Dave’s gonna lose eventually against Goliath, because there weren’t enough slingshots. Air superiority will become more crucial and “nuking it from orbit” isn’t possible. As written about last week, the seizing of the entire coastline seems likely prior to a ceasefire that would partition Ukraine over six months.
Everyone’s nervous about 15 nuclear reactors spread among four facilities. For so many of the millions displaced, there may not be a home to which they can return.
It’s still about numbers and there will likely be a lengthy resistance that will get muddled by groups of the actual Ukrainian Nazis that Putin is supporting now plus the ones he will bring in after partition. So much “Westplaining” here, but a transfer of all the NATO MiGs to Ukraine would be a boon for the West’s MICs replacing them with F-18s, F-35s, or Eurofighters.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are carrying out a counter-offensive in several directions. The General Staff of Ukraine stated about it.
"The Armed Forces continue to hold the borders, and in some directions counterattack and force the enemy to retreat with losses, disrupt rear communications and inflict crushing blows," the morning summary said.
Earlier it was reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a counter-offensive in Kharkiv and pushed the Russian troops back to the border.
charter97.org/…
- Russian forces conducted no major offensive operations against the cities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Mykolayiv in the past 24 hours;
- Russian troops continued to encircle, bomb, and shell Mariupol;
- Russian forces east of Kharkiv and in northern Luhansk Oblast appear to be trying to link up;
- Russian troops around Kherson city are likely preparing to resume offensive operations against Mykolayiv and ultimately Odesa; and
- Russian naval infantry in Crimea continue to prepare for amphibious operations, which would most likely occur near Odesa.
Russian forces in Ukraine may have entered a possibly brief operational pause on March 5 as they prepare to resume operations against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, and possibly Odesa in the next 24-48 hours. Russian troops did not launch major ground offensive operations against Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Mykolayiv in the last 24 hours. Ukrainian forces near Kharkiv, on the other hand, conducted a counter-offensive that reportedly penetrated to the Ukrainian-Russian border.
www.understandingwar.org/...
The Ukrainians may have to trade land for time to preserve Kyiv.
An outgunned but resilient Ukrainian military is adopting a two-prong strategy in the face of a flawed but fierce Russian assault, relying on hit-and-run tactics and the fortification of major cities as President Vladimir Putin’s campaign enters a more perilous phase, military experts said.
The odds remain stacked against Ukraine, even as it exceeds Western intelligence assessments that had predicted Kyiv, the capital, would fall within days. Russian forces have begun employing siege tactics, aiming to flatten civilian infrastructure and exact maximum punishment for Ukrainian resistance. While Russia has mostly failed, so far, to seize major cities and effectively supply its soldiers with food and fuel, the Pentagon believes it is probable that Russia will regroup and press its massive advantage in firepower.
www.washingtonpost.com/…
First and foremost, the Russians seem unclear on what their strategic level objectives are. They may have truly believed their own rhetoric about Ukrainians welcoming the Russian army, or perhaps they assumed Ukrainians would passively accept Russian dominance. But without one of those assumptions coming to fruition, the planned thunder run to Kyiv and other eastern population centers doesn’t seem like a complete plan. Further, neither of those assumptions should have been considered valid at the time and now, in hindsight, they both seem fanciful. It remains unclear what Russia believes the end state of the conflict is. If they seize Kyiv, that likely doesn’t result in an end of hostilities. If they continue to try to conquer all of Ukraine, that will add to their personnel and material losses. If they succeed in conquering all of Ukraine, that will require a constant military presence under threat of enduring insurgent violence.
At the operational level, assuming a quick seizure of Kyiv was the primary goal of the initial invasion forces, Russia seems to have diluted its combat power by trying to attack Ukraine through multiple independent axes. Arguably, the Crimean and Donbas axes are mutually supporting and have achieved some level of link-up in the vicinity of Mariupol, but this southern/southeastern front is a separate and distinct effort from what seems to be the main effort of seizing Kyiv, which is not supported by the fourth Kharkiv axis. The Russians seem to have believed they would be able to immediately flood and capture multiple major cities and therefore coerce a surrender, a plan that works only in a frictionless environment without the need to react to real time events. It’s as if the Russians forgot the warnings of both Von Moltke the Elder and Mike Tyson. So instead of quick victory on multiple fronts, the Russians have two bogged-down axes and two slowed axes, all with diminished combat power.
