US Drug Policy
US drug policy in Colombia consists mainly of the fumigation policy which, according to one Embassy official who I spoke to during a delegation in Bogota in 2006, is funded to a tune of about $4 million a week, coming to $208 million a year. The fumigations have been extremely controversial to say the least. Fumigations are blamed for the death of legal crops while coca, the plant used to make cocaine, has not been harmed (something I can attest to having seen it), and in numerous cases coca was not even present. After the first rounds of fumigation in December 2001 in Putumayo, a province in southern Colombia, data was collected on what crops were lost. Total, in just the municipaliy of the Valle del Guamuez, over 6,500 hectares over legal crops were lost, while only 894 hectares of coca was lost after some of the most intense aerial spraying that the area has seen. Secondly, human health is effected, as countless poor farmers (campesinos) who grow coca have complained of rashes, and one study done by an Ecuadorian Doctor showed that people exposed to the spraying have a far higher percentage of damaged genes than those not exposed to the fumigations.
Essentially, what is being sprayed is a highly concentrated form of Round-UP, added to it is a chemical called Cosmoflux, which is used to ensure that the spray sticks to plants better. Other chemicals, which are unknown, are added as well, meaning that any study on glyfosate alone, the main ingredient in Round-Up, really does not accurately show the effects of the spray used in Colombia. Also, the spray has caused displacement. One refugee in southern Colombia, during my visit there in August, told me that she was forced to leave her farm after all of her food crops were sprayed. While they may not have been sprayed intentionally, when sprayed, the chemicals literally just hover in the air, sometimes as high as 15 or 20 feet, allowing the wind to send them anywhere (this information taken from footage taken of the fumigations in 2001 by a priest in Putumayo which I was able to get my hands on). Lastly, it simply does not work. Despite record fumigations in 2005 (the latest year which coca data is available), coca growth increased! So besides all the other issues, the fumigations are ineffective at best, as farmers have been able to develop techniques to minimize losses, something they have done quite well.
Manual eradication is the other option used. Teams of hundreds of men are brought to where coca is, guarded by the police, and tear coca out of the earth by hand, along with some tools. This is doomed to fail as well. Farmers, if they are around/can return in time, can replant. Also, if they catch word of the eradication team, they can harvest before the team arrives. Lastly, and most importantly, it offers no alternatives. Coca farmers grow coca due to a lack of infrastructure, state presense and the inability for any other crops to be profitable. If you tear coca out of the ground, you have not addressed any of the reasons why campesinos grow coca. All you have done is temporarily set them back on their harvest, which, as experience with fumigation shows us, farmers can overcome quite easily.
Paramilitary Disarmament
While recent revelations by paramilitary boss Salvatore Mancuso are a small step in the right direction, the peace process with the right-wing death-squad umbrella organization known as the AUC has been disastorous, at best. While the truth has been revealed to a very small extent, and grave sites of the disappeared have been somewhat exhumed, most fighters are unlikely to face any sort of punishment for their crimes, whether it be drug-trafficking, committing massacres or forced disappearance. Not only that, some of these same fighters have created new paramilitary groups all across Colombia. Along with this theme, many fighters have committed crimes long after demobilizing. While a small number have been arrested, with the Colombian justice system, it is safe to assume many more are still roaming free.
The most famous of these cases is the case of a paramilitary boss named Jorge 40. As commander of the notorious Nothern Block of the AUC, Jorge 40 is responsible for countless murders committed in the Colombian civil war in the last 5 years or so. Not only that, he is responsible for hundreds of kilos of cocaine being sent to the United States, something the US government is well aware of as they have asked for his extradition. During the peace process in Santa Fe de Ralito, Jorge 40 signed a cease-fired agreement. It was later discovered that the demobilization of his Block was a sham in which the fighter to weapon ratio was about 2:1; poor criminals were paid to act as fighters and learn the anthem of the AUC amongst other responsibilities; he maintained a rear-guard in tact, that did not demobilize, in order to continue drug-trafficking and killing; and his laptop shows he is responsible for at least 558 murders committed during the peace process. His version of the truth may be coming soon, but revelations over his continued role in Colombia's war (which plagued the FARC during their peace process from 1999-2002) will greatly test the Law of Justice and Peace, which was passed by Colombia's Congress meant to rule the paramilitary peace process. Due to a provision in this Law, Jorge 40 would lose all his benefits, including avoiding extradition to the US, for violating the cease-fire agreement.
