Strategic Election Reform is a position in the electoral reform debate. Electoral reform is a debate about what sort of election rules we ought to use. Strategic Election Reform(SER) holds that there are two fundamental types of elections: winner-take-all (single-seated) and winner-doesn't-take-all (multi-seated) and that we need both to sustain a healthy democracy. An implication of SER is that it is because we only use winner-take-all elections in the US that our democracy has been so unhealthy in recent years. It makes our politics tilt to effective single-party rule at the state and national levels. If we used winner-doesn't-take-all 3-seated elections* for state representative elections then more elections would become competitive and neither major party could dominate our national politics. If neither major party could get a "permanent majority", it would make their rivalry no longer "cut-throat" and help to transform them both into better parties. The cumulative effects of the transformations caused by Strategic Election Reform would be to make our democracy more inclusive and dynamic.
That's the basic pitch of Strategic Election Reform. Here is an entry where I went into more details. SER is a little different than other electoral reform strategies, because it holds that a simple rule change in seemingly unimportant elections would spill over to improve the system as a whole, regardless of what other election rules are used.
It also tries to decentralize influence, not power. It does not try to end the fact that the US has two major parties. Instead, it promotes the emergence of local third (LT) parties that specialize in contesting more local elections and otherwise engage in civil-issue advocacy, which would include voting strategically together in less local elections. If these LT parties often were the decisive voters in less local winner-take-all elections then that would change the dynamics of those elections and the characters of both of our two major parties.
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* The 3-seated election rule advocated by SER is 3-seated
Hare Largest Remainder. This is the only form of "proportional representation" that works almost exactly like our current election rule, ie there is one candidate per party and one vote per voter. What it does is match as much as possible the percent of the three seats a party wins with its percent of the votes received. This is done for all of the competing parties. That may seem complicated but it results in a relatively simple rule.
There are basically two likely possible outcomes. The most likely outcome is that the top three candidates, those who get the most votes, win the three contested seats. The second possible outcome is that the top candidate beats the third place candidate by more than one-third of the total vote. In that case, the top candidate wins two seats for her or his party and gets to pick a team-mate to hold the second seat. And there is a third unlikely (unless you live in Russia) possible outcome where the first candidate beats the second place candidate by more than two-thirds of the total vote. In that case, (s)he wins three seats for her or his party and gets to pick two team-mates to hold the other seats. So if the percent of the vote received were split in four ways: 40, 30, 20, 10% then the top three candidates would get elected. But if the percent of the vote received were: 50, 35, 10, 5 then, since 50-15=35>33.333, the top candidate who won half of the vote would win two seats and the first runner-up would win one seat.
If you compare the percent of seats won with the percent of the vote received, it is apparent that this winner-doesn't-take-all election rule is biased in favor of smaller parties or the biggest party. The first bias serves to counter the persistent bias in winner-take-all elections in favor of larger parties. The second bias is less than it would be if we used our standard winner-take-all election rule. It incentives the bigger party to campaign hard to get a majority.
If 3-seated Hare Largest Remainder were used for state representative elections then third party representatives would determine which of the two major parties would be in power in the state house of representatives. The leaders of the major party voted into power by the state representatives every two years could be given extra powers to make sure they can get things done even though their party controls only one-third-plus of the state-representative seats. The large number of state-districts would spread out the LT parties whose small size and grass-roots orientation would make their hard to corrupt. This would then keep the major party leaders from abusing the extra powers given to them to stay in power in the state house of representatives indefinitely.