Lt. Col. Paul Yingling published this absolutely brilliant article in this month's AFJ, and it reflects a lot of things I (and people on this site, likely) have been thinking for a while, but, naturally, far more articulately and authoritatively. The gist of his argument is that from a military perspective, America's problems in this war and Vietnam are related to "a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps." Our generals, like too many across the course of history, have prepared our military to fight the last war - World War II, and to a lesser extent, Gulf War I. Worse still, they have been remarkably timid in providing sound policy advice to civilian leaders who have sought to use the military to accomplish political goals. The fact that the current administration has been both so brash, ignorant and careless with our military and foreign policy makes this failure all the more problematic and has contributed to our current quagmire in Iraq.
I'm a student of defense policy and military theory, as well as a political scientist (and a chemist, not that that applies here), so its nice to see a well grounded theoretical and practical article approaching military issues. Yingling identifies the problem, expounds on it, and offers concrete remedies to the challenge. I particularly like that he both criticizes the tactical and institutional bias of our military towards "army combat" (A feature much commented on by many other observers) - what I call our strategic failure - but also, the policy weakness of our generals in providing solid military advice to civilian leaders, and in standing up to them, publicly, when civilian leaders make poor decisions despite or in spite of countervailing military advice. This policy or political failure has allowed the military to be abused by the Bush administration, and has lead to the hundreds of thousands of deaths in Iraq (among other debacles).
Now, I certainly don't propose that the military be given more political independence; nor should it be permitted to buck civilian control when it feels appropriate. At the same time, however, despite the fact that the Department of Defense is an executive branch agency, war and war policy do not belong soley in the hands of the President. Congress, too, has a Constitutional role to play. Yingling's proposed solutions are thus particularly valuable at this juncture, as they encourage Congressional oversight and involvement in military affairs. Congressional hearings and requests for information can and should provide an outlet for sound military advice to reach unbiased, or at least, bipartisan ears. In Yingling's words (emphasis added):
Neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are likely to remedy the shortcomings in America's general officer corps. Indeed, the tendency of the executive branch to seek out mild-mannered team players to serve as senior generals is part of the problem. The services themselves are equally to blame. The system that produces our generals does little to reward creativity and moral courage. Officers rise to flag rank by following remarkably similar career patterns. Senior generals, both active and retired, are the most important figures in determining an officer's potential for flag rank. The views of subordinates and peers play no role in an officer's advancement; to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties.
If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities. Congress can create such incentives by exercising its proper oversight function in three areas. First, Congress must change the system for selecting general officers. Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America's military power. Third, the Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.
To improve the creative intelligence of our generals, Congress must change the officer promotion system in ways that reward adaptation and intellectual achievement. Congress should require the armed services to implement 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers are often the first to adapt because they bear the brunt of failed tactics most directly. They are also less wed to organizational norms and less influenced by organizational taboos. Junior leaders have valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of their leaders, but the current promotion system excludes these judgments. Incorporating subordinate and peer reviews into promotion decisions for senior leaders would produce officers more willing to adapt to changing circumstances, and less likely to conform to outmoded practices.
Congress should also modify the officer promotion system in ways that reward intellectual achievement. The Senate should examine the education and professional writing of nominees for three- and four-star billets as part of the confirmation process. The Senate would never confirm to the Supreme Court a nominee who had neither been to law school nor written legal opinions. However, it routinely confirms four-star generals who possess neither graduate education in the social sciences or humanities nor the capability to speak a foreign language. Senior general officers must have a vision of what future conflicts will look like and what capabilities the U.S. requires to prevail in those conflicts. They must possess the capability to understand and interact with foreign cultures. A solid record of intellectual achievement and fluency in foreign languages are effective indicators of an officer's potential for senior leadership.
To reward moral courage in our general officers, Congress must ask hard questions about the means and ways for war as part of its oversight responsibility. Some of the answers will be shocking, which is perhaps why Congress has not asked and the generals have not told. Congress must ask for a candid assessment of the money and manpower required over the next generation to prevail in the Long War. The money required to prevail may place fiscal constraints on popular domestic priorities. The quantity and quality of manpower required may call into question the viability of the all-volunteer military. Congress must re-examine the allocation of existing resources, and demand that procurement priorities reflect the most likely threats we will face. Congress must be equally rigorous in ensuring that the ways of war contribute to conflict termination consistent with the aims of national policy. If our operations produce more enemies than they defeat, no amount of force is sufficient to prevail. Current oversight efforts have proved inadequate, allowing the executive branch, the services and lobbyists to present information that is sometimes incomplete, inaccurate or self-serving. Exercising adequate oversight will require members of Congress to develop the expertise necessary to ask the right questions and display the courage to follow the truth wherever it leads them.
Finally, Congress must enhance accountability by exercising its little-used authority to confirm the retired rank of general officers. By law, Congress must confirm an officer who retires at three- or four-star rank. In the past this requirement has been pro forma in all but a few cases. A general who presides over a massive human rights scandal or a substantial deterioration in security ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to suffer the same penalty. As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. By exercising its powers to confirm the retired ranks of general officers, Congress can restore accountability among senior military leaders.
I've taken the liberty of excerpting only the policy solutions aspect of this article, but the entire thing is worth a read. In particular, for those who do not have a background in military theory or recent military history, this article will provide a lot of great background on the past half century of American military history and theory. Yingling is a pleasure to read, as he has a refreshingly direct style and is not afraid to cite history and/or other authors in clarifying or strengthening his arguments.
As far as policy proposals go, I think what Yingling is suggesting is a particularly good proposal. The military and the war powers should not be under the control of a single branch, particularly not in the light of the past 6 years of Presidental abuses of power. By reasserting itself (with the blessing of an esteemed commander such as Yingling), Congress will help to re-professionalize our military (which, in military jargon, means to take out of the hands of political stooges) and also strengthen the kind of meritocratic approach to leadership which is the governor of advancement in the lower ranks of the officer corps.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/...
I look forward to any comments, both on the subject itself and also my handling of it. Too much policy, not enough background? Too much detail? Too much blockquoting? Let me know.
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