Part 5. This concludes a five-part series on the Honduran coup. It proposes answers to the questions of Who ordered the coup? Why was the coup ordered? What effect will the election have on events? What is the condition of the Honduran economy? What tactics will the resistance and the dictatorship use? Who is most likely to win the struggle for control of Honduras?
Continues from Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
5. Conclusions
"And we do worry about leaders who get elected and get elected fairly and freely and legitimately, but then, upon being elected, begin to undermine the constitutional and democratic order, the private sector, the rights of people to be free from harassment, depression, to be able to participate fully in their societies."
–Hillary, 12/11, perhaps referring to the Obama Administration [120a]
a. Update and Reframing of the Issues
Overview. The questions that this article hoped to answer are the following
- Who decided that Zelaya would be removed from office?
- Why was Zelaya removed from office?
- What does whitewashing the coup through the transmission of the title of "President" to Porfirio Lobo mean in practical terms?
- What is the condition of the Honduran economy, and how will that change with the installation of Lobo?
- What tactics will the resistance use?
- Will the use of terrorism against the resistance continue, or is Micheletti getting in as much violence as possible to set the stage for Lobo to regain damaged Honduran credibility?
- Who is most likely to win the struggle for control of Honduras?
Events have unfolded since the last section was published, and new facts have come to light. The remainder of this section will update the previous four installments of this series.
Motives for and actors in the coup. Several interesting facts have come to attention since the previous post. First, a news report [138] immediately before the coup in La Prensa of 6/22 stated that on 6/21 Ambassador Hugo Llorens met with Zelaya, the presidential candidates Santos and Lobo, Roberto Micheletti, Romeo Vásquez Velásquez and other military leaders.
Also with regard to the coup, on June 26th, Tiempo published a report stating that Hillary Clinton and military leaders had avoided a coup. While this article has been removed from the Tiempo website, its existence was independently established on 12/7 by Mercury Rising [139] and a record of what it said remains in an article by Ivana Cardinale of Prensa Web YVKE [140]. The latter also states that the forged letter of resignation was read on 6/25 in Congress. The article suggests that Llorens (perhaps independent of the White House or the State Department) ordered the coup. While Cardinale’s reasoning is not as clear to me as it is to her, the hypothesis deserves consideration, particularly since Llorens is a Bush-appointed Cuban exile with possible involvement in the Venezuelan coup.
Second, in its Country Report on Human Rights for 2008 [141], issued 2/25/09, the US State Department declared that:
"In the run-up to the November 30 primary elections, there were several politically motivated killings, which analysts interpreted as a "message" from organized crime for the Liberal Party and President Zelaya in particular to stop maneuvering to remain in power."
In other words, as of February, 2009, the State Department regarded Zelaya as one of the "good guys," and the coup planners to be criminals. Country Reports are means by which the State Department applies political pressure, and can be taken as an indirect measure of the Administration’s stance. The Country Report also dovetails with the following article [142] which, although not particularly well researched or substantiated, states an alternative hypothesis for Zelaya’s removal:
"Zelaya was the first Honduran President who was not a total US puppet. His predecessors readily and profitably cooperated with DEA. The independent Zelaya who re-emerged as a populist leader ruined the plans of the US super-cartel which had turned Honduras into its base in Central America. The Honduran drug chronicles illustrate the proportions of the "commercial" aspect of DEA activity. Crushes or interceptions of planes loaded with drugs are reported nearly every week. Speed motorboats registered in Honduran seaports deliver cocaine and heroine to Mexico and the US East Coast, and only a fraction of the traffic – that with no ties to DEA – gets intercepted."
It probably is true that Zelaya’s deposal facilitated drug trafficking. Crashes of planes carrying narcotics appear, at least according to the pro-coup media, to have increased following his removal. This is best logically explained by an increase in total narcotics traffic.
The State Department report [141] also said that:
"On November 17, President Zelaya announced that he would seek to regulate the media through legislative means to counter a "culture of death" propagated by the media with support of National Congress President Roberto Micheletti."
