Lyman has fallen and Severodonetsk remains contested. Clarification on the supply of US rocket artillery to Ukraine happened, specifying their maximum possible ranges to not encourage launches into Russia. Russian disinformation goes to absurd lengths including some strange propaganda claims regarding Belarus and Poland. Combined arms warfare continues to reveals its norms in this conflict, where tanks and anti-tank weapons resolve their differences in maneuvering.
Moscow’s concentration on seizing Severodonetsk and Donbas generally continues to create vulnerabilities for Russia in Ukraine’s vital Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian counter-offensives continue. Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River. If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack. This strategic calculus should in principle lead Russia to allocate sufficient combat power to hold Kherson. But Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen instead to concentrate all the forces and resources that can be scraped together in a desperate and bloody push to seize areas of eastern Ukraine that will give him largely symbolic gains. Continuing successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson indicate that Ukraine’s commanders recognize these realities and are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that Putin’s decisions have created.
The Ukrainian leadership has apparently wisely avoided matching Putin’s mistaken prioritization. Kyiv could have committed more reserves and resources to the defense of Severodonetsk, and its failure to do so has drawn criticism.[1] Ukrainian forces are now apparently withdrawing from Severodonetsk rather than fighting to the end—a factor that has allowed the Russians to move into the city relatively rapidly after beginning their full-scale assault.[2] Both the decision to avoid committing more resources to saving Severodonetsk and the decision to withdraw from it were strategically sound, however painful. Ukraine must husband its more limited resources and focus on regaining critical terrain rather than on defending ground whose control will not determine the outcome of the war or the conditions for the renewal of war.
Sound Ukrainian prioritization of counter-offensive and defensive operations pushed the Russians almost out of artillery range of Kharkiv City and have stopped the Russian advances from Izyum—both of which are more important accomplishments than the defense of Severodonetsk. Ukraine’s leadership has had to make incredibly difficult choices in this war and has generally made the right ones, at least at the level of strategic prioritization and in the pace, scale, and ambitiousness of its counter-offensives. That is why Ukraine still has a good chance to stop and then reverse the gains Russia is currently making.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
The Russian ground offensive continued on the eastern city of Sievierodonetsk. Russian forces have seized half the city "in a frenzied push," the mayor told The Associated Press. Local leadership said Russian troops hit a nitric acid tank at one of the city's chemical facilities. Russia's military suggested the Ukrainian forces were to blame, saying that's who still controlled the area during the explosion.
Ukraine's military claimed some gains in its counter-offensive in the southern Kherson area, under Russian control. Russian state media, meanwhile, reported that Kherson was preparing to potentially formally join the Russian Federation. Ukrainian military officials accused enemy forces of cutting the fiber optic connections between Kherson and the rest of Ukraine, disrupting mobile internet for residents. Russia denied this, accusing Ukrainian leadership of undermining alleged local pro-Russian sentiment.
European Union leaders agreed to ban most oil imports from Russia. The move is part of the bloc's newest sanctions package on Moscow, which had been held up by Hungary and other member states that rely heavily on Russian oil. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the embargo would apply to around 90% of oil imports from Russia to the EU by the end of this year. Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban forced the EU to accept a ban solely on sea shipments of Russian oil. Pipeline deliveries, which are critical to Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, won't be affected by the ban.
www.npr.org/...
