The Emphasis on Final Status
Palestinians tend to focus on final status negotiations with Israel.
This is important symbolically because it indicates a true mutual respect.
Negotiations only occur when two sides acknowledge each others' existence, rights, power and value.
To deny or undermine negotiations is thus perceived as a negation of the other; you don't exist, you don't count, your concerns aren't real, etc.
This is perceived as an attempt to humiliate, intimidate and manipulate.
Final Status and Symbols
Any person finds some way of maintaining their sense of worth, self-respect, optimism and confidence, allowing themselves to function in life.
And for many if not most humans this is at least partly based on one's national identity and the status of the symbols of national identity.
These symbols indicate that the nation is real and worthy, and thus that oneself is real and worthy.
For Palestinians the relevant symbols here appear to include:
- owning their own land, free from occupation;
- having their national capital in Jerusalem;
- having an economically and infrastructurally viable state that is prosperous enough to support its people;
- reunifying all their people;
- having a functioning government and system of laws of their own choosing
The Reaction to Denial
The emphasis on final status negotiations is thus no surprise, because it primarily focuses on resolving exactly these issues.
When such negotiations are set aside, or when indications are made that they may never happen, this is interpreted as humiliation and destruction of the symbols, and an attempt to destroy the self of the Palestinians, to wreck them as a people.
Amongst any nation, the individuals will respond in a variety of ways to such a possibility.
And at least some in this case will simply not accept it and turn to violence.
Or they will at least organize so as to be able to weild a threat of violence.
These in turn become the very groups that are identified as the problem, the ones who don't want peace and make it impossible even in theory.
The Emphasis on Security
Now let's look at this interaction from the Israeli perspective.
Most Israelis have indicated, via polls, 'voting' on proposed peace plans like Geneva, general political consensus, and plands and gestures set forth by leading politicos, that they want peace.
The peace being proposed, includes in some fashion all the symbols of importance to Palestinians.
The details need to be worked out, but the will for peace is clearly there.
However, these details are touchy issues.
In area after area, Israelis will be wary of actually signing anything, or even negotiating, unless they are assured that the outcome will be truly safe and secure, will not threaten or allow to be threatened the existence and success of Israel.
And promises will not suffice in this matter.
Rather they want to see actual established, reliable, day-to-day realities on the ground and also infrastructures, protocols and systems which make security not a wish or a probability but a definite, unchallengeable reality.
Not Trusting
Clearly, though, on the ground, any observer would say things are a long way away from such levels of security.
How, for example, can life in Jerusalem be shared, under any scenario, when you have violence in the streets in Gaza that would at least suggest there are deep tensions throughout the territories?
Theoretically, of course, life in Jerusalem could be shared, we are human, we are creative, we can take on challenges and find ways to make things work.
But any such arrangement, to work, would require deep trust, so if you are not feeling the trust, how can you talk about such arrangements, at least now?
Thus Israelis tend to either put off final status negotiations, or to offer a take-it-or-leave-it plan which also does not include negotiations, or to present a long list of steps that are demanded of Palestinians, with the list subject to extension or modification at any time.
A Cycle of Reaction
Palestinians experience this as simply a refusal to negotiate, with all that implies: lack of respect, acknowledgement, honor.
And a moving of the final status horizon into some far distant future or simply out of the realm of reality and into theory.
This then triggers the cycle of resistance to ongoing humiliation.
And that triggers more Israeli fear and denial of the possibility of partnership.
Demanding Peace
One of the primary demands on an Israeli list is for the Palestinian leader to deliver a disbanding of the militias, removal of weaponry, etc.
But the nature of executive power in Palestinian areas now is that it depends largely on the ongoing consent of the governed, including the armed governed.
That consent is withdrawn to the degree that humiliation appears to be the likely outcome.
The leader seeks to deliver this greater peace on the streets, by emerging from meetings with agreements which affirm the likelihood of a final status negotiation, and thus a final honoring of the national symbols and the Palestinian self.
But when he emerges without this, and instead with a list of demands he is expected to comply with, his power to deliver is vastly undermined.
How can we break this cycle, which benefits noone?
Separating Final Status Agreement from Endstate
Here's one idea, certainly not the only idea, but at least a new one.
Amongst the symbols which are the goals of final status, are many realities which can be changed regardless of such an agreement.
Maybe what's needed is to separate the concepts of a final status or endstate which is positive for Israelis and Palestinians, from the issue of negotiations and a signed final agreement.
The signed final agreement would then emerge at a later date, as an honoring of the reality on the ground, the endstate which at that point actually exists or is clearly visible.
A Working Agreement
The primary focus, instead of a final agreement, would be a working agreement on how to get from here to there.
The working agreement would be a development plan for Palestine, which would progressively enact the construction of all aspects of the nation being sought, over a number of years.
To be able to create a working agreement, both sides would in a rough and general sense, have be in alignment, about the shape of the endstate.
