3. Here are earlier 'bridge pics' I mentioned in tweet 2, released on 9 May. Adding them here into one thread.
Drowned BREM-1 + unknown BMP under it, as described in tweet 2 pic 4
Sunk BMK-460
Abandoned T-72B, destroyed in later pics.
All are in the new pics released 11 May 🔜.
4-5. New imagery of failed RuAF pontoon crossings at Bilohorivka 8-10 May. @Rebel44CZ and I counted.
Russian NW bank:
2 pontoon bridges (1 destroyed + 1 abandoned)
drowned BREM-1 + BMP
PTS-3
4 PMP trucks (2 destroyed +2 abandoned)
3 abandoned PMP bridge sections
1x NK vehicle
5. Bilohorivka crossing - RuAF losses.
SE bank:
1 BMK-460 tugboat
4 T-72B (1 destroyed, 3 abandoned)
1 destroyed T-72B3
1 destroyed N/K tank
16 BMP-1 (9 destroyed, 7 abandoned)
2 destroyed unknown BMP
7x unknown AFV (5 destroyed + 2 abandoned)
4 MT-LB (2 destroyed, 2 abandoned)
6. So excluding bridges/boats, 43 🇷🇺vehicles were destroyed/damaged/abandoned (likely now captured) in twt 4-5. I didn't include those in twt 1+2 (unclear) or in this pic. From other info IMO minimum of 12-15 more losses to come. In link details of battles.
7-11. Update of RuAF losses at Bilohorivka. You saw via
@Blue_Sauron JP's great slides marking them. JP + I revised slides and losses: 70 vehicles (orange) excluding an unused PMP section + 2 boats (purple). Also 6 possible AFVs or buildings marked yellow. First tweet sets scene.
8-11. First on RuAF controlled NW bank tracks are cleared for 3 separate bridging attempts
1st 48.950837, 38.225860 destroyed (See tweet 1 pic 4);
2nd 48.950639, 38.225898 half submerged;
3rd 48.950311, 38.225944 half floats.
Note abandoned tucks #1 + 2 possibly since recovered
9-11 Next the SE bank under UAF fire control (waiting for ground film to confirm full control). As mentioned its a mess. Pic 4 for info shows all 3 bridge approaches. The 3rd bridge (nearest) seems still in use as tanks appear to cross, but for how long, its submerged on NW bank.
10-11. Now to the junction + forest road. In all twts + slides JP did an excellent job with graphics especially linking pics together. In these pics the orientation is east to the left + west to the right. The junction is at 48.951059, 38.229508. Building at 48.951008, 38.231723.
11. Further along forest road to building + beyond.
Summary of losses in twt 7-11 (70 vehicles + 2 boats destroyed/abandoned + 1 PMP bridge section):
6 T-72
35 BMP-1
16 unknown AFV (likely most BMP-1)
5 MT-LB
1 BMD
1 BREM-1
1 PTS-3
5 PMP trucks (2 likely recovered)
2 BMK boats
There’s more to come!
12-13. Further there's 1 more AFV loss in this film + potential lots more if, as we suspect, vehicles marked red in tweet 13 were later destroyed/abandoned. To understand timing, part of the film at crossing is earlier than tweet 7-11 as vehicles smolder.
tweet 13 to come later tonight and some other details if I get time. All thanks to JP for most of this work/research till now.
• • •
2/ The war in the east, and the war in
#Ukraine more generally, is approaching an important turning point.
3/ The Ukrainian success in the battle for Kharkiv is significant. It sees the recapture of Ukrainian territory and will ensure the city is out of Russian field artillery range. These are important humanitarian & political achievements for
#Ukraine.
4/ It also gives the Ukrainian Army another huge morale & confidence boost. As they did in the north, they have shown again that they can defend, and then go on the offensive to recapture their land from the Russians. They continue to out-think and out-fight the Russian Army.
5/ Despite the Russians recently reorienting their operational design on eastern Ukraine as its main effort, they have yet to make significant gains. Indeed, they have been fought to a near standstill by the Ukrainians.
6/ Not only are the Russians in trouble in the east, but the entire Russian campaign in Ukraine is also close to culminating. I would highlight – this is not the same as a Russian defeat. It just means that Russia may shortly be unable to conduct offensive operations.
7/ Russia, theoretically, might construct some last gasp offensive out of Crimea or elsewhere in the south. But this would be akin to the WW2 German Ardennes Offensive – tactically dangerous for a short time but ultimately operationally and strategically futile.
8/ Ukraine now has several options for what they might do in the wake of success in the Battle of Kharkiv. Issues such as forces available, logistics, air support and geography will be important. But there are probably two over-riding considerations: timing & exploitation limits.
9/ Timing. The Ukrainians got their timing just right for their north east offensive around Kharkiv. Now, they have to pick the right moment for a potential wider counter offensive in the east.
10/ This means they must balance continued attrition of the Russians during their current offensive and attacking a culminated Russian force before they can establish a well-developed scheme of defensive maneuver in the east.