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= Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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If you are going to make a bold claim like "we are seeing the very nature of combat change" you need extraordinary evidence, which this article lacks. Instead, the successes and failures of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries can be explained by well-known principles of war. 2/
In Ukraine most casualties are coming from unguided artillery, Soviet-era air defenses are countering modernized Soviet-era aircraft, infantry are fighting infantry in trenches with rifles and grenades, tanks are being destroyed by AT mines, and most equipment is decades old. 3/
UCAVs and loitering munitions are playing a role, but they're not decisive and they aren't replacing manned aircraft or artillery. COTS UAVs are significant, but they are mostly being used to facilitate artillery, ISR for advancing units, and supporting existing capabilities. 4/
Russia has lost a lot of tanks in Ukraine but this is mostly a result of poor strategy and employment, not a deficiency of tanks themselves. We haven't learned much new about tanks from this war, except the well-known lesson that tanks are vulnerable without combined arms. 5/
Re: Oryx's figures, of the 741 recorded Russian tank losses, 306 (41%) were found abandoned by their crews. Many of the destroyed tanks on the list were also abandoned and destroyed by UA forces who could not capture them. >50% of Russia's tank losses may have been abandoned. 6/
Those data do not indicate that tanks are obsolete, they indicate that tank units were poorly employed. Russia's invasion plan presumed little resistance, and its forces were not well-prepared to deal with resistance. Ground units focused on moving long distances too quickly. 7/
They did so by moving without proper support, such as artillery, EW, logistics, ISR, etc. and often did not move as cohesive BTGs. These units became rapidly overextended and were poorly positioned to handle resistance from the Ukrainian military or guerrilla tactics. 8/
The initial phase of Russia's invasion was not combined arms. The Air Force and Ground Forces fought separate campaigns and aviation didn't really support the ground advance. This left ground forces vulnerable. We should not try to draw sweeping lessons about warfare from this.9/
Tanks are vulnerable without combined arms support. This has been known for 100 years. Russia did not have enough infantry in this invasion and Russian tank regiments changed their T/O by reducing their motorized rifle battalions to a 75-man company. This was insufficient. 10/
How do you protect tanks from modern ATGM teams? You push UAVs and ground reconnaissance ahead of tank units and deploy sufficient infantry to protect tanks, particularly in urban areas. Russia didn't do this in the beginning, and tank units suffered as a result. 11/
VDV, motorized rifle, and spetsnaz units suffered similar problems at the beginning of the war. They made rapid dashes without combined arms support and sustained heavy casualties in many areas, including Hostomel, Bucha, Irpin, Sumy, Kharkiv, etc. 12/
There is ample evidence of the poor employment of tanks or tank units without sufficient infantry and other support that led to heavy losses. 13/
Russian units had little warning they were going to war, which is critical for logistics planning and ensuring proper maintenance. Many of Russia's tank losses happened in the 1st 2 weeks because of maintenance and logistics issues. Others got stuck. 14/
There was a particular issue with T-80 tanks because they didn't have enough gasoline for their gas turbine engines. Notably, Russia has adapted its TTPs and is fighting more competently in the Donbas and we are seeing fewer tank losses as a result. 15/
What is the alternative to tanks? Tanks are still important in urban warfare, counterattacks, exploiting success, and for supporting infantry assaulting well-defended and entrenched positions, which is what Russia is doing in the Donbas now with some success. 16/
Indeed, both Russia and Ukraine still clearly see the benefit of tanks and armor. Ukraine is asking for more armor, and they are using tanks in their counterattacks. They are likely using tanks to reinforce their defenses in the Donbas as well. 17/
People declared tanks were obsolete after the Nagorno-Karabakh war as well. But that was a misinterpretation of the data. Armenia lost a lot of tanks, but, imo, that showed that the side that loses its tanks will likely lose a ground war instead of showing they were obsolete. 18/
Tanks weren't Armenia's problem, its lack of air defenses to counter TB2 UCAVs was. People blamed the wrong system. Once Armenia lost those tanks or couldn't use them, Azerbaijan had success because Armenia couldn't reinforce its defenses with armor. 19/
Indeed, tanks were critical to Azerbaijan's success in penetrating Armenian defenses. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan made its breakthrough in the south where the terrain was flatter and Azerbaijan could maximize its advantage in armor. 20/
No, this war does not show that tanks are obsolete, it shows that they need to be employed with proper support in a combined arms operation, which is part of US/NATO doctrine. It is true that Russia invaded with too many tanks, but tanks were still important in OIF 1. 21/
