A class of ships that will be in service for 94 years makes less sense when some of that time might be spent on the ocean floor, and they’re not submarines.
The US commander-in-chief, who perhaps for reasons more explained by his heel spurs, has allowed and encouraged further military budget expansion in his first six months.
Other than taking credit for the products of his predecessor’s administration, Lord Dampnut has used such procurement to enhance US arm sales to “friendly” foreign powers that have even influenced their internal politics.
There may be more Reaganist resonances, however revisionist in the coming weeks, including at least spiritual violations of the 11th Commandment, and much like the warlordism appropriate to a coming “clash of civilizations”.
Today, the U.S. Navy is building the Ford class of aircraft carriers. Many recent articles quote values ranging from $13-15 billion as the cost to build the first ship of the class, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
Those figures, however, include not only the cost of building the first of ship, but also all of the design and development costs for the entire Ford class — a class of ship that will be in service for the next 94 years.
In 2005, USS Ronald Reagan, a newly constructed $6.2 billion dollar aircraft carrier, sank after being hit by multiple torpedoes.
Fortunately, this did not occur in actual combat, but was simulated as part of a war game pitting a carrier task force including numerous antisubmarine escorts against HSMS Gotland, a small Swedish diesel-powered submarine displacing 1,600 tons. Yet despite making multiple attacks runs on the Reagan, the Gotland was never detected.
PARIS --- The French Ministry of Defence has deleted from its website a news story relating how one of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, Saphir penetrated a US Navy carrier group and fictitiously “sank” the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt as well as several of its surface escorts (Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers).
(Source: compiled by Defense-Aerospace.com; published April 7, 2015)
(2013)
To sustain global leadership, we must have enough ships to maintain an enduring and capable naval presence in those areas of significant interest to the United States. To be effective, our capability must be credible — and fully appreciated by any potential adversary.
As we deal with declining budgets, there will be pressure to pursue a strategy suggested by some critics (who are mostly focused on near-term cost and perceived vulnerability) to eliminate some big-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) and convert the "savings" into some quantity of smaller surface combatants and L-class amphibious ships. In theory, this strategy would increase the presence density of U.S. naval forces and meet the capacity demands outlined in current defense strategic guidance.
Devolving the qualitative value of naval presence afforded by a CVN and her embarked air wing into the quantitative value of a larger number of smaller surface combatants neglects the fundamental purpose of naval presence: deter, influence, and win in an uncertain environment…
Smaller fleets around the globe are relatively limited in what they can accomplish, both at sea and ashore. Naval gunfire is traditionally effective on shore and the revolution in precision strike weapons, such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), has increased the range, precision, and explosive yield of its kinetic effects.
However, these are principally kinetic effects, limited to what we call the "right side of the kill chain."
An aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing, meanwhile, have the capability to operate across the full spectrum of warfare, including the electromagnetic spectrum and the non-kinetic or "left side of the kill chain."
But Russia’s spending on Kuznetsov is not about strict military utility. It’s political and a matter of national pride. Important states have aircraft carriers, and since Russia is an important state, then it must have one, too. Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin claimed the Kuznetsov’s voyage came from “his personal initiative.” Putin is well aware of the charged symbolism and global attention the combat deployment brought to Russia.
By the time Kuznetsov finishes her refit, the Syrian war may very well be over, meaning she likely had a limited window to see combat.
And the carrier is an economic engine. Kuznetsov’s modernization will take at least until the end of 2020 and cost around $713 million, according to TASS.
Though a fraction of the cost of a new Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, it is a substantial investment and will keep the shipyard at Roslyakovo near Murmask busy.
The first new Royal Navy aircraft carrier in thirty years is nearing sea trials.
After a brief absence from the world of fixed-wing naval aviation the Royal Navy’s brand new flattop HMS Queen Elizabeth and its sister ship, Prince of Wales, will soon sail the seas, their decks full of new F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. The result will be the most powerful “Senior Service” in generations.
Giant floating $600 ashtray with development and proliferation of the sub-launched cruise missile and silent diesel sub.
Today, the U.S. Navy is building the Ford class of aircraft carriers. Many recent articles quote values ranging from $13-15 billion as the cost to build the first ship of the class, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78).
Those figures, however, include not only the cost of building the first of ship, but also all of the design and development costs for the entire Ford class — a class of ship that will be in service for the next 94 years.
Factoring the design and development cost of the entire class into the price of the first ship is like saying the first iPhone cost $150 million or the first Toyota Prius cost more than $1 billion.
When the design and development costs are removed from the inflated "shock value" cost of the CVN 78, it is only 18 percent more expensive than the most recent ship built in our current Nimitz carrier class.
Moreover, the design and development investment in the Ford class will deliver a product that is more capable and has lower life cycle costs ($4 billion less) than its predecessors, and which will continue paying dividends for nearly a century.
(2017)
The first crisis over the future of the carrier came with 1949's "Revolt of the Admirals," in which the U.S. Air Force argued that aircraft carriers were so vulnerable that they represented an unwarranted expense; the Navy's admirals, as the name suggests, practically revolted at this idea.
Eventually the United States would build its Cold War navy around families of "super-carriers," each over 300m long, that began with USS Forrestal (CV-59) in 1955 and continues to this day with the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78).
These ships have become extraordinarily expensive, and they concentrate an enormous degree of firepower in one (potentially vulnerable) platform. Both during and after the Cold War, plenty of analysts — not to mention taxpayers — criticised the Navy's fixation with the huge ships and suggested that smaller, cheaper vessels could perform many of the same tasks.
For their part, the Soviets spent a great deal of time and money figuring out the best way to kill American carriers, especially after the Navy equipped its carriers with nuclear weapons. Today, China's system of anti-access systems has made US carriers the focus of its attention.