Lastly, I wrote about in an earlier blog of mine, according to a very well-known and internationally recognized human rights group, the Colombian Commission of Jurists, in the first half of 2006, when the culprit was known, paramilitaries killed or disappeared the most people out of any armed actor in the Colombian conflict. So despite the demobilization of over 35,000 troops (well, in some cases, alleged demobilization), paramilitaries are the main killers in Colombia's conflict. While the number of murders have dropped, especially committed by paramilitaries, the fact that they remain as the largest culprit in Colombia's war is a trend that cannot be ignored. The success of the peace process with the AUC hinges on the ability to keep ex-fighters from picking up their guns and new "paras" replacing the old groups. So far, on both of these fronts, the process has failed miserably. With regards to truth, justice and reparations, I will state that until now the process has failed on these aspects completely. But due to confessions just starting, and small steps in the right direction, I will avoid commenting for now (later post probably). I simply would prefer to see where the Mancuso testimony goes before commenting. So far though, things look bleak.
Uribe's War Against the Guerrillas
Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe was elected in 2002, and re-elected in 2006 (a first for any Colombian President after the new constitution in 1991), on the idea of taking initiative against the guerrillas, mainly the FARC, and going on a complete offensive. While roads have gotten safer, kidnappings have dropped (though no one is truly immune as I learned on August afternoon in Bogota), and the police or army has presence in all 1,098 Colombian municipalities, the guerrillas have not been truly pushed back. Just this year, in the first three weeks alone, the guerrillas have been quite active (see here, here, here, here, here (spanish).
Also, there is much debate whether the FARC guerrillas have really been beaten back or whether they have decided to "weather the storm" by strategically retreating back in the mountains they know intricately and opt for ambushes and hit-and-runs over open combat with Army or Police. Basic counter-insurgency warns us to make sure that success is not mistaken for a strategic retreat. General Pace may have forgotten this lesson. In 2006, the FARC carried out 367 attacks against the Army in 2006, or about one a day. This does not include any attacks against the civilian population, which the FARC are notorious for as well. Secondly, the FARC were able to realize two paro armados (armed stoppages) in which all economic activity is stopped along with the flow of any products or people. Anyone caught on the road is either kidnapped, or maybe allowed to go but their vehicle is burnt and belongings stolen, if not all of the above. While a paro armado may not seem like much, they are devastating upon the people and economies. Also not included is the war between the ELN and FARC raging in the department of Arauca. Since fighting broke out in November 2005, hundreds have died. Currently, traveling to the rural areas of the department is near impossible as the fighting is quite intense and regular. Also should be mentioned the disturbing regularity of murders carried out by the FARC in the department, against the civilian population.
The fact that the Colombian Army has soldiers in all the municipalities is also not significant. In my travels in Putumayo, a historic guerrilla stronghold and target of US military and anti-drug aid, in August of 2006, I saw groups of soliders on three occassions. The first was a roadblock they had set up on the outskirts of the urban part of Puerto Asis, Putumayo's most economically active city. The second was a group who had a roadblock protecting one side of a bridge. The third time was in Orito, about 10 days later. While sitting on the balcony of my hotel, a group of about 15 soldiers walked through part of the urban area of the city and continued walking down another road, totalling about 10 minutes in the urban area of Orito. All the other times I saw soldiers, it was a single soldier, usually standing on a corner in some small town on the side of the main road in Putumayo. Both times that I traveled at night in Putumayo, no soldiers were at any roadblocks, even in the rural areas. Guerrillas easily could have traveled undisturbed. In fact, leaving a small village called El Prado in rural Orito, as dusk was falling, our motorcycle drove by two children, both probably 14 or 15 years old walking, one with a large gun thrown over his back. (We were not stopped.)
El Prado is a typical small village in southern, rural Colombia, with no state presense whatsoever. There is no running water system, no electricity, no sanitation system; only farms with both coca and licit crops. Fumigation planes had flown overhead days before, and military helicopters were a regular occurence. The area is also home to some incredibly thick jungle, with foot-trails hidden from the air by the canopy of massive trees. El Prado is a typical place where guerrillas can find an ample supply of poor campesinos, kids to be recruited (voluntarily or not), coca as a source of money, and easy hiding places. While helicopters fly over head, guerrillas could easily do their work unharmed, and possibly unnoticed in the jungle. Until the Colombian state can address the causes of the war and its roots and have a true state presense on the ground in places like El Prado, the guerrillas will never be defeated, and never be beaten back. They will simply continue to duck into the jungle to avoid losses, only to comeback and continue fighting, as we see now and as Colombian history tells us.
Conclusions
If this is the great "model" being pointed to by General Pace, he is completely ignorant at best, or completely wrong at worst. Fumigations have not, and do not work. The only things they are good for are creating anti-government sentiments and further isolating poor farmers. The paramilitary peace process is in shambles, using a nice description. Lastly, the guerrillas have simply backed off for now, weathering the offensive storm, probably still making millions upon millions of dollars off of the drug trade while minimizing casualties. If the same policies were adopted in Afghanistan, the failures would be more obvious and blatant and simply will continue the war there, causing the lives of both American Troops and Afghani Civilians.
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