The Moskva was essentially an un-modernized 40+ year-old ship. It had very old air defenses (possibly non-functional), it didn't have modern CIWS comparable to US Navy's, it had conscript sailors, and it should have had newer ships providing close-range air defense for it. 22/
The loss of the Moskva was a blunder by the Russian Navy's leadership through complacency to the threat from Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. Such a large ship with old air defenses should not have been so close to the Ukrainian coast. It doesn't mean US Navy ships are obsolete. 23/
I think this part about aviation vs air defenses is wrong too. Ukraine has mostly Soviet-era S-300PT/PS, Buk-M1, and Osa air defenses (which are playing a bigger role and influencing Russian air ops more than than MANPADS). These aren't cheap systems but they are old. 24/
If Ukraine only had MANPADS, Russian aviation would be operating more effectively. Russian aircraft have changed their TTPs, putting them at greater risk to MANPADS, because they assess the threat from S-300 and Buk-M1 is greater and because of issues with targeting systems. 25/
This part isn't true. Russia is having success conducting air strikes in the Donbas because Ukraine can't afford to push valuable S-300 and Buk-M1 systems into the Donbas salient where they could be targeted by Russian artillery. MANPADS are not sufficient here. 26/
The US Air Force could conduct an effective SEAD/DEAD campaign against Ukraine's air defenses because it is better trained, has better aircraft (including reconnaissance aircraft), and has better PGMs than the Russian Air Force. Those capabilities are expensive. 27/
I fundamentally disagree that any technology we've seen in Ukraine proves the balance of modern warfare has changed "very much against the attacker." There is plenty of modern equipment and different TTPs that can be used by the attacker to give them the advantage. 28/
The increasing capability of UAVs helps both the defender and attacker. Advances in air defenses can be offset by longer-range munitions and UAVs launching those munitions. Assuming this development will only aid the defender is questionable. 29/
• • •
- The guardsmen held out for two months, before retreating to Lysychansk a couple of weeks ago. Many were combat veterans but hadn't experienced anything like this. “It wasn’t Mariupol, but it was pretty close," one man told me. Between 1000-1500 strike a day.
- Russian shelling is indiscriminate. In Rubizhne, Lysychansk and Severodonetsk. "artillery was removing those houses very fast - people were trying to hide in the basement so they had no view, no assessment of the current situation, so there was a lot of losses during that time.
- Repeatedly the Russians struck the town's chemical plant. Ukrainian service members were left struggling for breath, with blood pouring from their mouths and nose.
- This isn't a campaign of attrition, it's a war of oblivion. when I asked about Russian tactics: "well, there are a lot of them, there's a lot of artillery - bombardments are like nightmare, we shoot one round they shoot 10"
- Russia may be running low on tanks, precision weapons, morale, etc, etc. But it isn't running low on old fashioned artillery shells.
- "When our Sniper is shooting, they send in a full packet of grads on his position - so it's basically a sniper with one bullet and they send like $1,000 artillery rounds just for the sniper so they really don't care about how much ammunition they use"
- "I mean,(the Russians) have a lot of manpower, same with ammunition. And all that they do is come, die, retreat and start shelling from the artillery. They treat their soldier as meat, not as a living human beings. That’s it.
- The guardsmen and women I spoke to have suffered greatly, but they are back on the front lines, they refuse to submit. "The only question is time. The time and that’s it. And everything will be Ukraine".
• • •
Despite the massive influx of military aid from the United States and other NATO partners, the Ukrainians say they still lack weapons systems that would give them a chance against the Russian invaders: Rocket artillery.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has personally appealed to several members of Congress for the United States to provide Ukraine with multiple-launch rocket systems, said a congressional staffer, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
President Joe Biden recently caused a bit of confusion when he said the U.S. government will not give Ukraine any “rocket systems that can strike into Russia.”
A senior administration official subsequently clarified that the United States is still considering giving the Ukrainians multiple-launch rocket systems, but not with long-range artillery rockets that hit targets beyond the battlefield.
Specifically, the Biden administration is looking into providing Ukraine with Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, which has a range of about 43 miles, Wall Street Journal reporters Michael Gordon and Nancy Youssef first revealed on Tuesday. Those rockets would be mounted on High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.
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