VIAN INFLUENZA, POULTRY VS MIGRATORY BIRDS (04)
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A ProMED-mail post
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International Society for Infectious Diseases
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[1]
Date: 26 Feb 2006
From: ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>
Source: The Himalayan Times Online, 25 Feb 2006 [edited]
<http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullstory.asp?filename=6a4Ra5sa.9amal&folder=aHaoamW&Name=Home&dtSiteDate=20060225>
Wild birds not to blame for avian flu: experts
----------------------------------------------
Avian conservationists and related organizations have stated that the
logic
that migratory birds are the main cause of avian influenza is hollow.
"The
current avian flu crisis is exclusively blamed on migratory birds.
These
may not be the sole carrier of the disease in all cases. We believe
that
unrestricted movement of poultry could be a major factor in the spread
of
this disease in countries where monitoring is weak," said Dr Hem Sagar
Baral, ornithologist and chief executive of Bird Conservation Nepal
(BCN).
In a press statement, Dr Baral demanded an investigation into the
issue.
"In [the] face of lack of scientific evidence that avian flu is spread
by
migratory birds, there is a grave danger that people will take such
statements negatively against wild birds. A thorough investigation into
this is needed.
"By continuing to focus only on bird migrations, other mechanisms and
paths
for contamination are being overlooked, and effective protection
measures
are being ignored. Just because wild migratory birds were found to be
infected, they were labeled the authors of the crime. However, as in
any
normal investigation, all clues should be considered and all evidence
collected," said a joint statement issued by the United Nations
Environment
Program (UNEP) and Royal Society for Protection of Birds (RSPB).
"In the case of migratory birds carrying the virus, it would have been
noticed much earlier. Why such a hiatus if an infected bird normally
releases the virus within a couple of weeks of infection?" queried Dr
Taej
Mundkur, an ornithologist from Wetlands International, in the same
statement.
Also, there seems to be little correlation between the predominantly
north-south orientation of flyways and the southeast to northwest path
by
which the virus has spread from South ast Asia to Eastern Europe,
according
to the statement. "Why are certain countries on migratory routes not
vulnerable while others outside these corridors are being affected? In
what
other ways can the virus be spread," Dr. Mundkur asked.
"There is also a need to understand which species are carriers, and
which
ones don't contract the virus. Also, amongst those subject to
infection, it
is important to differentiate between those that do not survive, and
have,
therefore, a limited capability to spread the virus, and the
asymptomatic
carriers whose role in the transmission of the virus needs to be
further
explored," read the statement.
"The proximity of migratory birds to poultry is the outcome of
incorrect
planning and faulty development, which have caused the sharing of
important
habitats for migratory birds -- like wetlands -- between wildlife and
farms, with the obvious consequences that we are now experiencing," the
statement quoted Robert Hepworth, executive secretary to the Convention
on
Migratory Species (CMS).
Bird Conservation Nepal asked the government to follow the best
veterinary
advice concerning issues such as confinement of free-ranging flocks and
vaccination, to continue with thorough surveillance of wild birds
throughout the year, to collect as much information as possible on any
confirmed incidents, to provide sound and reliable public information,
especially concerning the risks (which remain extremely small) of
people
catching bird flu from activities such as bird watching, and to
continue to
oppose calls to cull wild birds, or destroy wetlands.
--
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>
******
[2]
Date: 26 Feb 2006
From: Mary Marshall <tropical.forestry@btinternet.com>
Source: International Herald Tribune [edited, abridged]
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/26/opinion/edgarrett.php>
Unless we act now, bird flu may win
-----------------------------------------
[This is a long and dense article. Those interested should use the
above
URL to read it in full. In it, she makes her argument on behalf of the
migratory spread threat. - Mod.MHJ]
... 1st, let's stop pretending nature is mysterious and concentrate on
what
we know. H5N1, though deadlier and potentially far more devastating
than
any other influenza seen in nearly a century, has followed a fairly
clear
set of biological predictable principles since it 1st surfaced in Hong
Kong
in 1997.
So far, the only tactics being deployed once H5N1 turns up in domestic
animals are slaughter, culling millions of animals that are suspected
of
being infected, or mass vaccination. If peasant farmers cannot afford
to
keep domestic animals indoors, away from wild birds' contaminating
viruses,
an alternative is to keep the migrating birds away from the farms.
For at least a decade H5N1 has circulated among a small pool of
migrating
birds, mostly inside China, and occasionally broken out in other
animals
and people. Last May [2005] however, more than 6000 avian carcasses
piled
up along the shores of Lake Qinghai, in central China, one of the
world's
most important bird breeding sites. Most of the dead included species
that
hadn't previously evidenced influenza infection.
The Lake Qinghai moment was the tipping point in the bird flu pandemic.
The
virus mutated, evidently becoming more contagious and deadly to a
broader
range of bird species, some of which continued their northern migration
to
central Siberia. By June 2005, Russia's tundra was, for the 1st time,
teeming with H5N1-infected birds intermingling with southern European
species that became infected before flying home via the Black Sea.
