Front Paged at Voices In The Wilderness
I have been on top of the situation in the Middle East for quite some time now. In light of recent developements I thought it would be a good idea to crosspost this diary here
Iran has refused to back down from its position that they have the right to produce its own nuclear energy and enrich its own uranium. When considering their claims it is quite difficult to disagree with their position. America is in the process of developing new nukes and with rising energy prices they have put a lot of money into developing nuclear energy plants themselves. The whole of the western world is in the process of debating possibilities to support the increased demand in oil. Is it just that the west alone has the right to develop modern day technology? To be fair and balanced the IAEA does have concerns about Iran's forthrightness in terms of nuclear materials and facilities.
More Below...
Treaty Breached?
The mainstream media reports Iran's breach of safeguards provisions as if it is an open and close case in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rather than explaining the complexities of the issue they prefer to take the Bush administrations approach of "We are the good guys they are the bad guys". The reality of the situation is that while there are concerns they really have not been found to be in breach of either the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the safeguards that branch from that agreement. On June 18, 2003 the 35 member board of governors at the IAEA conceded just that by refusing to adopt a resolution on the situation.
At the heart of the issue was Iran's failure to declare Uranium imported from China in 1991, a claim that Iran, for all intent and purposes does not dispute (though they claim it was well below the threshold of the agency). The American position seems to be on a similar path as their position on Iraq. While they have not found any hard evidence they are inclined to believe reports from, primarily spies within Iran. The IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has seemed to hold firms to his fence-sitting position that while Iran has not breached safeguard agreements they remain not fully cooperative.
Introduction June 19,2003
Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities, and that corrective actions are being taken in co-operation with the Iranian authorities. The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards. In this respect, we are continuing our efforts -- through technical discussions, inspection and environmental sample analysis -- to understand all aspects of Iran's nuclear program, including: the research and development work relevant to its uranium conversion and enrichment program; and its program for the use of heavy water."
While American diplomats were unable to get referral to the U.N security counsel at the time they were able to gain some support from the G-8:
We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program
Though the international community, specifically the G-8, was clearly uncomfortable with the prospect of Iran continuing its nuclear program they could not find them to be in violation of any laws. It is for this reason that the United States and now Europe are trying to get Iran to sign on to yet an additional provision as the United States state department spokesman Richard Boucher stated just days before the June 2003 report:
Board to make clear its concerns, to call on Iran to fix the problems, to call on Iran to sign the additional protocol and to support the efforts of the IAEA to find out more information and get compliance
(Emphasis mine)
Without the added provision the west doesn't have much of a foot to stand on right now in terms of Iranian violations of any treaties or laws. The recent decision by Iran to restart its uranium conversion program at the Isfahan plant adds absolutely nothing to the legal situation. By the opinion of the European Union itself Iran's decision was a voluntary one:
General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC)
13 December 2004: Iran - Council Conclusions (item debated)
The Council welcomed the confirmation by the IAEA that Iran had voluntarily suspended all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, thus paving the way for negotiations on a long term arrangement, as provided for in the agreement of 15 November 2004. The Council underlined that sustaining the full suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities is essential for the continuation of the overall process.
Source
Reasonable Response
If Iran has been confirmed to have breached the agreement what should be the response of the west? If the only "breach" that can be found is the 1.3 KG of Uranium that Iran failed to disclose then precedence shows that the only fair response, which is to say a response that is not harder than Iran than it would be on any other member state, is to simply ensure that Iran gets inline and complies with current agreements. This response may seem weak but again, precedence should be followed whenever possible.
The media would have us believe that Iran's failure to disclose materials is a unique case. To suggest that Iran is the only member state of the IAEA to fail to live up to safeguard agreements is a claim that can't stand up under true research.
The SIR 2002, GOV/2003/35 report noted the following failures of member states as referenced by the Iranian representative in a speech to the board June 6, 2003
Page 56 paragraph 187- Of the remaining 357 facilities with 1 SQ or more of nuclear material evaluated for 2002, 34 facilities (10%) in 15 states failed to fully attain the quantity component of the inspection goal; and 32 facilities (9%) in 15 states failed to fully attain the timeliness component.
Page 59 paragraph 198- At six facilities, the quantity component of the inspection goal has not been attained for several years because the measures foreseen in safeguards approaches could not be implemented.
Page 60 paragraph 205 - At six LWRs (seven in 2001), the quantity or timeliness components of the inspection goal couldn't be attained because spent fuel had been loaded into casks for shipment and was therefore unavailable for verification during inspections.
The transfer of uranium shielded ammunition into a country in hundreds of kilograms; have they been reported to the Agency's Safeguards either by the country of their origin or by the receiving country in this case, namely Iraq?
What is clearly seen here is that while Iran did indeed fail to comply with certain provisions in the safeguard it isn't the only nation to have done so. The IAEA isn't an organization built to generate new conflicts in the world but to ensure compliance and a willingness to comply and remedy failures.