According to Hondudiario [143], the "culture of death" referred to a sensationalization of violence to manipulate public opinion that has has been called "FOXification" in the United States. If media owners feared that they might be regulated or, worse, face real competition from government-run media, they had a motive to remove Zelaya.
Other motives which were not explicitly mentioned previously, but which a reader who prefers to remain anonymous brought to my attention are classism ("I believe that Micheletti last year called the people opposed to him and in support of new mining laws as "gente de la monte" - hillbillies."), and political tribalism ("Belonging to a particular political party is, some have said, something like an inheritance.") [144 (no link)].
The mining angle is also interesting, since there have been a number of assassinations of anti-gold mining organizers in neighboring countries, reports of which have trickled into the mainstream media, [145] since the coup. Rory Carroll of The Guardian [146] did a hard-hitting article on the damage inflicted by gold mining in Honduras, one that should be viewed in tandem with a photoessay [147] compiled by Rights Action [148] on the health effects of living near a gold mining operation. Mining had been regulated in 2004, and further limited by Zelaya in 2010 [correction: 2009] [149].
American expatriates from the tourist industry and related industries were involved in lobbying the US Congress. A document [150] came to my attention demonstrating that expatriates formed a powerful lobby directed at Republican and business-subservient Democrats to get them to pressure the State Department not to intervene. They met with no fewer than 18 Senators and Congressmen of both parties, 5 congressional staff of both parties, and the State Department Deputy Director of the Office of Central American Affairs. This is extraordinary access of the kind beyond most citizens. I have been told by Hondurans that this expatriate activity is informally coordinated by an American expatriate, married to a Honduran, who blogs as La Gringa.
Assuming that the expatriates have retained their US citizenship, there is nothing illegal or even unusual about this. However, because of the scope of organized crime in Honduras and the historically-established potential for US expatriates to act as part of the intelligence services, there may be reason for congressional awareness of the issue of expatriate lobbying. Lobbying on behalf of criminals or the intelligence agencies, or using funds supplied by the Honduran oligarchy for lobbying would be, presumably, illegal. Certainly lobbying for the "need to recognize the Honduran elections" seems to me to scuff the line drawn in 22 U.S.C. § 611 [151].
An article well worth reflecting on is Ismael Moreno’s ¿Después de Zelaya, qué? [121] mentioned earlier. This article defines three strains in the resistance. The first strand is the Zelayists, who might be analogized to Clinton supporters in the 1998 impeachment. These are largely "goo-goos"—good government liberals—who object to the arbitrary removal of a president on ethical grounds.
Honduras also has a left with affinities to the Bolivaran movement of South America. It should be remarked that the Bolivaran movement is more a phenomenon of indigenous nationalism to which conventional socialists are attracted. The distinction between indigenous nationalism and socialism is far too subtle for the right to comprehend, but indigenous people are analogous to small-town America, in which sharing is seen as essential to community survival. Like small-town Americans, indigenous nationalists are often xenophobic and culturally conservative. In this way, they are very different from most socialists. But, thanks to the crudity and repressiveness of the right, there has been a fusion of those movements. In addition to the indigenous nationalists and conventional socialists, the left includes unionists and other members of populist movements, gay rights activists, feminists, and others, all of whom may or may not be indigenous nationalists or socialists.
The third strand that Moreno describes is that of "the melting pot," many of whom (if I understand him) are mestizos who feel displaced and under siege from the relentless downward pressure on wages that globalization has brought. They tend to be Catholic or evangelical, not closely associated with unions or indigenous peoples. These represent an independent populist strand, something like Perot voters in the US.
There are no clear lines between the strands: they are people, people with grievances. Those grievances range from hourly wages to control of land and water to experiences of government brutality. Rather than understand the resistance as ethnic or social groups, as Moreno does, it may be more helpful to understand the actual grievances.
Mark Weisbrot [152] has put together the case that the US was behind the coup, noting the lengths to which the US has gone in weasel-wording its statements to avoid declaring the coup to be military in nature, to refuse to demand the unconditional return of Zelaya, to withhold endorsing the elections as leverage, and especially, to forthrightly condemn the human rights violations. The latter is probably the matter of greatest concern, since it implies a disturbingly strong and unconditional support for the coup. The next section will cover these issues in more depth.
