Over the summer, H5N1 continued to smoulder away in places like
Indonesia and China. Mostly in birds, sometimes in
humans, there have been more deaths from H5N1 - 70 (and more human cases - 104) in 2006 than 2005 (with three months to go). Indonesia now has had more deaths than any other country, and there remains a
reservoir of mixing and matching viruses, constantly mutating, that pose a significant risk for future illness. And there remains need to discuss it. As our wiki partner
revere sums up:
When we first began to cover the bird flu problem -- back in 2004 -- it wasn't being discussed much anywhere, including the blogs. We started talking about it for two main reasons. First, it seemed to us, as it seemed to many informed public health scientists, that this was a possible freight train coming down the tracks. We didn't know then (nor we know now) how far the train was, whether it would get all the way to us or how fast it would be going if it did get to us. But we could feel the vibrations on the tracks and we knew enough about train wrecks of the past to worry. That was the first reason.
The second reason is more complex. For us, the response (or lack of response) to the genuine possibility of a pandemic of influenza from an avian subtype that had already shown itself capable of infecting humans to deadly effect, was a grotesque metaphor for failed public health leadership, both in our on country (the US) and most everywhere else. The US CDC was preoccupied with a phantom bioterrorism threat and remodeling the agency and US public health in general to respond to the Bush administration message: "be afraid, be very afraid."
There is no current worldwide pandemic. That would take a viral mutation, recombination or reassortment that as yet has not happened. And compared to last year, we know much more about the virus, though not nearly enough. But the fact remains that pandemics (worldwide epidemics of Influenza A) happen, they happen on average three times a century, and we haven't had one since 1968. This virus, the H5N1, is especially alarming because of its high case fatality rate (58% of those infected die). In 1918, 675,000 Americans died from pandemic flu (50 million worldwide) with a CFR of only 2.5% (estimated).
Will H5N1 actually ever move to an easily transmissible form (it's not now) and become a pandemic virus? We don't know. We certainly don't have any proof it won't. And the consequences of this or some other flu virus going pandemic means that a great deal of preparation needs to be done in advance, similar to preparing for a hurricane (even if one doesn't come this year, it will happen sometime - ask New Orleans). Of course, with a pandemic, the problem is that everyone is affected everywhere, so there's no "outside" help. And your local hospital would be overwhelmed with the ill and the very ill (upwards of a third of the community might be sick).
For regular Daily Kos readers, these are familar concepts. But to take a fresh look, Flu Wiki is sponsoring Pandemic Flu Awareness Week starting Oct 9, a week from tomorrow. if you have a blog, consider posting a flu story, a link to pandemicflu.gov or Flu Wiki, or another site that helps explain the current situation (see link for suggestions). And understand that this is a non-profit citizen-sponsered preparedness effort that has never really been done before on any large scale. We called it a "public health experiment" when we first launched Flu Wiki. It still is, though a surprisingly effective one (we've been linked by World Bank, WHO, local health departments, Nature, the Harvard Business Review and multiple media sources, including most recently Slate).
We're not into being alarmists. But we are fond of communicating risk, and you need to know more about the story that the media got tired of covering.