[...]
In contrast, the Ukrainians have proven far more effective and fiercer than most observers estimated prior to the conflict. They have been fighting an effective campaign of distributed resistance while massing tactical effects at key locations. They have integrated and adapted new weapons systems to exploit Russian vulnerabilities, and the forces the Ukrainians have relied on to exploit these Russian weaknesses have also had a disproportionately high payoff. Teams of special operations forces (SOF) have conducted mobile attacks against bogged-down Russian armor and vehicles. Territorial defense units have been mobilized to defend their local cities and countryside. These are examples of forces that are neither expensive nor require a massive logistics tail compared with the lumbering mechanized formations of the Russian battalion tactical groups. While Russian logistics have been unable to figure out how to move fuel, water, ammunition, food and vehicle parts, Ukrainian supply lines seem streamlined to push Javelins, NLAWs and Stingers to forward elements.
The Ukrainians have also exploited Russia’s inability to achieve air superiority. Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs) continue to take down Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft at a rate that will become unsustainable for the Russian military. The Ukrainian air force is still flying, and Ukrainian Bayraktar drones are maintaining consistent strikes against Russian forces on the ground.
newlinesmag.com/...
The Russian Army, like the Soviet Army before it, has manifested significant logistics problems for decades, and if anything the preliminary evidence is that the problem might be worse than expected. You can start with this report.
Basically Soviet logistics as shown in Afghanistan were too rigid, top heavy and wedded to doctrine. What it means is that when things went wrong, there was signficant problem adjusting. The way Soviet logistics was so road centric (and weak for that) is telling
Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have undertaken nothing at all close to their deployment to attack Ukraine, which would be a challenge to any force. But is probably doubly for them as their logistical development also seems not to have progressed much.
Indeed the Russian Army now seems to have fallen prey to one of the great temptations of many militaries created by dictators--lots of flashy weapons but little consideration about how to deliver them (few trucks).
Indeed looking at this
@WarOnTheRocks estimate, they Russians will struggle at 90 miles from working railheads. And they still suffer from the inflexibility mentioned by earlier reports at Afghanistan.
Here is another article highlighting the significant truck problem faced by the Russians (and their reliance on civilians to keep going--which will be a real handicap in any protracted war in Ukraine).
If anything, early indications in Ukraine are that the Soviet Logistics problems are worse than expected. There are the basic problems of tire maintenance that has doomed some of the most expensive equipment Russia possesses. See
@TrentTelenko for a few great threads
There is indications that basic rations have not been kept up to scratch, with soldiers given food seven years out of date, and at the same time running out of food already and having to loot from Ukrainian civilian supplies.
Clearly there is Ukrainian understanding of these weaknesses, which has led to their very effective and constant efforts to attack Russian convoys--and guess what they are doing. Destroying large numbers of precious Russian trucks.
And if Ukrainian claims are anywhere near the truth, they are destroying some of the most important--fuel trucks. As of today, the Ukrainians have claimed to destroy 60 Russian fuel carriers--which would be a significant blow.
aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukra….
One of the reasons the famous 40-mile convoy is such a disaster is that much of it is valuable trucks--which are not probably out of fuel, with dead batteries, stuck in the mud and not salvageable. You can scan the convoy here.
Why does this all matter--it reveals that almost certainly that Russian combat strength started significantly below the stated levels, and is dropping fast as damaged but not destroyed equipment still in Russian hands cant be repaired and resupplied.
And all of this will get worse as Russia's weak link of trucks further wastes away. It is impossible to calculate how far below stated levels of strength Russian forces are because of these logistic difficulties. A very conservative guess would be around 25%
I am getting that figure from my own calculations in How the War was Won on WWII logistics for the Luftwaffe. Regularly one quarter of Luftwaffe aircraft were out of commission because of basic logistical problems. As the war went on, it was much higher than 25%.
btw, logistic difficulties might also help explain the incredibly deficient performance of the Russian Air Force. Both seeming to have insufficient supplies of directed munitions (thus having to use large numbers of dumb bombs), which means they have to fly low and be shot down.
Also might explain how relatively few Russian planes overall they can maintain in operations. Much fewer in number than expected before the invasion started.