Finally, an important interview [153] of the younger Rodolfo Pastor in Clarín proposes a significantly different view. He thinks that the US actions in response to the coup were simply crassly utilitarian:
"The US has a defined agenda with regard to Honduras which seeks, in a pragmatic manner, an exit to the crisis. In our opinion: although an exit was sought, a solution to the crisis and to the structural problems the crisis unleashed, was not promoted. It is said that the US doesn’t have friends or enemies, only interests. It’s clear that the policy which they have decided to implement in the region has strayed from the official rhetoric of the Obama Administration, which promises a new era of multilateral rapprochement, respectful and consistent with regional interests. Instead it [the policy] rather clearly seeks to establish and defend US priorities, such as stability and protection of the status quo, which provides economic resources at any cost, including democracy itself."
He does not accuse the US of involvement in the coup, and provides an alternate explanation of the actions of the State Department as, to read between the lines, the result of ignorance and laziness.
So, in summary, this section added or amplified on previously stated motives with the following:
• Llorens had a motive to support the coup, independent of the State Department or Administration, and was meeting with the players in the coup just days before it happened
• The State Department had not signed on to the coup as late as February, 2009
• The Obama Administration and State Department failed to respond forcefully
• Consistent with the State Department Country Report of 2008, corrupt members of the DEA in league with narcotraffickers had a motive for the coup. There is tentative evidence that removing Zelaya resulted in an increased flow of drugs
• The Honduran media had a motive to assist in removing Zelaya
• Foreign, notably Canadian gold-mining companies had a motive to remove Zelaya
Whitewashing the coup: the practical consequences. There were a series of developments on the minutiae of exactly how the coup would transfer power to the government formed to whitewash the coup without admitting that the planners had done anything wrong. This amounted to a negotiation internal to the coup, since the planners recognized that they had violated, and continue to violate, both Honduran and international law. One faction wanted amnesty for themselves as a first priority, even if that meant that Zelaya was let off the hook. The other felt it was more important to deny amnesty to Zelaya.
There was a temporary impasse, and the coup planners settled for universal self-congratulation and numerous awards. A mid-January report of amnesty in the media [154] was wrong, but amnesty was expected to be passed in Congress on Wednesday, January 27, 2010 [155]. Nor did the coup delay amnesty for into the Lobo Pretendisency, which might have had the effect of strengthening its force. Under Micheletti, its illegitimacy is self-evident. The Supreme Court simultaneously dismissed charges against the Honduran military who actually carried out the coup [156]. None of these amnesties has any force under international law, since they represent pardons of criminals by their co-conspirators.
The US government clearly hoped that Micheletti would step down in favor of a "unity government" ahead of the "toma" (inaugural transfer of power) as a token admission that his ascension to power was illegal. The Spanish government, critical to European recognition of the new government, made signs that it would attend the inaugural if this were done [157]. According to pro-coup La Tribuna [158], they are sending their Charge d’Affaires, which I would call a cave. By canceling the visas of a few lower-level coupistas (which the Wall Street Journal dementedly equated to pistol whipping [159]), the State Department has sent some signals that it isn’t completely moribund, but State may well have done this simply to maintain shreds of credibility.
Micheletti not only made it clear that he would not step down prior to the toma, but the dictatorship ostentatiously issued awards [160] and lifetime security guards [161] to its members. As a minor concession, Micheletti took a vacation in the last week—he did not step down—and let his Cabinet run things [162]. Also as a token concession, the military chiefs were threatened with arrest and prosecution, but this was opera buffa, strictly a sideshow.