Not surprisingly, by October 2005, countries from Ukraine to Greece
were
rumored to have H5N1, but only the Romanian government responded with
swift
transparency, culling tens of thousands of chickens and ducks. Most of
the
governments in the region did not confirm their H5N1 contaminations
until
Turkey, after at least 3 months of denial, was forced on 6 Jan 2006 to
admit that the virus had infected birds in a 3rd of the country's
provinces
and had caused several human infections and deaths. Since then, we have
learned of confirmed bird and/or human H5N1 cases in Iraq, Azerbaijan,
Iran, Greece, Spain, Italy, Croatia, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia,
France,
Germany, Denmark, Bulgaria and, most disturbingly, Nigeria, Egypt and
India.
Not a single one of these countries' outbreaks ought to have been
surprises. Each of them is located along either the Black
Sea/Mediterranean
migratory bird flyway, which starts in Siberia and, at its southernmost
point, ends in Nigeria and Cameroon, or the European flyway, which
overlaps
the former, and stretches from northernmost Siberia to Nigeria.
Anybody tracking the birds could have seen it coming. Several countries
along the flyway between Saudi Arabia (which has confirmed H5N1
infections
in falcons) and Nigeria have not reported H5N1 cases, but much of the
region is North Africa's sparsely populated Sahara Desert. Egypt
reported
widespread bird infection last week, and it is likely that infected
birds
have landed along the few waterways in the area, such as the Nile, Lake
Chad and the Red Sea.
We should not be astonished to learn of H5N1 outbreaks in birds or
people
in the next few weeks in nations located along the East Africa flyway,
which overlaps with the already contaminated Black Sea/Mediterranean
one:
Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania,
Gabon,
Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi and the
rest
of the eastern African countries.
Because H5N1 has been confirmed in Nigeria, Egypt, Germany and Spain,
which
straddle the intersections of the Black Sea/Mediterranean and the East
Atlantic flyways, over the next 6 weeks, we should not be surprised to
hear
of H5N1 bird and even human cases in several northern European nations,
including Britain and Iceland.
By June or July 2006, if the biological imperatives continue to follow
their course, H5N1 should turn up in eastern Siberia, and then Alaska,
via
the East Asia flyway. It might also at that time jump from Iceland, via
Greenland, to northern Canada. Once in the Arctic zones of the
Americas,
H5N1 will be able to follow any, or all, of the 4 primary north/south
flyways that span the Americas, from the Arctic to Tierra del Fuego. It
is
in the realm of reasonable probability that H5N1 will reach the United
States this summer or early autumn [2006].
Instead of simply sitting back and watching nature take its course, the
global community should be proactive. Being ahead of the virus is akin
to
being ahead of the migrating birds.
One of the best untapped resources in this epic battle against
influenza
are bird-watchers, who are among the most fanatic hobbyists in the
world.
The major bird-watching organizations and safari clubs ought to work
with
the World Health Organization and OIE, the World Organisation for
Animal
Health, to set up Web-based notification sites, where birders could
report
sightings of groups of dead birds, and the movements of key migrating
species.
Ornithologists and climate experts should immediately sit down with
pandemic planners and virologists, creating lists of known H5N1
carriers
and plotting their most likely global movements. As the birds appear in
new
regions of the world, birders and professional wildlife surveillance
personnel should issue alerts, which should be swiftly confirmed and
form
the basis of government response.
When carrier species are sighted in a region, swift action should be
taken
to minimize contact between the wild birds and their domestic kin. In
such
a way, it might be possible to limit avian deaths to susceptible wild
birds, such as the dying swans of Europe.
[Byline: Laurie Garrett, International Herald Tribune: Laurie Garrett,
a
senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, is
the
Pulitzer Prize-winning author of "The Coming Plague."]
--
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>
[Mobilizing amateur ornithologists ("birders" in North America) and
professionals to monitor, count, log and plot arrivals of migratory
species
and to collect sick and dead birds makes sense. This would certainly
add
some harder data when analyzing what is and is not happening.
Retrospective
studies are academically interesting, but getting out ahead of any such
migration is better, whether or not infected birds are or are not
found.
Then, there should be reliable data plus, with luck, virus isolates for
genomic studies as to what individual birds were carrying, or not.
So far, we just have the Nigerian outbreaks south of the Sahara, but I
am
sure that one might propose various valid reasons for it not being seen
even if the virus successfully made it to other West African and East
African countries. The coming months will tell us whether it made it
[i.e.
new outbreaks not associated with the Nigerian series] or failed [no
outbreaks, no positive serology]. To quote Mary Marshall: "We also need
to
learn more about the risk of silent carriers: how long are they able to
shed virus, and can rapid RT-PCR or other tests be used? ... With FMD
2001
in the UK, there was no attempt to collect data for future
epidemiological
work. I hope the same mistakes aren't being made now." - Mod.MHJ]
[see also:
Avian influenza, poultry vs migratory birds (03) 20060222.0578
Avian influenza, poultry vs migratory birds (02) 20060218.0536
Avian influenza, poultry vs migratory birds 20060217.0516]
......................as/mhj/msp
