"Failure to act (on the I/P conflict) would prove extremely costly. It would not only undermine current efforts to weaken extremist groups, bolster our moderate allies and rally regional support to stabilize Iraq and contain Iran, but would also risk permanent loss of the two-state solution as settlements expand and become entrenched and extremists on both sides consolidate their hold. In short, the next six to twelve months may well represent the last chance for a fair, viable and lasting solution." U.S./Middle East Project Position Paper (USMEP)
At the end of March, the USMEP released a position paper titled, "A Last Chance For A Two-State Israel-Palestine Agreement: A Bipartisan Statement On U.S. Middle East Peacemaking". This paper was delivered to President Obama from a group of ten former senior U.S. government officials who are Senior Advisors of USMEP. The President has signaled his intention to meet with these signatories.
Yesterday, Ha'aretz reported that Middle East Quartet Envoy, Tony Blair, stated a new strategy for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks is being developed with most of the input coming from the highest levels of the Obama Administration. This plan will be released in the next 5 to 6 weeks. On April 30th, National Security Adviser, General James Jones, told the Washington Post that the U.S. will submit its own ideas to help break any logjams between the Israelis and Palestinians. Due to the significance of the paper's writers, their positions may have great importance with the President and his Administration as a new Israel/Palestine peace proposal is prepared. Below is a summary of the paper with respect to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
The list of Signatories:
Brent Scowcroft: Chair, U.S./Middle East Project; Former National Security Adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush
Zbignew Brzezinski: Former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter
Chuck Hagel: Former U.S.Senator (Nebraska); Distinguished Professor at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Lee Hamilton: Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Co-Chair Iraq Study Group; Vice Chairman 9/11 Commission; Former Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Carla Hills: Former U.S. Trade Representative for President George H.W. Bush; Former Secreatry of Housing and Urban Development for President Gerald Ford
Nancy Kassenbaum-Baker: Former U.S. Senator (Kansas)
Thomas Pickering: Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel for President Ronald Reagan; Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations for President George H.W. Bush; Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs for President Bill Clinton
Theodore Sorensen: Former Special Consel and Adviser to President John Kennedy
Paul Volker: Chair of President Barack Obama's Economic Advisory Group; Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve; Honorary Chair of the Trilateral Commission
James Wolfensohn: Former President of the World Bank; Former Special Envoy for the Gaza Disengagement for the Quartet on the Middle East
I. Arab-Israeli Peace In The Context Of American Interests And Capabilities
American Presidents have struggled to define how best to help Israelis and Arabs resolve bitter disputes left behind by wars and dislocations in 1948 and 1967. While the intimacy of the American-Israeli relationship is highly valued by both nations, this intimacy presents policy and security challenges for the U.S. in the Middle East and beyond. The U.S. has long had strategic interests in the Middle East: Israel's survival, assured access to vital natural resources, security of transportation routes, close relations with friends and allies in the Arab world, and post-9/11 national security needs. The achievement of these interests is greatly facilitated and improved when the U.S. is seen as genuinely pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.
Our relationship to Israel is what makes the U.S. central in brokering a comprehensive peace. Security assistance and strategic dialogue aim to guarantee Israel's qualitative military edge over an array of enemies, while strengthening the U.S.-Israel security partnership. There are settlers and their political supporters in Israel, however, that oppose peace. Those Israeli politicians who understand that a relationship based on trust with the U.S. and President Obama is best for Israel's security need to challenge this strong and vocal minority.
The ongoing defeat, injustice, and humiliation of Arabs and Muslims in the Arab-Israeli conflict allows groups like al-Qaeda to target these people for recruitment. While many of these recruits have found their way to Iraq, others await opportunities to strike at American interests and persons. Also, while the Iranian government has not offered significant material support to the Palestinians, it has used their misery to gain favor with the Arab world and challenge governments friendly to the U.S..
Since enemies of the U.S. avoid confronting America's military superiority, they wage information warfare and practice terror by taking advantage of failed and failing states to kill Americans and defeat American interests. Therefore, it is essential that the Obama Administration make Arab-Israeli peace a high national security priority from the beginning. While a comprehensive peace will not eliminate al-Qaeda, it would help reduce the ability for America's enemies to use the conflict for exploitative purposes.
At the center of the conflict are two peoples who want and deserve peace after all these years of struggle. Each side believes it is the other that holds the key to peace and that the other needs to take the first step. The U.S. role is to do all it can to help restore trust and confidence by building effective cooperation and limiting breakdowns in the process. The U.S. will need to use a variety of diplomatic techniques, such as persuasion, inducement, reward, and punishment to convince each side that compromise is essential.