So, we give a very false idea of the realities of war when we talk about number of troops, AFVs, planes that the Russians deployed for the invasion. They started with fewer in combat conditions than we know, and it looks like Russian truck support is suffering hugely.
Logistics, as it always does, will play a significant role in determining this war, right now the signs are not good for Russia, but people are mostly ignoring it and talking, as always, about tanks and planes....
Retweeted this but probably should have put this here. This should terrify the Russians if it means what it could mean. They are already running out of trucks.
Ukrainian path to victory is clear. Go for every Russian truck they can see, particularly fuel trucks. Russian Army will freeze in its tracks.
Btw. Replacing military grade trucks with civilian ones is catastrophic on many levels. You have to stick to better roads, they are less robust and you can’t stock spare parts for all the different models
We might be about to witness a logistic collapse
• • •
en.wikipedia.org/...
Shaped in a fury to counter Russia's blitzkrieg assault, Ukraine's hundreds-strong volunteer "hacker" corps is rather more than a paramilitary cyberattack pressure in Europe's first main conflict of the web age. It's essential to info fight and to crowdsourcing intelligence . "We're actually a swarm.
This thread could be hearsay, but if this tweeter’s contact is really an FSB analyst, it does jibe with some of the MSM reports.
I will add clarification comments inside parenthesis where necessary. So, let's roll:
"I have hardly slept at all these days, at work at almost all times, I have brain-fog. Maybe from overworking, but I feel like I am in a surreal world.
The Pandora’s Box is open – a real global horror will begin by the summer – global famine is inevitable as Russia and Ukraine are main producers of wheat. (MY COMMENTARY: I disagree that this will result in global famine.)
I can’t say what guided those in charge to decide to proceed with the execution of this operation (Ukraine invasion), but now they are methodically blaming us (FSB). We are being scolded for our analysis. Recently, we have been increasingly pressured to prepare more reports.
All of these political consultants and politicians and the powers-that-be are causing chaos. Most importantly, no one knew that there will be such a war – it was concealed from everyone.
For example – you are being asked to analyze various outcomes and consequences of a meteorite attack on Russia (MY COMMENTARY: Here he most likely means the West’s sanctions) –
So you research the mode of attack, and you are being told that it’s just a hypothetical and not to stress on the details, so you understand the report is only intended as a checkbox for some bureaucrat, and the conclusions of the analysis must be positive for Russia, otherwise you basically get interrogated for not doing good work. So, you have to write that we have all necessary measures available to nullify the effects of a given type of attack. We are completely overworked.
But then it turns out that the hypothetical has turned into reality, and the analysis we’ve done on that hypothetical is total trash. We have no answer to the sanctions because of this. No one knew there’d be such a war, so no one prepared for these sanctions.
It’s the flipside consequence of the secrecy – since everyone was kept in the dark, how could we prepare for it?
Kadyrov has gone nuts. We (FSB) were very close to a conflict with him because the Ukrainians claimed to having received intel from the FSB on his squad in Kyiv.
Kadyrov's squad was absolutely demolished before they even had a chance to fight and they got blown to pieces. I do not have any info that it was an FSB leak to Ukraine, so I’d give it a 1-2% chance – but can’t exclude this possibility completely.
Our Blitzkrieg has totally collapsed. It is impossible to complete the task: If Zelensky and his deputies were captured in the first 3 days, all key buildings also captured, and they were forced to read an address of their surrender to the country, then Ukraine’s resistance would have likely dissolved to a minimal level. Theoretically. But then what? Even in this IDEAL outcome, there remained an unsolvable problem: Who is the counterparty to our negotiations?
If we remove Zelensky – fine – who is going to sign the agreement? If Zelensky signs, then that agreement is worthless after we remove him.
ОПЗЖ (The Opposition Party in Ukraine collaborating with Russia) has refused to cooperate.
Medvechuk, the coward, ran away. There is another leader – Boyko, but he refused too, even his own people won’t understand him. Wanted to bring back Tsaryova, but even our guys are against him here in Russia. Bring back Yanukovich? But how?
If we are saying we can’t occupy, then the newly formed government will be overthrown in 10 minutes as soon as we leave.
To occupy? Where would we find that many people? Commandant’s office, military police, counter-intelligence, security – even at minimum resistance from the Ukrainians, we’d need over 500,000 people, not including supply & logistics.