But they would not necessarily have to sign a document to this effect.
Without signing a final status document now, an informal consensus can be the basis of creating a working agreement on how to get there.
The development plan would clearly be constructed to lead towards this generally agreed upon endstate.
This is different from the roadmap in that it would mostly not emphasize security-related behavior of hard-to-control actors, but rather on infrastructure and major shifts in the reality of life on the ground.
Building peace by building a viable nation, building all the supports for a peaceful and prosperous life.
This includes of course building out security-related infrastructure as determined by need and technology.
And of course, separate from any development plan, the security forces will be doing what they can to diminish violence.
Real Steps Towards a Future
If the steps taken, year-over-year, as part of the development plan, are significant, both pratically and symbolically, then Palestinians will feel they are being honored and there will be a much greater likelihood of a much more rapid de-escalation of violence.
Groups which operate independently in a quest for honor, will be much more likely to integrate themselves into the national project, the government, the formal organs of power.
Security, peace, prosperity, cooperation will not emerge overnight, but there could be progressive and significant, quanitifiable movement in these directions, year-over-year.
The key is some balance, where things are not demanded to go so fast and overwhelming, nor so slow and meaningless, that they inevitably produce distrust, distance, alternate paths, chaos, violence, fear and retreat.
A Development Plan
So, what might such a development plan, a working agreement look like?
Let's say we take an 8 year timeframe.
An integrated approach could be adopted to resolve a number of related issues.
These goals are:
- Resettling Palestinians who currently live in refugee camps throughout the Middle East, to the West Bank
- Resettling Israelis who currently live in settlements within Israel-proper
- Reintegration of the West Bank by opening roads, constructing new ones and removing internal barriers
- Building sufficient housing to provide a decent home for all Palestinians
- Building factories and other industry to provide jobs and reduce unemployment to reasonable levels
- Growing the Palestinian economy to restore it to 90's levels and then from there sufficiently to attain per-capita GDP levels which are understood to provide a good basis for democracy
- Building schools, universities, hospitals, universal high-speed internet and other civic infrastructure
- Renewing and modernizing agriculture so that to the greatest degree possible everyday food is produced locally
- Developing security and sovereignty concepts and infrastructure for East Jerusalem
- Building a home for the symbols of government, such as parliament and an executive house in East Jerusalem
- Building public spaces of honor, celebration, culture and commerce throughout Palestinian areas
- Allocating and making habitable and viable any land which is to be swapped
The development plan would set targets for each of these, year by year.
Some of the steps will intertwine.
Each goal would be broken up into pieces, so that each year you are accomplishing just a portion of it.
Each step would be well planned, deliberate, understood well in advance, have clear metrics for success and real oversight during its implementation.
The steps each year would build support for the steps the following year.
People would clearly understand where things were heading.
The plan could be adjusted along the way, while preserving the gist of continual and significant forward motion.
An Example: Housing
Take housing.
In a given year you might have resettlement of some number of Israeli settlers, thus freeing up some housing.
Simultaneously in that year you might bring back from refugee camps some number of Palestinian refugees abroad.
You also have a target for so much new housing for the existing.
Palestinian population, dealing with overpopulated and unsafe areas, people living in wretched conditions or homeless.
This leaves you with a requirement of so many missing homes to be built in that year.
Those homes would be built as neighborhoods, with roads, schools, etc, according to a national master plan.
That building project then provides so many jobs, as well as the need for building materials to be produced in factories, which themselves must be built.
You are then also growing the agricultural system so that it can move towards feeding this population base.
This all requires so much financing, via a combination of donations from the other nations, including the US; loans and investments.
All of this is planned such that at the end of 8 years, you have accomplished the original goals fully.
A New Model in Jerusalem
As far as Jerusalem, it's unclear exactly how it would work
To get the creative juices flowing, one might consider unusual security arrangements around the world, which nevertheless work smoothly.
The Vatican is protected by the swiss guard, projecting sovereignty, yet they are basically unarmed.
'Bobbies' in England traditionally provided law enforcement and the expression of sovereignty, yet without guns.
Embassies throughout the world are sovereign territory of the country whose embassy it is, existing surrounded by the local government.
In any case, there are many examples of security with fairly low amounts of weaponry, and sovereignty of an area that is also of major security concern to a larger nearby area.
How Jerusalem works 100 or 200 years from now, we don't know; Jerusalem has existed for millenia and many arrangements have been tried and adjusted.
But the goal of the development plan should be to simply figure out how it can work in 8 years.
Some Ideas for Jerusalem
East Jerusalem could work, for example, as a demilitarized area, with a very low tolerance for crime.
Guns could be largely removed from the area.
If a situation developed requiring a swat team, or a military team, that could be an Israeli or joint-forces one.
But apart from that it could be patrolled by a special Palestinian force, whose members are very highly screened and trained and monitored, by an joint stakeholder entity: Israeli/Palestinian/Quartet/Regional.