Significant time, energy, and resources will be needed by any person or Administration actively involved in the conflict's diplomacy. Since the President has to deal with many existing foreign and domestic issues, as well as unexpected crisis, he will need to appoint a Special Envoy to focus on the conflict. This Envoy, in whom the President needs to have extraordinary confidence, can reserve Presidential input for truly decisive moments, while pressing the parties closer. The parties must have confidence that the Envoy is impartial and speaks authoritatively for the President. If not, there will be successive attempts to end-run the Envoy and throw the U.S. efforts into chaos.
By being actively involved, President Obama will become involved in controversy with Jewish-American and Christian Zionist groups that voice the positions of uncompromising Israeli politicians. The President needs to explain to the American people why the conflict must end, and why he needs to invest the necessary time and energy. In the end, extremist and terrorist enemies of America are counting on the continuation of this conflict. Avoiding the difficult tasks of mediation cedes the field to our enemies. Seen in this light, the unpleasant and frustrating aspects of the Arab-Israeli peace process are considerably less costly than neglect.
II. OBSTACLES TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS
There is deep distrust at the local popular level on both sides. Palestinians feel the demoralizing weight of occupation and have little confidence in Israel's willingness to lift it voluntarily. Israelis see violence and terror from Palestinians as the continuation of a long history targeting Jews.
There is a history of weak governments and chronic disunity in Israel. The Israeli government involves a multi-party coalition. The difficulties involved in holding these different groups together result in frequent government collapse. Due to these complexities, a Prime Minister interested in achieving a comprehensive peace will need enormous political skills, steady American support, cooperation from Arab parties, and good fortune.
There are splits within the Palestinian society and government. Since 2007, Hamas has ruled the Gaza Strip and Fatah governs the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the West Bank. The absence of Palestinian unity, at least in the form of a PA governing all of the Occupied Territories, makes it difficult for negotiations to succeed.
There are negative external influences from Iran. Through their support of Hamas and other Palestinian "rejectionist" groups, Iran aims to keep diplomacy from reaching closure. Also, the ongoing violence associated with the conflict offers Iran the opportunity to penetrate the Arab world politically and marginalize the U.S. strategically.
There has been a recent history of ineffective, half-hearted American facilitation. The Bush Adminstration was generally absent from the diplomatic process. The Annapolis Initiative is a flawed process, since it asks the Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate in good faith and implement the Road Map obligations with only part-time American involvement. It also discourages efforts aimed at identifying ways to bring elements of Hamas into the equation.
III.SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
If any agreement is to be reached, a legitimate, unified, and empowered Palestinian side to negotiate with Israel is needed. Direct U.S. engagement with Hamas may not now be practical, but shutting out the Movement and isolating Gaza has only made it stronger, and made Fatah weaker. There should be a shift from ousting Hamas to modifying its behavior, offer it inducements that will enable its more moderate elements to prevail, and cease discouraging Palestinian national reconciliation. It should also be made clear that a government that agrees to a ceasefire with Israel, accepts President Abbas as the chief negotiator, and commits to abiding by the results of a national referendum on a future peace agreement would not be boycotted or sanctioned.
In terms of territory, the borders of the two states would be based on the 1967 Armistice Line. Yet, they would be adjusted, by mutual consent, in order to take into account areas heavily populated by Israelis in the West Bank. Equivalent areas would be ceded to the Palestinians in exhange for these lands. The aim would be to incorporate large settlement blocs within Israel, while preserving Palestinian contiguity both within the West Bank and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This would provide each State with the territorial size determined by the 1967 line.
With respect to security, the borders between the two states must be physically secure and fully controlled for their entire length. A U.S.-led multinational force would be essential for a transitional period once a peace agreement is concluded. The transitional force, under a UN mandate, would feature American leadership of a NATO force supplemented by Jordanians, Egyptians,and Israelis. The force would habve a five-year, renewable mandate with the objective of achieving full Palestinian domination of security affairs within 15 years. Palestine would likely be non-militarized and special agreements would be needed for the use and regulation of its air space.
Jerusalem would be undivided and a home to both capitals. Jewish neighborhoods would fall under Israeli sovereignty. Arab, Muslim and Christian, neighborhoods would be administerdd by Palestine. Special secuirty and administrative arrangements would be needed for the Old City providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them.
With respect to the refugee issue, a formula must be found to protect Israel from an influx of refugees, and assist Palestine to absorb as many refugees as possible. It should, also, offer Palestinian refugees options for economically and socially productive, dignified lives in Palestine or elsewhere. Refugee camps, with the support of Arab nations, the U.S., and Israel, need to be closed after the resettlement.
Finally, water, issues will need to be addressed. The terms will need to be reached protecting Israel's access to acquifers located largely beneath Palestinian territory. In addition, Palestine will need to be permitted to develop its water resources to support an expanding population, as well as agricultural and industrial development.