Some world decision-makers may have been deceived by the flagrantly dishonest inflation of voter turnout which CNN rendered as its service to the dictatorship. As Pastor says, diplomats and politicians are remarkably ignorant about Honduras. But reality has a nasty way of puncturing propaganda. So, the major consequences of the whitewash are economic. A number of financial institutions have restored or are likely to restore normal relations with the dictatorship after the installation of Lobo. These included the IMF, the World Bank, and the BCIE [163]. While this may slow the freefall in which the Honduran economy finds itself, the sums involved would not be enough to counteract an intensification of the economic crisis in the US, which seems likely.
Condition of the Honduran economy
Although official statistics are not to be believed, even those imply that the Honduran economy is in parlous condition. The continuing recession in the US has weakened the export market. Drought threatens to damage crop yields and has forced emergency expenditures to drill wells and augment water purification facilities. The government suspended payment of salaries to many workers, creating near-mutiny in the ranks of teachers and some government workers. Aid dollars that would normally assist Honduras will be diverted to the Haitian crisis. And, of course, the costs of militarization of the entire country have been enormous, both as direct costs and as opportunity costs.
The pro-coup La Tribuna reports [164] that remittances from abroad are down 11.1 % from 2008, that foreign investment is down 40.8% (1/09-11/09), that exports are down 20.8% and imports down 36.8% (1/09-11/09). The internal debt rose to $1.26B between July and December, 2009, while the external debt rose to $3.5B. La Tribuna attempts to blame Zelaya for much of the rise in debt, but that’s another example of why one should ignore the pro-coup press. The recession is driving the bad economic statistics. Having strikes and international suspensions of aid simply intensifies pre-existing problems.
The one factor which will cushion the economy is debt forgiveness which, as I understand it, could pump in $163 M in Special Drawing Rights [165]. However, the IMF is such an opaque institution that it’s difficult to be certain.
Tactics of the resistance
The regime was not only extraordinarily well-prepared for a violent response, it seemed to want to provoke one. Assassinations and other violence certainly seemed to target junior leaders of the resistance. Property damage of which the resistance was accused was often found to have been committed by police, firing bullets, rubber bullets, and tear gas canisters with reckless abandon. Even now, Micheletti claims that Honduran troops never fired on protestors [166]. Coup apologists routinely make completely unsubstantiated claims of violence by the resistance. In particular, Micheletti accused the resistance of murdering Nicolle Cabrera, the daughter of journalist Karol Cabrera. The assailants were later determined to be soccer hooligans [167]. To the best of my recollection, the only documented violence by the resistance had to do with the burning of a Popeye’s restaurant in Tegucigalpa.
Terrorism against the resistance. The key question was whether Micheletti was using the last days of his Pretendisency to kill as many resistance leaders as possible, leaving Lobo free to wash his hands, or whether Lobo intends to continue the violence. Violence against the resistance intensified as the Micheletti regime wound down. While reliable official statistics are non-existent, one recent incident [168] serves to illustrate the situation. Heavily armed men, dressed as police and soldiers, came to Gualaco, a town in Olancho, and murdered eight people in cold blood. It remains to see whether the men were government terrorists or simply imposters, but it seems likely that this was a government-sponsored death squad.
The press has been a particular target of violence. The son of Radio Globo journalist Eduardo Maldonado was kidnapped [169]. Radios Catolicas de la Diocesis de Santa Rosa de Copan began broadcasting [added: online]. One of their programs, Dando en el Clavo, was threatening enough to the regime that they fired gunshots at one of the hosts while he was driving Father Fausto Milla’s car, shattering its windshield. Since the Father could well have been in the car, it’s clear that the dictatorship’s assassins are willing to murder religious leaders in order to silence dissenters in Santa Rosa [170]. That host, Salomon Orellana and his co-host, Miguel Carcamo[correction: Misael Cárcamo] , had previously been threatened with death. The kidnapping of Maldonado’s son may well be a common crime, but since it remains unsolved at the date of this writing, that is unclear.