11/ The region to the east of Kharkiv is vulnerable to a Ukrainian advance. Not only are the majority of Russian forces further south and east of this area, seizing this region (to the east of the Donets) poses a threat to ground supply routes for Russia's eastern offensive.
12/ It will be an attractive option for Ukraine. While the ground is better suited for the defender (Russia), it is always better fight over the worst ground than through the greatest concentration of enemy. This, in many respects, has been Ukraine’s approach throughout the war.
13/ By attacking Russian rear areas, weakly defended locations and logistic hubs / convoys, the Ukrainians have forced Russian withdrawals in the north and northeast.
14/ While Russian forces in the east are stronger than those faced in the north and northeast, any interference with their supply lines will have a significant impact on Russian combat operations on the Izium axis of advance.
15/ Of course, Ukrainian success in any offensive is not guaranteed. Operational outcomes range from a Russian collapse followed by withdrawal; they fight each other to a standstill, followed by stalemate; or, potentially, a Ukrainian defeat. In war there are no certainties.
16/ Summarising, Ukraine doesn’t have a lot of time to assemble the forces & support if they are to conduct another counter offensive in the east. They have to strike before the Russians shift to a defensive posture. The Russians will be much harder to push back if that occurs.
17/ Exploitation limits. There has been speculation about how far the Ukrainians might carry their offensives. In particular, might the Ukrainians advance on Belgorod in Russia? This is probably unlikely for several reasons.
18/ First, the Ukrainians have already proved that they can out fight, outthink and defeat the Russian Army. They don’t need to go into Russia to re-prove that.
19/ 2nd, President Zelensky has gained global influence as President of a country that has been invaded. For him to engage in similar behaviour would have an impact on his influence in the outside world.
president.gov.ua/en/news/kozhno…
20/ 3rd, as Russia has found, invading another country is much harder than defending your own. The motivation for soldiers ‘invading’ another country is different to the motivation when defending one’s own nation. The Ukrainians are clever enough to understand this.
21/ Finally, any Ukrainian incursion into Russia would (for Putin) validate the sense of external existential threat that Russia is under, and that Putin described in his Victory Day speech. The Ukrainian President (as well as the US & NATO) would want to avoid this.
22/ Within Ukraine’s borders, do they seek to only recapture ground taken by Russia since 24 February, or something more? The Ukrainian President will balance reclaiming Ukrainian territory, retaining Western support & not pushing the Russians to use chem / nuclear weapons.
23/ A window of opportunity is opening for Ukrainian operational design in the east. While defending the Kharkiv region they have just re-secured, they may be able to conduct an operational level strike across the Donets and into the rear of Russia’s axis of advance on Izium.
24/ With their recent experience, home ground advantage & western support, there is no one in the world better at making such a decision than the Ukrainian high command. It will be their decisions, not Russia’s, that could result in an important turning point in this war. End
• • •
In this graphic (2019)
#NATO spend is compared to the rest of the world… 🌎
At that time
#NATO spending was about 117% of that from non-member nations ⚖️
#NATO budget has only increased to now represent 57% of all global military spend 💪🏼
🪡 2/X
$40B heading to #Ukraine would represent ~4% of our annual #NATO contribution… 💸
But as Ukraine is not a member nation, it is unlikely this money will be considered in 2022 contributions to #NATO… 🌐
See how the $40B breaks down in link:
randoland.us/bill_breakdown
🪡 3/X
Lets compare
#Russia to the
#USA in terms of
#GDP 🌽🐮🛢
The US has a GDP of ~$21 trillion 🇺🇸
Russia has a GDP of ~$1.5 trillion 🇷🇺
The states of
#CA,
#TX, and
#NY all individually have a higher GDP than Russia…
Russias entire military spend is only 8% of that of USA
🪡
5/X
Having $40B on the way + $20B already sent + #Ukraine’s $6B… We have already exceeded the Russians entire annual military budget of $62B… 💰vs 💵
Not to mention there are many reports showing #Russian forces have poor equipment, little skill, and no discipline 🤷🏻
🪡 6/X
In 1961, Eisenhower delivered his farewell address, and the central theme was warning of the “Military Industrial Complex” ⚠️ 💣
In 2022, Biden is spending $60B+ to support and perpetuate the foreign #UkraineRussiaWar 🇷🇺 🥊 🇺🇦
Where do we get that cash? 👀 👇🏻 🇨🇳
🪡 7/X
Apparently top US officials are OK with a “prolonged stalemate” where both sides “continue to do what they’re doing”…
But this comes at a detriment to US citizens, while we fight soaring inflation w ridiculous prices on homes, gas, and food 🏡 ⛽️ 🥩
🪡 8/X
TLDR; USA borrows cash from China to protect Ukraine from Russia, despite Russia being a “speck” on the global stage and Ukraine being a non-NATO-member 🤔
Meanwhile, the US does NOT support a #FreeTaiwan from China, yet we fund their military to fight China… 🇨🇳 💣 🇹🇼
🪡 9/X
Now more than ever we must avoid spending billions to support the Military Industrial Complex we’ve been funding for nearly a half-century now…💥🛫
~ Please consider throwing me a follow (@coopsimms) if you enjoyed reading ~
🪡 10/10
• • •