The distinction turns on the following point: Whether the Kyl-Lieberman Amendment ("K-L Amendment") provides the necessary authority to the President to use military forces against Iran.
Bush is arguably restricted from unilaterally attacking Iran by the War Powers Act, which provides that presidents must withdraw military forces from combat missions that are not authorized by Congress. That is why the Iraq War Resolution ("IWR") was necessary to authorize the President's use of force in Iraq. Under the IWR, the President is authorized to use armed forces "as he deems necessary" to "defend the national security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq." The IWR is the "specific statutory authorization" required under the War Powers Act, and is thus the technically legal basis for our current presence in Iraq.
Of course, it's unclear right now what "threat" is posed to the national security of the United States "by Iraq," since the Iraqi regime is no more. Arguably, because the IWR declares that it is the "policy" of the United States not only to topple Saddam Hussein (mission accomplished!), but also to "promote the emergency of a democratic government to replace that regime" (mission impossible!), it is not hard to see how the current troop presence is technically "authorized" because it is in our national security interest to stablize the elected Iraqi government ("they stand up, we stand down").
The debate between Obama and Clinton is about the K-L Amendment and what it does and does not authorize with regard to the use of force against Iran. Clinton is right that, by its plain terms, the Kyl-Lieberman Amendment only allows for the designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force ("IRG") as a terrorist group. The consequences of this designation are that the Treasury Department can freeze any funds or assets held by that group and that economic and political sanctions can be levied against that group or individuals associated with the IRG.
So, when Clinton says, "I voted for sanctions and diplomatic pressure against Iran," she's correct in part. However, under the K-L Amendment, the "policy" of the United States was declared to be to "combat, contain, and roll back" violent and destablizing Iranian influence inside Iraq. Further, it was declared to be in our "vital national interest" to prevent Iran from waging a proxy war against the Iraqi government and our troops through assistance to Shiite militants (akin to Hizbollah).
If our forces are currently authorized to be in Iraq to stablize Iraqi Democracy, and if the President believes it is necessary to use military force against the IRG or Iranian targets to prevent their destabilization of the Iraqi government, then arguably the K-L Amendment extends the IWR military mission and implicit authority to include an attack on Iranian targets to prevent the destablization of our "authorized" purpose.
The Webb Amendment, S. 759 (later co-sponsored by Sen. Clinton), prohibits the use of funds for any military action against Iran, except "pursuant to a specific authorization of Congrsss." The text of the Webb Amendment states that such specific authorization must be in the form of a statute enacted after the date the Webb Amendment is enacted.
That last provision is important: if the Webb Amendment passes, it denies funding for any military action against Iran (except to repel a direct attack or thwart an "imminent" attack from Iran) except as authorized, and any such authority must be new authority, not the IWR.
The exceptions to the Webb Amendment, however, create a loophole that dovetails with the K-L Amendment. If the IRG is making bomb components, for example, inside Iranian territory, and then exporting those components to its Shiite Militant proxies inside Iraq to destablize the Iraqi state, then the Webb Amendment's limitation on the use of funds does not apply.
Moreover, although the Webb Amendment ostensibly denies funds for military actions against Iran, it does not explicitly deny the legal authority of the President to attack Iran. As a matter of politics, we've all seen how much difficulty Congress has with "not supporting the troops" by "cutting funding." With the billions of dollars sloshing around Iraq unaccounted for, the prohibition on the use of funds by the military to attack Iran is a bit quaint, as if a green eyeshade wearing accountant is going to stop a Four-Star General from obeying a direct order from the CinC.
The Obama Resolution takes another approach by overtly removing the legal "fig leaf" that Bush could argue provides him with the implicit legal authority to attack Iran. The Obama Resolution thus does not have to be, in any sense, "binding," because the binding framework is the War Powers Act itself. The Obama Resolution expressly removes any implication of authority created by the K-L Amendment or the IWR to attack Iran. Granted, the President could simply thumb his nose at the law and simply attack, based on a memo written by his personal attorney, "Fredo" Gonzalez.
Both the Webb Amendment and the Obama Resolution are necessary eleents of the push to stop World War III with Iran. They are both imperfect and ultimately depend on the good faith of a President who has shown nothing but bad faith in his relations with Congress since the Dems took power. So, to a certain extent, both can be criticized as mere "political posturing." However, neither can be accused of simply copying the other. They both serve a purpose, working hand-in-hand, in constraining the President's ability to attack Iran, and claim that he did so with bipartisan support
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