Fiona Hill should be in the current administration, because she’s been correct on most of the Russian moves as well as Putin’s effect on trumpism. Any invasion will be a sad commentary on post-soviet authoritarian capitalism because Putin’s oligarchs will be unhappy with him when “the mother of all sanctions regimes” falls on global Russian financial interests. Odessa steps will have new meaning if there’s a new Black Sea war, which could result if Russia tries to take Kyiv, since it will also need to hold whatever territory it seizes. An offensive to build some new Transdniestria version of 1930s Sudetenland might be the unfortunate option considering how successful the Crimean “little green men” were.
The Kuleshov effect is the idea that two shots in a sequence are more impactful than a single shot by itself. This effect is a cognitive event that allows viewers to derive meaning from the interaction of two shots in sequence.
A double tap is a shooting technique where two shots are fired in rapid succession at the same target with the same sight picture (as opposed to the controlled pair, where a second sight picture is acquired for the second shot). Instruction and practice of the double-tap improves overall accuracy...
If peace talks fail, the Russian military has several options to advance into Ukraine through northern, central, and southern invasion routes. But a Russian attempt to seize and hold territory will not necessarily be easy and will likely be impacted by challenges from weather, urban combat, command and control, logistics, and the morale of Russian troops and the Ukrainian population.
Consequently, it is important to understand how Russia could invade Ukraine, how specific political objectives may influence an invasion plan, the challenges an invasion may face, and what options the United States and its European partners have to respond. To help understand these dynamics, this brief asks several questions. What are Russian president Vladimir Putin’s objectives? What military options does Russia have, and what might an invasion look like? How should the United States and its allies and partners respond?
The brief makes two main arguments. First, if Russia decides to invade Ukraine to reassert Russian control and influence, there are at least three possible axes of advance to seize Ukrainian territory:
- a northern thrust, possibly attempting to outflank Ukrainian defenses around Kiev by approaching through Belarus; a central thrust advancing due west into Ukraine; and a southern thrust advancing across the Perekop isthmus.
- Second, if the United States and its European partners fail to deter a Russian invasion, they should support Ukrainian resistance through a combination of diplomatic, military, intelligence, and other means. The United States and its European partners cannot allow Russia to annex Ukraine. The West’s appeasement of Moscow when it annexed Crimea in 2014 and then orchestrated an insurgency in Eastern Ukraine only emboldened Russian leaders.
- In addition, Russian annexation of some or all of Ukraine would increase Russian manpower, industrial capacity, and natural resources to a level that could make it a global threat. The United States and Europe cannot make this mistake again.
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...The Kremlin’s primary goal is a guarantee that Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia will never belong to a military or economic bloc other than the ones Moscow controls and that Russia will be the ultimate arbitrator of the foreign and security policy of all three states. In essence, this conflict is about whether 30 years after the demise of the Soviet Union, its former ethnic republics can live as independent, sovereign states or if they still must acknowledge Moscow as their de facto sovereign.
[...]
Based on these political objectives, the Kremlin has at least six possible military options:
1. Redeploy some of its ground forces away from the Ukrainian border—at least temporarily—if negotiations are successful but continue to aid pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine.
2. Send conventional Russian troops into the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as unilateral “peacekeepers” and refuse to withdraw them until peace talks end successfully and Kiev agrees to implement the Minsk Accords.
3. Seize Ukrainian territory as far west as the Dnepr River to use as a bargaining chip or incorporate this new territory fully into the Russian Federation. This option is represented in Figure 2a.
4. Seize Ukrainian territory up to the Dnepr River and seize an additional belt of land (to include Odessa) that connects Russian territory with the breakaway Transdniestria Republic and separates Ukraine from any access to the Black Sea. The Kremlin would incorporate these new lands into Russia and ensure that the rump Ukrainian statelet remains economically unviable.
5. Seize only a belt of land between Russia and Transdniestria (including Mariupol, Kherson, and Odessa) to secure freshwater supplies for Crimea and block Ukraine’s access to the sea, while avoiding major combat over Kiev and Kharkiv. This option is represented in Figure 2b.
6. Seize all of Ukraine and, with Belarus, announce the formation of a new tripartite Slavic union of Great, Little, and White Russians (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians). This option would involve operations represented in Figure 2a as “phase one,” with Figure 2c representing “phase two” of this option.
www.csis.org/…
Earlier on Wednesday, Blinken’s top deputy, Wendy R. Sherman, said the United States sees “every indication that [Russian President Vladimir Putin] is going to use military force sometime” soon. She said it was likely between “now and the middle of February,” while speaking in an online conversation with the Estonian president that was hosted by the Yalta European Strategy, a forum to discuss the future of Ukraine and Europe.
