"Abstract"
George W. Bush's reaction against Clintonism wasn't just reflexive and political; it was also philosophical. He filled his Administration with strategic thinkers, mostly neoconservatives, who had big ideas about how the world should work. The most important concept was the moral sanctity of American power. The post-cold war world was unipolar; multilateral institutions like the United Nations were feckless constraints on American action. Diplomatic protocols like the Kyoto accord and the Middle East peace process were outdated as well (the protection of Israel was another basic neoconservative assumption). The response to Islamic radicalism would be strategic, as Rice said, not tactical: the Middle East would be rebuilt according to American principles, and Iraq was the key. If Saddam Hussein could be replaced by a democracy (or perhaps just a pro-American government headed by every neocon's favorite Iraqi, Ahmad Chalabi), then there would be a "benign domino effect." Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran and, ultimately, the Palestinians would be intimidated into moderation. Terrorism--which was, after all, just a tactic--would evaporate because the states sponsoring it would be transformed.
Say what?
It's actually Joe Klein saying it:
In all that big thinking, al-Qaeda was an inconvenience at best. Strategy so overwhelmed tactical thinking in the Bush Administration that practicalities of any sort--except the military details of an Iraq invasion--were bumped down the ladder to deputies. The terrorist threats that were setting George Tenet's and Dick Clarke's hair on fire in early 2001 took a backseat to "brilliant" strategic notions like responding to the Cole by "doing something about" Saddam Hussein. Even the Aug. 6 memo to the President from the CIA, which was titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in U.S.," was seen as merely "historical," although it contained the shocking information that the FBI had 70 ongoing full field investigations of al-Qaeda activity in the U.S. and that there were "patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings." Without a specific "actionable" threat, any response to the memo would have been "tactical" and possibly misguided because there was no strategic matrix. And so there was none.
The same was true in Iraq: the tactical details of the American occupation--the mind-numbing complexities of keeping the peace, turning on the electricity, negotiating with Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds--were not nearly so important as the strategic goal. Iraq was to be liberated. The rest would fall into place. Last week Bush's neoconservative strategists seemed in desperate need of a few good tacticians--obsessive bureaucrats like Dick Clarke who live crisis to crisis, who have no bigger thoughts than chasing down bin Laden or getting the lights turned on in Baghdad.
Combine this strategic thinking approach with the administration's absolute certainty that it knows what is correct - its faith-based approach to governance and .... Sometimes I get the sense that it's all about using the power of government to privatize the world.
Ok, Ok I'm not heading toward the tinfoil hat approach. However as I keep saying of late, thanks to Molly Ivins: a good reason to hate the Bush crowd is that they have elevated conspiracy theory to legitimate political thought.
Nevermind