A recent OAS report [171] removed any excuse for the US State Department not to recognize the human rights violations that occurred in Honduras, but the State Department continues its Sergeant Schultz routine. While the report essentially ends in September, when the human rights team traveled to Honduras, and while the statistics of people murdered and abused and unjustly jailed greatly understate the issue, it creates an official bedrock that the International Criminal Court will find hard to ignore. Another problem with the OAS report is that it fails to state that Zelaya was flown out through a US airbase. While one sympathizes with the dilemma of the report writers, faced with saying that the dominant power in the hemisphere may well have kidnapped the President of Honduras, it’s unlikely the crisis will end as long as the suspected motive force is both unrepentant and still occupying Palmerola.
b. Who decided that Zelaya should be removed from office?
The answer to the question of who decided to remove Zelaya from office has to answer the following questions:
i. Why did the State Department describe Zelaya’s opponents as members of organized crime and otherwise depict him in a positive light as late as February 2009?
ii. Why did General Romeo Vásquez blow the whistle on the coup in September, 2008, then lead the coup in June, 2009?
iii. Why was Zelaya removed from office rather than simply held in check or prosecuted until his term expired?
iv. Why were three separate tracks to remove Zelaya from office (by prosecution, by Congressional action including the phony letter of resignation, and by military force) in play simultaneously?
v. Why did the plane carrying Zelaya stop at Palmerola airbase?
vi. Why did Obama say that the coup was probably illegal, while Hillary only said that it was a coup, refusing to rule on its legality, and refusing to demand the unconditional return of Zelaya?
vii. Why did the US refuse to clearly condemn the coup and human rights violations by the dictatorship?
viii. Why did the US refuse to call the coup a military coup and apply hard sanctions?
ix. Why did the State Department, and especially Hillary Clinton, back the San José process long after it had turned into farce?
x. Why did the State Department dispatch the notorious, crass, and rude Lewis Amselem to serve as the US negotiator at the OAS?
xi. Why did the US fail to use the leverage of recognition to force Micheletti to adhere to the San José-Tegucigalpa Accords?
xii. Why did the Honduran regime refuse to take any steps to remove Zelaya as an issue by letting him leave the embassy?
It is the conclusion of this report that the decision to remove Zelaya from office most likely began within the US military and/or the CIA and/or the DEA in 2007-8. The motivation was most likely ideological, trying to reverse the Bolivaran tide in Latin America. One can not exclude the possibility that preserving the narcotics trade was not a consideration, but so far there is no direct evidence of this. The press has speculated that the point man to carry out the removal was Colonel Richard Juergens.
The idea found ready acceptance among elements of the oligarchy, some of whom are believed to be involved in narcotics traffic, but even as late as September, 2008, Gen. Vásquez Velásquez suspected that it might be a rogue operation. His public statement that Zelaya’s enemies were plotting against him presumably forced the coup plotters to provide him guarantees and offered a chance to negotiate for better terms with Zelaya. The oligarchy used the media thoughout 2008-9 to generate a rationale for removal of Zelaya from office and to prejudice the courts.
The idea for removal from office was probably sold to the Administration and State Department in March-June, 2009 as a legal process of impeachment, not as a violent removal from office. Both State and the Administration were clearly wrong-footed in the first few days after the coup. However, the US military/paramilitary plotters realized that impeachment would not serve to intimidate other members of ALBA. Therefore, the decision was taken by the military/paramilitary forces to use military force, using the method used against Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, namely, a phony letter of resignation and kidnapping.
This explains why multiple tracks for removal from office were used: the legal route, through prosecution, satisfied State and the Administration and, indeed, would have been acceptable to the world community had it been carried through. The route of violence was initiated by those who wished to intimidate the ALBA nations by resurrecting the specter of US-initiated military coups, which most of Latin America thought were a thing of the past. The Congressional route may have been initiated by Micheletti under the advice of US Republicans, knowing that Americans would understand impeachment but perhaps not the legal process actually required in Honduras. Perhaps he got advice from US Republicans like Jim DeMint. In any case, Honduran congressional votes served as a vehicle for him, rather than Gen. Vásquez or some other leader, to take power.
The decision to fly Zelaya out through Palmerola was probably made on the Honduran end, although there’s a chance that a US planner made it. That act guaranteed that no one would believe that the US was uninvolved. However, since permission to land doubtless required an American at Palmerola to approve, perhaps someone like a Colonel Juergens assented to this part of the plan.