There’s a rule - if you try to cover for bad quality leadership with quantity, you’ll make everything worse. And I repeat this would be the problem in the IDEAL SCENARIO, which does not exist.
And what now? We cannot announce general mobilization for two reasons:
1) Mobilization will implode the situation inside Russia: political, economic, and social.
2) Our logistics are already over-extended today. We can send a much large contingent into Ukraine, and what would we get? Ukraine – a territorially enormous country, and their hate towards us is astronomical.
Our roads simply cannot accommodate the resupply of such convoys, and everything will come to a halt. And we can’t pull it off from the management side because of the current chaos.
These two reasons exist concurrently, although just one of them is enough to break everything.
With regards to Russian military losses: I don’t know the reality – no one does. There was some information the first 2 days, but now no one knows what is happening in Ukraine. We’ve lost contact with major divisions. (!!)
They may re-establish contact, or may dissipate under an attack, and even the commanders don’t know how many are dead, injured, or captured. Total dead is definitely in the thousands, maybe 10,000, maybe 5,000, or maybe just 2,000.
But even at our command no one knows. But probably closer to 10,000 Russian soldiers killed. And we are not counting losses at DNR & LNR.
Now even we kill Zelensky or take him prisoner, nothing will change. The level of hate toward us is similar to Chechnya. And now, even those loyal to us in Ukraine are publicly against us.
Because all of this was planned at the top (in Russia), because we were told that such a scenario will not happen (Ukraine invasion) except only if we were to be attacked first.
Because we were told that we need to maximize our threats in order to negotiate an outcome through peace. Because we were already preparing protests against Zelensky in Ukraine without ever considering invading Ukraine.
Now, civilian losses in Ukraine will follow a geometric pattern progression, and resistance against us will only get stronger. Infantries already tried to enter cities – out of 20 paratrooper groups, only one had “provisional” success.
Recall the invasion of Mosul. It’s a rule – happens with every country, nothing new. To siege? Over the last decades in Europe – Serbia being the best example, cities can remain functional under siege for years. Humanitarian convoys from Europe to Ukraine is only a matter of time.
Our conditional deadline is June. Conditional because in June there will be no economy left in Russia – there will be nothing left.
By and large, next week there will be a collapse (in Russia) to either of the two sides (for vs against war), simply because current tension (in Russia) is unsustainable.
We have no analyses, we can’t make any forecasts in this chaos, no one will be able to say anything with any certainty (in Russia).
To act through intuition, especially with high emotions, this is no poker game. But our bets will have to grow in size with hope that some option will succeed. The tragedy is that we can easily miscalculate, and as a result lose everything.
By and large, Russia does not have an out. There are no options for a possible victory, only of losses – this is it. (BREAK FOR NOW, WILL CONTINUE POSTING TRANSLATION IN A BIT)
(THIS UPCOMING 2nd HALF IS ARGUABLY MORE INTERESTING AND ENDS WITH A PLEASANT SURPRISE)
"100% we’ve repeated our mistake from last century, when we decided to kick the “weak” Japan in order to achieve a quick victory, and it turned our army was in a state of total calamity.
Then, we started a war till the victorious end, then we started conscripting the Bolsheviks for re-education in the army. Then these barely-known Bolsheviks picked up their anti-war slogans and started doing such things...
From the pluses: We did everything to ensure there wasn’t even a hint that we sent penal military units to the front. If you conscript political prisoners and the socially undesirables, the moral spirit of the army will be in the negative.
The enemy (Ukraine) is motivated. Monstrously motivated. Knows how to fight, plenty of capable commanders. They have weapons and support. We will simply establish a precedent of human catastrophe in the world.
What we are afraid of the most: The top is trying to mask old problems with new problems. Largely for this reason Donbass happened in 2014 – We needed to distract the West from the Russian Spring in Crimea, so Donbass’ so-called crisis had to pull in all of the West's attention and become a bargaining chip. But even bigger problems started there. Then we decided to pressure Erdogan to get 4 pipes for the Southern Stream (gas) and entered Syria.
This is after Suleimani (Islamic Revolutionary Guard) knowingly provided false info to us to solve his own problems. As a result, we couldn’t resolve the problem with Crimea, and Donbass’ problems didn’t go away.