To enter the area, one would go through a primary check point in the West Bank, which checks biometric id.
Violations of law and security would result in individuals being ejected back out.
So, the lawmakers and executive could meet and work there, pilgrims and tourists could go there, Palestinian residents and merchants would live there.
But there would be little or no possibility allowed for any individual or group with violent intent to enter or remain there, and this would be enforceable as needed by an group via which any partner can demand action as concerns a security threat.
Let's say one of the stakeholders, Israeli/Palestinian/Quartet/Regional, says there is a problem, then no other stakeholder could prevent action from being taken; so it's the opposite of the security council model, where any member can prevent action to enforce security by a veto.
These kind of details for Jerusalem would need to be explored, experimented with, revised.
New technologies may emerge and need to be incorporated into the plan
Security and sovereignty should get better and better, but the specific shape of it all would remain flexible.
The development plan would lay out steps that are partly experimental to move the situation in this direction, building infrastructure as needed to support it.
A Council to Oversee the Plan
The implementation of the plan, and its continual revision, would be overseen by a council of the wise, comprised of members from all stakeholders, Israel/Palestine/Quartet/Regional.
These members of the council could be replaced from time to time, put forward by the relevant parties.
For example, the composition might look like: 3 Israeli, 3 Palestinian, 1 US, 1 EU, 1 UN, 1 Russia, 1 Egypt, 1 Jordan.
The members of such a council would have to be people who subscribe to the plan and its overall intent which is to bring about a peaceful coexistence of 2 stable, prosperous states.
The financing of the plan would be developed by this group and all monies donated would be allocated to specific projects, the completion of which would result in release of further funds; rather than dumping it all into a general fund.
This council would then have teams of on-the-ground managers who arrange to make things happen and also determine whether things did happen or not (was the road built, was the house built, how many refugees came back)
These teams would also determine what needs are as far as further infrastructure, what problems are coming up.
Palestinian National Structure and the Plan
Participation in this from the Palestinian side would be guided by the President and the level of government he represents, which is to say above parliament and prime minister.
Day to day life in Palestine, however, would be governed by the parliament, prime minister and cabinet.
Hamas has accepted in principle that the President is the negotiator, so this leads to a resolution of the West Bank / Gaza dilemma.
For now, Hamas is the de facto ruler in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank
This de facto reality does not change the President's power, nor development in the West Bank.
If people want to live under Hamas as their local rulers, they can move to Gaza, if not they can go to the West Bank.
To the extent prisoners are released, they could be released into the appropriate area.
If Hamas' military operations are gradually wound up, then what Hamas in Gaza would end up being is simply a culture, a local government, a way of life there.
If you have a model for highly devolved governance, then fairly significant differences in local law are not a problem, as long as the structure and integrity of the national state are preserved.
Even if the situation is not entirely democratic, if there is an enforced separation into two very different kinds of local entities such that the West Bank remains a Fatah-run area, this need not concern Israel or other stakeholders.
Over longer stretches of time, the political situation will evolve, but for a development plan to be meaningful, all that is required is a stable national entity, stable national leadership and a local governing reality in the West Bank which can allow the major goals to be accomplished.
A Plan Builds Cooperation
The development plan itself would not be a political or partisan or religious statement, so it should be embraced by all.
Its benefits, symbolically, and in terms of economic well-being and a stable vision of the future, would extend to all.
The specific areas where infrastructure build-out can occur would be determined by conditions on the ground, but should at least include the entire West Bank.
Gaza then has an incentive to participate more fully but also has freedom to choose.
It could well be that has Hamas sees things moving towards the endstate goals they desire, the political tension reduces, and cooperation becomes easier.
While minimizing arms importation and military build-up in Gaza may make sense, attempting to remake it politically by force may not.
It could just lead to more chaos, instability and the inability to get any movement forward overall.
Fundamentalist religious local areas, local governments, which are peaceful and integrated into a stable, secure national framework, need not be seen as a problem, as long as those who live there do so voluntarily.
Everyone may not want to live there, but some will.
In order to bring in investment and opportunity, beyond simply getting donations, they will have to find flexibility of some kind, but that can be allowed to arise in its own time.
Beyond All or Nothing; Let's Move Forward
Getting beyond the all-or-nothing approach, on both sides, would benefit everyone.
Peace is something that needs to be constructed and the steps involved are quite large and complicated.
The longer these steps are not undertaken however, the more tensions grow.
A plan to move forward systematically towards an endstate that everyone is in general agreement with, may be a better approach.
As that endstate is approached, the willingness to trust more fully and sign more final documents will arise.
Security will grow as there is a combination of movement forward towards that endstate, and towards a prosperous future.
Security in messy areas is largely a matter of convincing people, establishing a basic social agreement on how to live together.
Positive realities speak loudly here.
If there is a real plan, real process and a real oversight council and structure to move it forward, then we get out of having discussions about competing theoretical realities and idealisms, and into actually walking towards a viable future.