Hillary Clinton was probably the strongest Administration advocate of removal, and was cynically indifferent to the means used. She only wanted to limit the damage to American "smart power." Following her admission of the obvious, i.e., that this was a coup, she and the State Department quickly abandoned Zelaya and even tried to turn him into the culprit by criticizing his decision to re-unite with his family in his native land.
The apparent self-destructiveness of the Honduran regime is probably due to Micheletti. Confining Zelaya in the Brazilian embassy, using banned weapons against the embassy, failing to drop prosecution of Zelaya on what look to be specious charges, refusal to form a government of national unity and destroying any pretense that the San José-Tegucigalpa Accord was being followed all guaranteed that the world’s memory of this event will be long and unpleasant.
If the US had dreams of toppling other Latin American nations, Micheletti probably ended that. Sure, the US can proceed—and end up a world pariah, with revolutions incipient from Tierra del Fuego to Tijuana. As long as the US economy is wobbly and US military force is overextended, interventions elsewhere simply raise the risk that the entire empire will collapse.
Of course, it may be that the US planners of the coup are not very smart. Certainly they do not understand how to influence events indirectly, so gently as to be invisible. That is, after all, how they have created messes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and elsewhere. That is why every year the American empire gets weaker, even as the Chinese empire expands. In a word, what losers do is lose.
c. Why was Zelaya removed from office?
There were probably many factors involved in the decision to remove Zelaya from office, including domestic US and Honduran politics and internal Washington politics. The analysis of the preceding section, however, suggests that the primary driving force was ideological rather than economic. Within Honduras, anti-Chavez feeling is both xenophobic and ideological, as illustrated by the startling poll finding that over 80% of Hondurans are anti-Chavez [10].
US treatment of Latin American is bipartisan in its stupidity. The Democratic Party has long relied on support from Latin American oligarchs, most notably the sugar kings of Florida, Alfonso and Jose Fanjul. There’s a long history of Democratic support for coups and dirty tricks in the Western Hemisphere, from Woodrow Wilson’s occupation of Haiti to Lyndon Johnson’s invasion of the Dominican Republic to Carter’s secret support for Somoza’s thugs to Clinton’s hamstringing the Aristide regime. While Democrats have generally been more concerned than Republicans about providing economic benefits to the colonies and less ghoulish in tormenting those who get out of line, ideological blindness has driven the United States into increasingly self-destructive acts. It is one thing to be anti-communist—one can make a logical case that socialism is not in the best interests of Latin America—but quite another thing to become as brutal as any communist regime ever was and expect that that will win over the population.
It is the conclusion of this report that the removal of Zelaya represents an extension of US policy toward Venezuela and the ALBA countries.
d. How does whitewashing the coup change the situation?
As a practical matter, by whitewashing the coup, the dictatorship gains:
• an opportunity to distance itself from the repressive tactics of Micheletti in world opinion
• recognition from the United States and a few other, with a number more likely to come around in the coming year.
• normalization of financial ties with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the BCIE
Had the coup failed to achieve the latter two goals, it would have collapsed of its own weight. So, in that sense, the whitewash succeeded. However, the United States probably would have recognized the dictatorship no matter how ludicrous the terms and conditions and, with US approval, approval by the major financial institutions was sure to follow.
What remains as an actual possible gain is in world opinion. While Honduras is heavily dependent on the US, and much less so on other nations, a refusal by Europe to recognize the dictatorship would hurt, probably delaying economic recovery by a year or more. There is little chance that Brazil or Venezuela will recognize the dictatorship. Strangely, however, Honduras will apparently continue to receive the benefits of cheap oil from Petrocaribe [172]. The benefit will probably be pocketed by the cartel that controls Honduran oil distribution.
e. What is the condition of the Honduran economy?