The United States’ written responses included proposals for improving “reciprocal transparency” between Russia and the West regarding “force posture in Ukraine” and military exercises conducted in the region, Blinken said. It also included proposals addressing the placement of missile systems in Europe and arms control, such as “our interest in a follow-on agreement to the New START accord that covers all nuclear weapons,” he said. Last year, the Biden administration agreed to extend New START until February 2026.
The document, Blinken said, “reiterates what we’ve said publicly for many weeks, and in a sense for many years: that we will uphold the principles of NATO’s open door, and that’s … a commitment that we’re bound to.” He noted that the responses “were fully coordinated with Ukraine and our European allies and partners,” and that their recommendations were “incorporated … into the final version delivered to Moscow.”
“NATO’s door is open, remains open, and that is our commitment,” he said.
NATO delivered its own written responses Wednesday to Russia’s embassy in Brussels, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
www.washingtonpost.com/…
Fiona Hill should be in the current administration, because she’s been correct on most of the Russian moves as well as Putin’s effect on trumpism.
“George, you have to understand that Ukraine is not even a country. Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe and the greater part was given to us.” These were the ominous words of President Vladimir Putin of Russia to President George W. Bush in Bucharest, Romania, at a NATO summit in April 2008.
This time, Mr. Putin’s aim is bigger than closing NATO’s “open door” to Ukraine and taking more territory — he wants to evict the United States from Europe. As he might put it: “Goodbye, America. Don’t let the door hit you on the way out.”
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Ukraine is both Russia’s target and a source of leverage against the United States. Over the last several months Mr. Putin has bogged the Biden administration down in endless tactical games that put the United States on the defensive. Russia moves forces to Ukraine’s borders, launches war games and ramps up the visceral commentary. In recent official documents, it demanded ironclad guarantees that Ukraine (and other former republics of the U.S.S.R.) will never become a member of NATO, that NATO pull back from positions taken after 1997, and also that America withdraw its own forces and weapons, including its nuclear missiles. Russian representatives assert that Moscow doesn’t “need peace at any cost” in Europe. Some Russian politicians even suggest the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against NATO targets to make sure that we know they are serious, and that we should meet Moscow’s demands.
For weeks, American officials have huddled to make sense of the official documents with Russia’s demands and the contradictory commentary, pondered how to deter Mr. Putin in Ukraine and scrambled to talk on his timeline.
All the while, Mr. Putin and his proxies have ratcheted up their statements. Kremlin officials have not just challenged the legitimacy of America’s position in Europe, they have raised questions about America’s bases in Japan and its role in the Asia-Pacific region. They have also intimated that they may ship hypersonic missiles to America’s back door in Cuba and Venezuela to revive what the Russians call the Caribbean Crisis of the 1960s.
Mr. Putin is a master of coercive inducement. He manufactures a crisis in such a way that he can win no matter what anyone else does. Threats and promises are essentially one and the same. Mr. Putin can invade Ukraine yet again, or he can leave things where they are and just consolidate the territory Russia effectively controls in Crimea and Donbas. He can stir up trouble in Japan and send hypersonic missiles to Cuba and Venezuela, or not, if things go his way in Europe.
Mr. Putin plays a longer, strategic game and knows how to prevail in the tactical scrum. He has the United States right where he wants it.
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Mr. Biden has promised that Russia “will pay a heavy price” if any Russian troops cross Ukraine’s borders. If Mr. Putin invades Ukraine with no punitive action from the West and the rest of the international community, beyond financial sanctions, then he will have set a precedent for future action by other countries. Mr. Putin has already factored additional U.S. financial sanctions into his calculations. But he assumes that some NATO allies will be reluctant to follow suit on these sanctions and other countries will look the other way. U.N. censure, widespread and vocal international opposition, and action by countries outside Europe to pull back on their relations with Russia might give him pause. Forging a united front with its European allies and rallying broader support should be America’s longer game. Otherwise this saga could indeed mark the beginning of the end of America’s military presence in Europe.
www.nytimes.com/...
Once Kyiv can no longer take the unacceptable cost of warfare operations, Russia would move to ‘diplomacy’ where it could potentially force a regime change in Ukraine, install a pro-Kremlin team – as outlined by the recent UK release of intelligence – and enable its own implementation of the Minsk agreements as well as achieve further strategic concessions.
But the Kremlin needs the US to sign off on this too. This could arguably be the only way for Washington and NATO to obtain the (partial) removal of Moscow’s ’shopping list’ of unachievable demands and deconflict a tense situation.
There would probably be no Russian force withdrawal until after the Minsk agreements have been fully implemented to Russia’s satisfaction. But what could then conceivably follow is a partition of Ukraine, with the creation of a ‘Union State’ as part of an enlarged Russia and a diminished Ukraine. From a broader security perspective, Russia could then seek to push for more ‘accommodations’ regarding European security and NATO’s role.
www.chathamhouse.org/...