For the past three weeks, the advance of Ukrainian forces out of Kharkiv to capture surrounding villages, march all the way to the Russian border, and even cross the Siverskyi Donets River to threaten Russian supply lines has given supporters of Ukraine a lot of opportunities to cheer. The Ukrainian drive into the Russian salient at Izyum, which still seems to be underway, is an additional cause for optimism. And there’s the massive losses Russia received in not one, not two, but three failed attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets near the town of Bilohorivka.
On a more strategic level, there is also the estimate, first issued by the U.K. Ministry of Defense earlier this week, that Russia has now lost over one-third of all the forces it brought to Ukraine. Those losses didn’t exit Ukraine in the form of neat little markers taken from a Risk board, one neat little plastic triangle at a time. They went out in the form of a tank here, an artillery piece there, a helicopter downed here, troop transports lost almost everywhere—and every one of those losses was accompanied by the loss of people. That means almost every Russian battalion tactical group (BTG) still on the ground in Ukraine is almost certain to be short of both equipment and experience,—critical factors in operating a military structure that is both fragile and easily disrupted.
If you stop reading at that point, it would be reasonable to think that any day now, Ukrainian forces would be driving the last Russian across the border at bayonet point and Ukrainian commanders would be fighting the urge to chase Russian soldiers all the way to Moscow. Unfortunately, that’s not the case. Russian forces have been terribly ineffective over the course of this invasion. What they’ve taken came at high cost, and most of of their gains have been temporary. Ukraine recaptured the area around Kyiv, and Sumy, and Chernihiv. They’ve recaptured almost all the territory north of Kharkiv, fought off what seem to be innumerable assaults by Russia in the east, and seem to be engaged in counteroffensives at multiple points along the line.
But Russian military leaders still have one ace up their sleeve. Which is: They don’t give a f##k about how many men they lose in the field. Repeating an action that resulted in failure may be one definition of insanity. It’s also Russia’s underlying military tactic. And in two key locations, that tactic is bringing Russia close to capturing key objectives.
The first of those locations is Severodonetsk in the east, where its position on the east bank of the Siverskyi Donets River isolates the city from other areas under Ukrainian control and leaves it with Russian forces pushing in from three sides. The second one is Lyman, where the city’s position on the north side of the same river leaves it isolated from other Ukrainian areas, etc. etc. etc.
Much has been made, and rightly so, about Russia’s inability to sustain long supply lines or move quickly toward objectives. Those factors are still in place here. But in this case, the cities being squeezed are practically on the front line with areas that Russia has long controlled. The entire distance from Lyman to Severodonetsk is only about 45 kilometers (28 miles). Russia hasn’t made any big leaps, rapid breakthroughs, or astonishing gains in this area. It’s an open question which is faster: the movement rate of the Russian military, or the speed at which your fingernails grow.
Even so, the news from this central part of the battlefield has consistently been one of Russia taking more villages, more towns, and applying more pressure to the cities at the edge of Ukrainian control. Russian forces have been reported in parts of both Lyman and Severodonetsk and fighting could soon reach a level that forces Ukraine to surrender territory and decamp to the other side of that twisting river. Reports are that getting either troops or supplies into these two cities is already difficult.
Add on the apparent removal of all but a handful of the remaining Ukrainian troops resisting the occupation of Mariupol, and Vladimir Putin may well claim that the “special military operation” has reached its objectives. It hasn’t. That doesn’t mean Putin will not say that it has.
If that happens, be prepared for a string of media outlets to trumpet Russia’s victory in the Donbas, if not the entire Ukrainian invasion. CNN will definitely break out the doom graphics. And definitely expect both Republicans and right-wing media to complain that this is somehow Joe Biden’s fault.
But consider this brief list:
- Seredyna-Buda, along the Russian border in Sumy Oblast
- Ternova, on the Russian border north of Kharkiv
- Bohorodychne, 20 km to the southeast of Izyum
- Dovhenke, 15 km due south of Izyum
- Toshkivka, 5 km north of Popasna
- Pylypchatyne, 7 km west of Popasna
- Novomykhailivka, directly north of Mariupol
- Marinka, just west of the city of Donetsk
- Pisky, a northwestern suburb of Donetsk
- Avdiivka, 5 km north of Donetsk
Those are all places where Russia tried to advance on Tuesday alone. And failed.
The disaster at the attempted river crossing may be the largest and most conspicuous Russian loss of men and materiel, but it’s far from the only one. A military whose presence is already down by one-third is still launching multiple piecemeal attacks every single day. As a result, the percentage of Russian forces out of action increases every day.
How high do those losses need to be before Russian troops can no longer act as a cohesive fighting force? It’s certainly not 100%. It may not even be 50%.