Could it be the case that many of the same industrial-military problems faced by America in Vietnam are repeating themselves in the War on Terror? A recently retired Major from the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) thinks so. What follows are the Major's thoughts in the first installment of what hopefully will be a recurring series discussing the inside of the Global War On Terror (GWOT).
The Major writes:
The singular reason we haven't rolled up aQ [al-Qaeda] at this point is lack of manpower. We simply haven't grown our highly trained special operators to the size and level we need to project lethal power into aQ's zone of influence. For example, we've lost entire SEAL teams in this war, and are barely treading water in terms of their replacements. The amount of training and investment which goes into just one Navy SEAL is exceedingly high. Yet, that training is critical in order to bring our forces into sufficient contact in order to make the kill. This situation is duplicated in every division of our special forces.
Not a good sign. The Major has been sharing similar thoughts with me for quite awhile. Recently he added:
aQ is evolving. Most alarming is their new trust with other groups. Their outposts in Iraq have learned to cooperate with a diverse range of interest groups: former baathists, sunni diehards, kurdish revolutionaries. The result of these joint ventures is an increasingly dangerous enemy. As our regular forces fight battles they were never trained to fight, our enemy is adapting to become even more lethal. The training now necessary to effectuate counter-terrorism operations is even more expensive and more time consuming than right after of 9/11. The window of opportunity on aQ is closing fast.
The Major has a lot to say. And he'll be saying more hopefully in the very near future. For now he wants us all to focus on a single problem.
Special forces simply aren't being funded at the level they need to be. Instead, billions of dollars are being spent on upfitting programs which don't even exist yet. We can win with the tools we have now, we just don't have the manpower necessary to operate, maintain, and maneuver those tools. I'm not unrealistic. Killing aQ will not solve the problem. But it is a necessary first step. Right now, other steps are being taken and all Americans should ask why."
Indeed. We should ask why. And we should be ever fearful that the same set of perverse incentives that corrupted the war effort in the Vietnam era are doing the same to our professional military today.