As outlined above, the Honduran economy is in bad shape. The worst area seems to be debt, which will restrain any recovery. The demoralization of the 70% of the population that lives in poverty cannot be good for productivity. The likelihood is that low wages and poor opportunity will spark a further explosion of crime. If there is a world recovery in 2010, Honduras might squeak through. If the recovery falters, it is likely that Honduras is headed for default. That risk, of course, will raise interest rates and make borrowing more difficult.
It is likely that the coastal regions of Honduras, especially the east coast, will increasingly be sold off to Europeans and Americans, in the form of time shares and vacation homes. The oligarchy can probably survive for some years selling their country to foreigners. However this sort of development devastates local economies, displacing rural people into the cities, impoverishing them and intensifying the conditions that lead to civil unrest.
f. What tactics will the resistance use?
So far, the resistance has wisely chosen to resist any temptation toward violence. Their primary methods of non-violent resistance—marches that slow down traffic, and "tomas" (sit-ins at public buildings or highways)—clearly have been a factor in slowing the economy, the dictatorship’s weak point. The boycott of the election would have worked as a resistance tactic but for the flagrant dishonesty of CNN and other pro-coup or coup-tolerant media outlets. But these tactics have cost the resistance many injuries, deaths, and jailings and, despite the resistance song ("nos tienen miedo porque no tenemos miedo") people are frightened. Violence, both criminal and governmental (if the two can be separated) has risen. And so, the resistance has debated how to proceed.
One idea is to form a political party. That would doom the Liberal Party of Micheletti to extinction. It would also create the impetus to co-opt the resistance party, just as the Liberal Party was co-opted. With the next election years away, however, electoral politics is not an effective means of dealing with the present. No clear strategy has surfaced. What is most likely is that they will attempt to place strain on the economy through strikes and slowdowns. Whether this can bring down the dictatorship is unclear.
g. Will state terrorism continue?
Yes, although there may be a pause as Lobo seeks to gain recognition for the dictatorship from Europe and Asia. Lobo may be less sociopathic than Micheletti, but there’s no reason to think that he’s any less willing to use violence or that the factors stimulating unrest will ease. The amnesties granted to the military leaders will encourage a sense of impunity.
One point to mention: As of the day before the inaugural, Micheletti has not seized power, as was discussed in section 4 he might do. It will be interesting to see whether, having tasted power, he is able to retire.
h. Who is likely to win?
The narcotraffickers and other international criminals have won a huge and lasting victory. The US military has won a short-lived, meaningless victory in being able to retain Palmerola. The US right succeeded in wrecking Obama’s credibility in Latin America; they will find that they will pay half the bill. The real estate business, the Honduran military, and the oligarchy have won medium-term victories that they may well end regretting for a very long time thereafter.
In the long term, as Leonard Cohen sings [173],
"It's coming through a hole in the air,
from those nights in Tiananmen Square.
It's coming from the feel
that it ain't exactly real,
or it's real, but it ain't exactly there.
From the wars against disorder,
from the sirens night and day;
from the fires of the homeless,
from the ashes of the gay:
Democracy is coming to the U.S.A."
© 2009, 2010 Charles Utwater II
[Added: Thanks to Brother John for catching typos]
Correction of reference for Hillary quote, formerly 120, added as 120a on 3/24/10
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Blogs that you ought to be reading and probably aren’t:
http://www.quotha.net
http://www.hondurascoup2009.blogspot.com
http://www.hermanojuancito.blogspot.com
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References
- Greenburg-Quinlan-Rosner, Honduras Frequency Questionnaire (October 9-13, 2009), 10/09, http://www.gqrr.com/...
- State Department briefing, 12/3/09, http://www.state.gov/...
120a. State Department briefing, 12/11/09, http://www.state.gov/...
- Ismael Moreno, ¿Después de Zelaya, qué?, Oct. 2009, Envío (331), http://www.envio.org.ni/...
- Unsigned, "Gobierno nos mandará turbas": Micheletti, 6/22/09, La Prensa, http://www.laprensa.hn/...
- Charles Utwater II, Honduras Coup, Act VI, Day 8, 12/7/09, Mercury Rising, http://phoenixwoman.wordpress.com/...
