians accept most existing settlers will stay right where they are. Only very small settlements would be "de-perimetrized" immediately (most likely never, morphing instead into conventional gated communities), but their inhabitants could choose to stay forever.
5. Negotiating points include exact border demarcation, exact amounts of monetary compensation for land, resettlement incentives, the name of the commonwealth, the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth particularly regarding jurisdiction, security arrangements, safeguards for settler communities and returning Palestinians, status of existing Palestinian prisoners and known terrorists and Israeli war criminals (Truth Commission? Amnesty? Hand over to ICC? Jail 'em all?), water and energy agreements, treaty compliance mechanisms, official languages of the Commonwealth, etc.

Principles
The main principle here is to de-link place of residence with citizenship. There is plenty of precedent for this. How many people live in one state but vote in another, for years? Quite a few. This changes the nature of the return issue, and under this approach the settlers can stay where they live as well, under the same concept. In fact, rather than treat right of return as an intractable problem, it makes it a centerpiece for both peoples: the very definition of why both Jews and Palestinians have the right to live there.

The second principle is not to partition the territory economically. The whole point of a commonwealth being that it is setup for the common benefit. This is not an option: economic integration is a basic antidote to armed conflict.

The third principle is that the arrangements be as symmetrical as possible, at least in spirit and in writing.

The fourth principle is that external intervention is required, not just for the agreement, but as a long-term fixture. Foreign officials would be needed not only in the Council, but also in the Commonwealth Supreme Court and Monetary authority board, at least.

The biggest risk lies in not physically separating the populations. Violence will be tough to control at first. It all depends on whether the scheme is in fact supported by the majorities of each side, and is not undermined for short-term political gain. Ideally, both sides would hold referendums, and both would be approved. To avoid what happened with the Greek Cypriots, the international community should clearly stipulate a high economic and diplomatic cost to either side if they voted against the peace deal.

FAQ

Q: You propose a Secular Commonwealth, but one of the biggest problems seems to be Israel's insistence on a non-secular state. (Davinci)
A: The Commonwealth would be secular. The states would be whatever they want, so long as they have periodic democratic elections of the top leadership, and they allow basic universal rights and legal protections to all legal residents (free speech, habeas corpus, right to an attorney, to travel freely, to own property, to worship, etc.)

Q: Israelis will never fold their functioning relatively prosperous state into a federation with what?  Please. (webfoot)
A: Israelis are entrepreneurial, educated, and hard-working. Nonetheless their "relatively prosperous" state is not economically viable if you take it off the life-support of US aid and favorable trade treatment. As an economic entity, there is nothing prosperous about Israel on its own, and much less in a permanent state of war.
This way, Israel does get a number of important things, right off the bat. It gets a market of 10 million rather than 5 million people. It gets a cheap labor force (which it used to use extensively till border controls gradually shut it down). It gets pumped into its economy all rather than half, of the aid which will be pumped into any peace deal by the US, Arabs, and so forth.
Economic federations are about markets and the future, not existing development. Otherwise, Mexico would never have been attractive to the US for NAFTA, yet it was. The same applies to countries such as Poland entering the EU.

Q: You want Israel/Palestine to have a central bank with US and EU members on its board? The idea is so weird I can't even  figure out where to start... (webfoot)
A: Considering the financial stake the US and EU would have, the least they can expect is to have representation in the board.
But their primary purpose would be as guarantors that the CB would not be misused to harm the interests of either side.
This is not a standard peace solution, where third parties come in to help and then go home. Here third parties would be permanent as long as needed. In fact, it already is that way. The US has been supporting Israel for decades, and we send money to Egypt as well. The EU finances the Palestinian Authority, as do many Arab nations.
This is so, because this is a conflict where the stakes are much higher than those of the actors directly involved. We are a stakeholder, and are not only useful, but have the right to have a say in this thing.
If the Israelis/Palestinians want their Commonwealth to be independent, they can always join forces and vote as a block in the Council (and win 4 to 3, since the other members don't have veto power). So long as they remain unable to come to terms with each other, they will depend on third party arbitration.