From the top, I’m stipulating that Ukraine’s goal is to push Russia back to the pre-invasion borders. You can read my reasoning here, but in short, while there’s a universe in which Ukraine might play for its full territorial integrity, the human toll (both civilian and military) would be frightfully high, and they would then suffer the same logistical challenges that Russia has. That piece also argues that Ukraine simply doesn’t have offensive weapons. But let’s talk about that. What if they were supplied such weapons? What would they look like?
There are three major offensives currently underway in Ukraine at this moment. Russia is advancing on the eastern Donbas axis, while Ukraine is advancing on the northern Kyiv and southern Crimea axes. In the north, heavy woods and hydraulic warfare (purposefully flooding the region) disadvantage armor. Russia was unable to push to Kyiv despite all their armor, and the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is, by all indications, an artillery-and-infantry affair. Note this artillery barrage knocking out several Russian vehicles in the town directly west of the hard-fought Bucha:
This American is part of a squad that liberated one of the small towns near that artillery strike.
Small infantry squads are mopping up wreckage left behind by artillery strikes. It’s working. (And speaking of that American, check out this tweet he posted.) The terrain makes this all possible, both advantaging a tactic that Ukraine seems to have mastered, and disadvantaging Russian reliance on heavy armor.
Down south, in the Mykolaiv/Kherson counter-attack, Ukraine has to use armor. The terrain is desert-like, no trees, flat. If Russia had a functioning air force, Ukraine wouldn’t stand a chance. If there was adequate Russian artillery available, Ukraine wouldn’t stand a chance. But all indications are that Russia over-extended, seeing its spearhead elements destroyed at Mykolaiv, Voznesensk, and that stupid under-resourced attempt to reach Kryvyi Rih (which I mocked from the second we first saw that push several weeks ago). So the last couple of nights we’ve been treated to MLRS bombardment … of Russian positions at Kherson’s airport. Is Russia fighting back with its own artillery? Presumably so, though we’ve seen previous scant evidence of it.
So that leaves the east, where Russia is making gains. Slow, painful, incredibly costly gains, but gains nonetheless. Mark Sumner wrote earlier about Russian efforts to move the goalposts, and claim that Donbas was their focus all along. Of course that’s utter horseshit, contradicted by Vladimir Putin’s own demands for demilitarization, “denazification,” and neutral status for Ukraine. And even those demands were watered down from Putin’s original demand of regime change. If they really just wanted Donbas all along, well, they would’ve put everything into that single axis and Russia would’ve pushed to the region’s administrative boundaries long ago.
But here’s the problem: The only notable geographic features in this region are rivers, and that’s what’s keeping Russian forces delayed. Ukraine built a network of trenches, which are essentially artificial geographic defensive positions. Other than that, this is wide-open, flat terrain with few trees.
Russia has countless artillery resources in this region, and it’s the place we’ve seen the most Russian air force sorties. The open, flat terrain makes Ukrainian forces sitting ducks if they try and maneuver outside their prepared defenses. It’s a hellish kill zone.
We all know it wasn’t Russia’s original strategy, but it makes sense for them to reconsolidate around that front. All they need is enough pressure around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv to keep significant Ukrainian military assets tied up.
Russia will want that land bridge to Crimea in the south, so expect Melitopol to be seriously contested after Ukraine liberates Kherson. But otherwise, Russia can keep light pressure on those northern urban cities while repositioning its military assets on the Donbas front. (In theory, anyway. Moving that many troops from the other fronts to the eastern front takes, you guessed it, logistics.)
Ukraine has what it needs to handle its matters everywhere except on the eastern front, with its unforgiving terrain. So what would change the equation?
Air defenses. Russia appears more comfortable flying in this region because of the short distances in and out of Ukrainian territory. Ukraine could always use more Stingers, sure, since Russian aircraft deploy extensive countermeasures to protect themselves from missile attacks (you can see defensive flares in this video). I’m guessing, but it must take dozens of attempts to take down a plane or helicopter. And those man-portable missiles can’t hit high-flying aircraft, or reach deeper into Russian territory. Those more advanced systems are much bigger, and logistically, much harder to maintain and keep supplied. (Missiles can be 20 feet long and weight over 1,000 lbs. each. So they’re not an easy upgrade to deploy.)
Close-air defense. If Ukraine can clear Russian aircraft from the zone of combat, the next step is to get its own air support. MiG-29s aren’t the answer—they are designed for air-to-air combat, not strafing and bombing ground positions. Helicopters fit the bill, but they are relatively easy to take down, and logistically difficult to maintain and operate. The best bet here? Drones, more drones, and then all the drones. American suicide Switchblade drones should prove a game-changer by themselves. Take out Russian artillery, and suddenly Russian close-air support becomes less threatening. If a Ukrainian unit is pinned down, suicide drones or Turkish TB2s can clear a path out. And while TB2s are a scarce and precious commodity, suicide drones are small and cheap and designed to be destroyed. Also, they make TB2s less of a scarce commodity. Let’s have hundreds of these babies in the air. And literally thousands of Switchblades—per week.
Night-vision equipment. Those night-vision goggles (NVG) you see special forces operators wear cost around $50,000 each. Back in my day, units controlled their NVGs as tightly as their weapons, and I can’t imagine it’s any different today. They’re incredibly valuable, incredibly expensive tools. We’ve only seen a handful of Russian special forces with them, which is why most of their ground operations are during daytime. Nights have been left to their artillery. What that means is that Russia is blind at night. Outfit Ukrainian offensive forces with NVGs, and they can move under cover of darkness, with TB2 drones in support (as they’re less vulnerable at night).
Body armor and helmets. Yes, there’s nothing sexy about body armor, except that it saves lives and keeps an infantry fighting force moving forward. Regular Ukrainian army units appear well equipped, but we’re seeing more and more forces (territorial defense, foreign legion) running around in combat without proper protection. Ukraine needs hundreds of thousands of these items.
Armor. Russia is providing Ukraine with plenty of material. But there are certainly NATO allies with hundreds, if not thousands of outdated, mothballed Soviet-era tanks in storage. Those should be pulled out, as they literally serve no other purpose than “defend against Russia.” Well, here we are. Now deploy them in defense against Russia.
All this equipment would allow Ukraine to both reclaim its pre-invasion territorial borders, as well as inflict unyielding military and economic pain on Russia. Could it be used to push into Donbas? Sure, but Donbas has its own defense trench system, and does Ukraine really want its own bloody urban warfare campaign? Same thing heading south, into Crimea. Is there a scenario in which that could happen? Of course. But again, it would prolong death and misery among the Ukrainian civilian population, would cost thousands of soldiers their lives, and would prolong economic damage.
Would that price be worth it for Ukraine and its people? That’s not for us to decide.
If you haven’t caught Mark Sumner and me discussing the war this week, check it out:
Friday, Mar 25, 2022 · 10:11:36 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
Mariupol’s location, and Turkey’s involvement, both suggest that this would be a provision of humanitarian aid, and possibly an evacuation of the wounded, by sea. It looks to be exactly the kind of operation many have been begging for since Mariupol was cut off from the rest of Ukraine. This is exciting. And hopefully it will happen quickly, because people are dying right now. Stay tuned.
Friday, Mar 25, 2022 · 10:19:32 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
It’s also worth noting that getting Greece and Turkey to work together on a project is an accomplishment. The only thing wrong with this is that it didn’t come sooner, but there could be days of negotiations behind the scenes. It seems very much as if Macron intends to tell Putin what happens next, not ask his permission.