- Ivana Cardinale, ¿Está Hugo Llorens detrás del golpe de estado en Honduras?, 6/29/09, Prensa Web YVKE, http://voselsoberano.com/...
- Unsigned, 2008 Human Rights Report: Honduras, State Department, 2/25/2009, http://www.state.gov/...
- Nil Nikandrov, The US Drug War, or the Curacao Contact, 12/26/09, Strategic Culture Foundation Magazine, http://en.fondsk.ru/...
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- Jeremy Kryt, ¡Golpe! Last Summer’s Right-Wing Coup in Honduras Still Threatens Human Rights and the Environment, 12/9/09, Earth Island Journal, http://www.earthisland.org/...
- Unsigned, Washington DC Trip Summary, Created 11/6/09, http://tortugadigital.com/... via http://www.world4honduras.com/...
U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 11, Subchapter II, § 611, http://www.law.cornell.edu/...
- Mark Weisbrot, Top Ten Ways You Can Tell Which Side the United States Government Is on With Regard to the Military Coup in Honduras, 12/16/09, Common Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/...
- Mario Casasús, Interview with Rodolfo Pastor de María y Campos in translation, 1/25/10, Clarín, http://www.quotha.net/... See original at http://www.elclarin.cl/...
- Unsigned (Anne Tang, ed.), Congress grants amnesty to Honduran interim leader, others involved in coup, 1/16/10, Chinaview, http://news.xinhuanet.com/...
- Unsigned, Amnistía sería aprobada mañana, 1/26/10, Tiempo, http://www.tiempo.hn/...
- Elisabeth Malkin, Honduras: Court Clears Military Officers of Charges, 1/26/10, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/...
- Unsigned, España no apoyará el futuro Gobierno hondureño si hay presencia de golpistas, EFE, 12/27, http://www.google.com/...
- Unsigned, España enviará representante a la investidura de Lobo, 1/26/10, La Tribuna, http://www.latribuna.hn/...
- Unsigned, Hammering Honduras, 1/25/10, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/...
- Unsigned, En reunión de comandantes FF.AA. condecoran a funcionarios Políticas, 12/15/09, La Tribuna, http://www.latribuna.hn/...
- Unsigned, Más de 50 funcionarios gozarán de seguridad vitalicia, 1/15/10, Tiempo, http://www.tiempo.hn/...
- RAJ, Micheletti: "This is my last day in the presidency," 1/21/10, Honduras Coup 2009, http://hondurascoup2009.blogspot.com...
- Unsigned, BCIE reanuda operaciones con Honduras, AP/El Nuevo Herald, 1/21/10, http://www.elnuevoherald.com/...
- Unsigned, Lobo recibe un país resquebrajado, 1/25/10, La Tribuna, http://www.latribuna.hn/...
- Unsigned, Transcript of a Press Briefing by Mr. David Hawley, Senior Advisor, External Relations Department, IMF, 9/10/09, International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/...
- Unsigned, Micheletti insiste en que militares solo han utilizado balas de salva, 1/19/10, Revistazo.com quoting El Heraldo, http://www.revistazo.biz/...
- Unsigned, DNIC dice que la muerte de Nicolle se origina en un problema de barras, 12/17/09, Tiempo, http://www.tiempo.hn/...
- Unsigned, Ocho muertos en Gualaco, Olancho, 1/18/10, Tiempo, http://tiempo.hn/...
- Unsigned, Secuestran hijo de periodista Hondureño y piden un millón de dólares por liberación, 1/10/10, Revistazo.com, http://www.revistazo.biz/...
- John Donaghy, More than threats, 1/18/10, Herman Juancito blog, http://hermanojuancito.blogspot.com/...
- Unsigned, Honduras: Human Rights and The Coup d’état, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 55, 30 December 2009, Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, http://www.cidh.oas.org/...
- James Suggett, Honduras Withdraws from ALBA, El Salvador Won’t Join Despite FMLN Support, 1/15/10, Venezuelanalysis, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/...
- Leonard Cohen, Democracy Official Music Video, 5/14/08, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/...