You want this guy on YOUR side.
If you haven’t been tracking Ukraine news closely recently, the largest Ukrainian offensive operation since Summer 2023 has been launched. The ongoing operation appears to be comparable, in terms of number of Ukrainian units committed, to Ukraine’s 2022 Kharkiv Counteroffensive or 2022 Kherson Counteroffensive. Ukrainian regular army troops have boots on the ground in Russia for the first time since the start of the War.
The Battle of Kursk (2024) has begun.
The Ukrainian army achieved both tactical and strategic surprise, amassing a large operation force including some of its most elite units. matched up against the dregs of the Russian army, where Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast and Russia’s Kursk Oblast meet.
Ukrainian units confirmed to be participating in the operation thus far include
In particular, the 82nd and 80th Air both employ American Stryker and German Marder IFVs, giving the powerful modern NATO standard infantry fighting vehicles, which along with their elite paratrooper training and selective recruitment, makes them some of the finest heavy infantry units Ukraine can deploy in the field.
Six brigades matches the number of regular army brigades Ukraine devoted to the Kherson Counteroffensive in 2022, or roughly the same number as employed during the Kharkiv Counteroffensive. it would represent roughly half the 12 Brigades employed by Ukraine during the Summer 2023 Counteroffensive, or the size of the “main force” Ukraine sent toward Robotyne.
That is to say, even if this were the entire extent of Ukraine’s offensive force, it represents a significant commitment of a major force, by all rights this is no small operation of few hundred, or even a few thousand soldiers. It appears to be a force commitment north of 10,000 troops.
Their target is the Russian Army’s Northern Grouping of Forces (AKA “Sever,” North in Russian). This operation group is one of six operational groups that are de facto semi-independent field armies operating in Ukraine Northern Group was confirmed to have been formed in April, 2024 under the command of General Aleksandr Lapin, centered around Belogorad and Kursk Oblasts, east of Sumy and North of Kharkiv.
Open in new tab to expand
Shortly thereafter, the Northern Group launched a large scale surprise attack towards Kharkiv (see above) out of Belgorod Oblast. Rapid Russian gains over the first 2-3 days of the attack caused considerable consternation, but Ukraine quickly contained the Russian advances, permitting a gain of only 10-12km.
Fierce fighting has sporadically continued in this sector, but the lines have been largely static since early May.
Two things may have made Kursk Oblast an appealing target.
First, the lack of first rate equipment. ISW noted that Northern Group has not been one of Russia’s priorities for the best and newest equipment, as Russia has been prioritizing its assaults in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas on the Eastern Front.
This lack of first-rate equipment and troops was likely exacerbated in the Kursk area by the fact that Russia was using Northern Group to launch a significant and ongoing offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast. Given that Ukraine had never launched a large-scale ground invasion of Russia with its soldiers, it would be natural for Russia to focus its best troops and equipment in the area that was seeing combat, and leaving the dregs for the troops defending a border they likely never thought would be crossed in force.
Indeed, this lack of first-rate equipment was heavily exploited by Ukraine’s forces, in particular the use of Russians in this sector of older drone models. The Russo-Ukrainian War has seen a bewildering array of innovations and advances in drone and counter-drone technology, but one place where the technological race is constant is in the field of electronic jamming and communications.
While it’s rare for first-rate jamming technology to completely overcome all electronic defenses, and conversely, for drones to fly completely free in the face of enemy electronic warfare, the advances on both sides barely keep pace with each other to maintain an uneasy equilibrium. A unit that is operating outdated drones is susceptible to mass jamming.
This was exactly what the Ukrainians did, employing massed jammers attuned to the frequency of older Russian drone models, grounding the defenders’ drones for the critical first 72 hours of the attacks while Ukraine blew past Russia’s prepared defenses along the border.
The second vulnerability I suspect Ukrainians noted was the Russian commander in this sector: Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin. To put it bluntly, General Lapin may be one of the most incompetent senior generals that Russia possesses with a truly dismal combat record.
During the initial invasion, General Lapin was in command of Army Group Center, given the responsibility of capturing Kyiv with what were thought to be overwhelming forces. He failed, losing much of the cream of the pre-war Russian Army in the process.
After ordering the retreat from Kyiv, General Lapin was reassigned to a more quiet sector of the front, presumably in hopes his incompetence would not hurt Russia further. His assignment? Kharkiv. Lapin’s incompetence is widely regarded as a key factor in the Russians’ utter rout during the 2022 Kharkiv Counteroffensive and the loss of Izium and Lyman.
General Lapin lost his field command after this debacle but must have some incredible connections. Because Lapin was promptly given a plum position as Chief of Staff of the Russian Army.
General Lapin’s glorious return to field command was as commander of Northern Group, where he botched the surprise attack on Kharkiv… and now he appears to have been in the crosshairs of the Ukrainian Army with his responsibilities including defense of Kursk Oblast.