Beyond the response of the international community as a whole The United States already has unilaterally placed sanctions on Iran and they could enforce stiffer sanctions if the multilateral response seems to weak. The EU can also follow suit and place sanctions on Iran which could go a long way to squeezing the Iranian people. This option does not seem a good route because of the possible problems that can stem from such economic wars (Namely the price of oil). Iran has already threaten that if they are so much as brought before the UN to be considered for sanctions they would ensure that the cost of oil is painful for even the wealthiest western nations. The UN option is a high risk play for the west especially when one considers that passing such sanctions may prove impossible as long as China and Russia have close ties with Iran. As I see it the west has cornered themselves; With the unwillingness of Germany under its current leadership, (Granted that may soon change) and France as well as the already overstretched American military the military option doesn't seem feasible and may prove unsuccessful without a major offensive. The west will really have to rely on the good will of the Iranian government rather than bullying tactics that has worked in the past.
Final Defense
Iran recently took its defense to the IAEA. The Islamic Republic fully grabs hold of the obvious double standard between the treatment of its state and other nuclear nations. The full statement follows:
The issue at hand was simple: Iran has commenced operation at a safeguarded facility to produce feed for nuclear fuel under full scope monitoring of the IAEA.
Let me state this again with a slight modification: An NNWS party to the treaty and the member of the agency's safeguards has commenced operation at a safeguarded facility to produce feed for nuclear fuel under full scope monitoring of the IAEA.
This is the core of the debate.
Was anyone able to explain how this could be an issue in the first place? Was anyone able to suggest why and under which pretext the board had to convene urgently to deliberate on this matter? Was anyone able to describe what provoked an alarm that called for a quick-fix reaction?
I do not believe anyone here had a single convincing response to these questions. The reason is clear because there is none. How can this body be called to react to an act, which is in full conformity with the NPT and the safeguards and constitutes a limited
manifestation of the exercise of an inalienable right? A right, which by its own simple meaning, cannot be alienated from anyone.
The states, who prompted this debate and were the proponents of this decision today imply that they do so under the precept of non-proliferation.
At the same time, these states either possessors of nuclear weapons or rely on them for their security in one form or the other, or are the exclusive producers of nuclear fuel, or have stood firm on not foregoing this capability under any circumstances.
The point is, how can a small amount of feed material for enrichment to produce nuclear fuel be a matter of concern whereas a number of these states, including non-nuclear weapon states amongst them, are sitting on many tons of separated plutonium, which can be directly diverted to nuclear weapons, at any time of their choosing? "The conventional reply has been that these states have good standing with the safeguards. What they forget to say is that these states have never been forcefully denied access to nuclear material, equipment, and technology. Give us a fraction of that access and we will make an example of fullest possible transparency, and will be in exemplary standing.
It is evident that the motive is to apply pressure, to the victim of the denials. And the purpose, it is obvious, is to move from denial to deprivation. A prescription, which is written for Iran but which will be rolled for all other developing states too if Iran bends.
Fortunately, Iran will not bend. Iran will be a nuclear fuel producer and supplier within a decade.
Iran, like all other developing countries and members of the NPT, has rejected nuclear weapons decisively and firmly. All Iran wants to do is to enjoy its right under the NPT, the right, which has been denied to it for more than two decades, a denial that has been firm and decisive.
The agency is founded on the premises of:
First: Providing and facilitating nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes.
Second: Safeguarding material and facilities
Third: Ensuring safety The first obligation of the agency is severely undermined, at the behest of the second. No wonder the Americans call this agency the UN watchdog, the term that is demeaning and condescending to the integrity of this organization.
If you go by the book, the agency should be assisting Iran to operate and improve its fuel production capability, including the segment of UCF, just as it should for all other developing states.
Well, we understand that it has been disabled and prohibited to perform this obligation. But what is absurd is that a decision is passed here, which betrays even the agency's second, more revered objective. If this body expresses concern over the operation of our facility, which is under safeguards and which is fully monitored, then what should this body say about so many unsafeguarded facilities spread around in other parts of the world, and particularly in our region?
The Americans have for long maintained, demonstrated, and acted upon the conviction that assurances of non-diversion of the agency are not credible. The same conviction led that country to ignite a war in no less than two years ago. But is this deja vu again? I am sorry, not this time -- Iran is not Iraq and the United States is not that self-appointed policeman of the world anymore. The decision today is, apres tout, a vote of no-confidence to the agency and its safeguards system. It signals the beginning of the road to an unwanted and undue confrontation through which, in the words of the director general, all parties stand to lose.
We believe in the agency and the safeguards system.
We will continue to work with the agency.
We will maintain our activities fully under safeguards.
The operation at the UCF is Isfahan will remain under full scope monitoring.
The product will be sealed by agency.
In one word, we will fully observe our obligations in our program of producing nuclear fuel. So, there is no point for concern whatsoever.
We will not heed to questioning of the agency's credibility that this resolution stands for.
This resolution is, in essence, a vote of no-confidence to the credibility of the agency and its safeguards system.
The appeal by the United Nations secretary general and the director general here to revert to negotiations, we will be prepared, despite this hoopla, for negotiations, free of preconditions and with manifest goodwill.
Iran definitely has built a good case for their right to build the technology but if they want better relations with European nations they'll have to bite the bullet and play a much more proactive role in solving the problem peacefully. It is in the best interest of Iran to resolve this quickly with the strong backing of Europe. The stakes are high for the United States as well because if Iran and Europe can come to an agreement then Iran will have fully been excepted into the international community of trade (with the odd exception no doubt). The world community may well be inclined to play a bigger role when it comes to dealing with major crises; as a consequence, the American dominance of international affairs will take an even greater blow than in the aftermath of the realization by the world community that the intelligence on Iraq was almost completely wrong.