Southern Stream was reduced to 2 pipes (gas), and Syria is hanging – we leave and Assad will be toppled and we will look like idiots, and staying there is hard and pointless.
I don’t know who come up with the “Blitzkrieg of Ukraine.” Had we received all the real inputs, we would have at minimum pointed out that the initial plan is arguable, and that much has to be reassessed. A lot had to be reassessed.
Now we are in crap (PG language mine) up to our necks, and we don’t know what to do. “Denazification” and “demilitarization” are not analytical categories because they don’t have concretely formulated parameters by which meeting of the objectives can be evaluated.
Now we are stuck waiting until some mentally screwed up advisor convinces the top to start a conflict with Europe, with demands to reduce the sanctions – they either loosen the sanctions or war.
And what if the West refuses? In that instance I won’t exclude that we will be pulled into a real international conflict, just like Hitler in 1939. Our “Z” will be equated to the Swastika.
Is there a possibility of a localized nuclear strike (in Ukraine)? Yes. Not for any military objectives. Such a weapon won’t help with the breach of the defenses. But with a goal of scaring everyone else (The West).
We are plowing to create a scenario to blame everything on Ukraine. Naryshkin (Director of Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia) and his SVR is digging the ground to prove that Ukraine was secretly building nuclear weapons. F*&K.
They are hammering at what we’ve already analyzed and closed the book on: We can’t just make up any evidence or proof and existence of specialists and Uranium. Ukraine has a ton of depleted isotope 238 – this is nothing. The production cycle is such that you can’t do it in secret
A dirty bomb can’t be created in secret. Ukraine’s old nuclear power plants can only produce the material as a by-product in minimal amounts. The Americans have such monitoring at these plants with MAGATE that even talking about this is stupid.
Do you know what will start in a week? Let’s let it be even in 2 weeks. We are going to be so screwed we will start reminiscing about the good ol’ hungry days of the 90s.
As the markets are being closed, Nabiullina appears to be taking the right steps, but it’s like plugging holes on a ship with your fingers. The situation will break through anyway and even stronger. Nothing will be solved in 3 or 5 or 7 days any longer.
Kadyrov is kicking his hoofs not without reason. They have their own adventures. He created a name for himself as the invincible – and if he falls down once his own people will remove him.
Next. Syria. “Guys – hold on, everything will end in Ukraine and then we will fortify our positions in Syria.” And now at any moment our contingent stationed there may run out of supplies, and then ridiculous heat will come….
Turkey is closing the strait, and sending supplies to Syria by air is the same as heating an oven with cash. Please note – this is all happening at the same time, and we don’t even have time to throw it all in one pile for analysis.
Our current position is like Germany in 1943-1944 – but that’s our STARTING position in Ukraine.
Sometimes I get lost in this overwork, sometimes it feels as if this is just a dream and all is as it was before.
With regards to prisons – it will get worse. The nuts will start to get tightened till blood. Everywhere. To be frank, purely technically, this is the only way to maintain any control of the situation.
We are already in total mobilization mode. But we can’t remain in this mode for long, but our timetables are unknown, and it will only get worse. Governance always goes astray from mobilization. And just imagine: You can sprint 100m – but try that in a marathon. And so, with the Ukrainian question we lunged as if going for a 100m sprint, but turned out we’d signed up for a marathon. And this is a rather brief overview of the current events.
To offer further cynicism, I don’t believe that Putin will press the red button to destroy the entire world.
First, it’s not one person that decides, and someone will refuse. There are lots of people involved in the process and there is no single “red” button.
Second, there are certain doubts that it actually functions properly.
Experience shows that the more transparent the control procedures, the easier it is to identify problems. And where it’s murky as to who controls what and how, but always files reports full of bravado, is where there are always problems.
I am not sure that the “red button” system functions according to the declared data. Besides, plutonium fuel must be changed every 10 years.
Third, and this is the most disgusting and sad, I personally do not believe in Putin’s will to sacrifice himself when he does not even allow his closest ministers and advisors to be in his vicinity.
Whether it’s due to Putin's fear of COVID or a possible assassination is irrelevant. If Putin is scared for the most trusted people to be near him, then how could he possibly choose to destroy himself and those dearest to him?
( END OF TRANSLATION )
ADDENDUM: I wrote the following thread on March 1st - my opinion of the situation.
• • •
Seizing those Citgo assets.