Based on reports primarily from Russian sources due to Ukrainians maintaining operational security, Ukraine launched a “drone blitzkrieg.” Ukraine massed electronic jammers that grounded most of Russia’s outdated drone resources defending the frontline trenches. Ukraine’s new air-to-air FPV drones intercepted Russia’s eyes in the sky, the Orlan and other reconnaissance drones Russia has grown utterly reliant upon.
Blinded, and unable to employ drones, a key part of their defensive triad, Ukrainian forces surged forward through gaps in the Russian defenses and began pouring into Kursk Oblast.
Ukraine relied on the same tactics as it did in the 2022 Kharkiv Counteroffensive, relying on speed to overcome weak Russian defenses that were undermanned. Each time Ukrainian forces would run into a Russian defensive strongpoint, rather than waste time clearing each strongpoint, Ukraine would leave a small holding force to pin them down, while the rest of the forces surged into the rearward areas.
Without drone swarms to strike Ukrainian engineering units, Ukraine quickly cleared its way through Russian defenses and began making dramatic advances into Russian territory.
The situation remains difficult for outsiders to gain a comprehensive picture of the battlelines. Due to Ukraine bypassing many Russian strongpoints, Ukraine was attacking positions 10km+ behind positions where fierce fighting was ongoing, as follow up Ukrainian units engaged in fierce “mop-up” operations against isolated Russian strongpoints.
Three things indicate things are going well for the Ukrainians.
First, the simple fact of Ukraine’s continued advance deeper in Russian territory.
Second, numerous videos and photos from the front lines of entire units of Russian soldiers surrendering.
And additionally, the fact as of August 10th, Ukraine’s supply lines are open—as evidenced by the fact Ukraine is towing damaged vehicles from the front back to the rear for repair.
Literally the only way frontline Ukrainian vehicle losses could be towed to the rear is if the routes from the front lines to the rearward areas are open and secure.
This means that Ukrainian advances may temporarily have left many Russian strong points in the rear, but these strong points likely have been cleared now, verifying Ukrainian claims (and contradicting some Russian bloggers).
I am hoping Ukraine has further fresh troops ready to go to continue feeding this assault, as it has been a smashing success thus far—but Russia is slowly transferring reinforcements in, and inevitably, Ukraine will be faced with the prospect of eventually facing more of Russia’s best troops.
To hang on to, or expand the amount of Russian territory that they have seized, I dearly hope there are more Brigades ready to go—or to open a second prong to the assault into Kursk.
I thought the news of intense shelling of Tetkino on Aug. 10th was interesting, because if Ukraine’s ambition is to occupy a large chunk of Kursk Oblast, Rylsk is a good ambitious target—and the current advance towards Koronevo would be perfectly complemented by another axis of advance from Tetkino.
(This is complete speculation on my part, there is no indication thus far a second prong exists)
Whatever the case may be, what I think is one of the most fascinating aspects of this campaign is how it was made possible by Ukrainian deception… and cold blooded and brilliant ruthlessness on the part of CIC Syrskyi.
From April and through the summer, there were numerous comments from anonymous Ukrainian high military officials and US officials slipping information to media outlets commenting about how close Ukraine’s army was to collapse.
Numerous articles emphasized how Ukraine was just hanging on, waiting for the arrival of additional US aid and the fall, when the influx of conscripts finishing their training from the new Ukrainian Conscription law was expected to arrive.
Numerous comments were leaked from the front lines, complaining of a lack of artillery shells and equipment, despite the US passing the $61B Ukraine aid bill in April.
Every indication seemed to suggest Ukraine barely hanging on, hoping just to get by till the fall and winter when it might have a fighting chance.
Apparently, this was a ruse, and a ruthless ruse by General Syrskyi.
I say ruse, because clearly, Ukraine was hoarding both men and ammunition all throughout the summer. Even just six patarooper and mechanized infantry brigades is a significant force, parts of which General Syrskyi could have released at any time to relieve pressure on various parts of the front.
For example, north of Avdiivka, Gen. Syrskyi made the decision to rotate the crack 47th Mechanized Brigade off the line, and replace their position at Ocheretyne with the 115th Mechanized Brigade. The decision was noted to be one of “desperation” as the 115th Mech had not completed its training and was equipped with predominantly old Soviet equipment. With second rate equipment and undertrained men, the unit was subsequently mauled by the Russian VDV elite troops thrown against it, being driven back again and again while taking reportedly heavy losses.
Over the next four months, the 115th Mech would lose almost 15km of ground. It did not imperil any other Ukrainian units, and the Russians were still 10-15km from any notable strategically important targets, but Syrskyi’s decision to leave the novice troops to continue to get mauled was interpreted by outside observers as a sign of Ukrainian weakness and desperation.
Instead, it appears to be representative of Syrskyi’s cold-blooded ruthlessness and willingness to lose ground and men—if he can preserve an offensive force that could accomplish something of greater significance.
I say that with the greatest admiration. It remains to be seen if the gamble will pay off, or how much. But thus far, it seems to have been a gamble worth taking.