The Russians continue to try to cut off the Ukrainians in the east, but seem to have been stalled. The ground attack on the Azovstal steel plant continues with capitulation expected by Victory Day on Monday. The Russians now appear to have lost another ship to anti-ship missiles — a frigate, the Admiral Makarov. By summer, Russia’s troop losses in Ukraine will exceed American losses in the entire Vietnam War
Key Takeaways
- The Ukrainian counteroffensive along a broad arc north and east of Kharkiv city took further terrain and will likely push Russian forces out of tube artillery range of the city in the coming days. The ability—and willingness—of the Ukrainian military to concentrate the forces in Kharkiv necessary to conduct this operation indicates Ukrainian confidence in repelling ongoing Russian attacks with their existing forces in the region.
- Russian forces did not make any progress on the Izyum axis.
- Russian forces likely secured small gains on the outskirts of Severodonetsk in the last 24 hours but are unlikely to successfully surround the town.
- Russian forces continued assaults on the Azovstal plant, but ISW cannot confirm any specific advances. Likely widespread civilian resistance to the Russian occupation may additionally be disrupting previously announced Russian plans to conduct a Victory Day exhibition in Mariupol.
- There were no significant changes on the southern axis in the last 24 hours and Russian forces continued to reinforce their forward positions.
- ISW cannot confirm reports of a Ukrainian anti-ship missile strike on the Admiral Makarov at this time.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive north and east of Kharkiv city secured further gains in the last 24 hours and may successfully push Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv in the coming days. Ukrainian forces captured several settlements north and east of Kharkiv in the last 24 hours, reducing the ability of Russian forces to threaten Ukraine’s second-largest city. This Ukrainian operation is developing into a successful, broader counteroffensive—as opposed to the more localized counterattacks that Ukrainian forces have conducted throughout the war to secure key terrain and disrupt Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are notably retaking territory along a broad arc around Kharkiv rather than focusing on a narrow thrust, indicating an ability to launch larger-scale offensive operations than we have observed so far in the war (as Ukrainian forces predominantly retook the outskirts of Kyiv following Russian withdrawals rather than in a major counteroffensive). The willingness of Ukrainian forces to concentrate the forces necessary for this scale of offensive operations, rather than deploying these available forces to defenses in eastern Ukraine, additionally indicates the Ukrainian military’s confidence in repelling ongoing Russian operations to encircle Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk area. While Ukrainian forces are unlikely to directly threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum (as they run further to the east of recent Ukrainian advances), Ukrainian forces may be able to relieve Russian pressure on Kharkiv and possibly threaten to make further advances to the Russian border.
www.understandingwar.org/...
In this new operation, Russia was to eliminate the Ukrainian salient with two massive strikes from the north (along the Izium-Sloviansk highway) and from the south of the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts.
The two key axes were to meet up in between, effectively cutting the Ukrainian force off from supplies and the rest of the country.
A critical axis was also to surround the Sievierodonetsk-Lysychansk area, bisecting the Ukrainian salient.
Ukrainian units continue to successfully defend key points of Huliaipole, Velyka Novosilka, and Vuhledar in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts since mid-March, preventing the Russian axis from moving north.
According to the Pentagon, the southern deadlock appeared to have been so tight that Russia decided to withdraw at least two BTGs from Mariupol (despite ongoing attempts to take the Azovstal steel plant by storm) and likely redeploy them to Donbas.
The Battle of Donbas’ map looks virtually the same since the Russian withdrawal from the north in late March.
“Due to strong Ukrainian resistance, Russian territorial gains have been limited and achieved at significant costs to Russian forces,” the U.K. Ministry of Defense stated on April 29.
Moreover, according to British intelligence, following the battles of Kyiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv, the Kremlin had limited time to re-equip and reorganize its forces before the Donbas Offensive. Therefore, this reality, alongside poor morale, has hindered Russia’s combat effectiveness and the offensive’s momentum.
[...]
Even before that, Ukraine’s military and U.S. intelligence both said that Ukrainian forces have managed to advance 40 kilometers near Kharkiv, mainly in areas northeast of the city.
On May 6, the Ukrainian military reported the liberation of a number of towns some 30 kilometers northeast of the city, having pushed the Russian forces farther north to the state border.
Ukraine’s activity in the region will likely be of secondary, auxiliary nature to divert parts of the main Russian forces in Donbas.
“The Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv city may disrupt Russian forces northeast of Kharkiv and will likely force Russian forces to decide whether to reinforce positions near Kharkiv or risk losing most or all of their positions within artillery range of the city,” the ISW wrote on May 5.
“Russian forces made few advances in continued attacks in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to build their ongoing counterattacks and repulse Russian attacks along the Izyum axis into a wider counter offensive to retake Russian-occupied territory in Kharkiv Oblast.”
kyivindependent.com/...
- We can assume Ukrainian losses, even though we have no detail on them from, are equally relentless. It’s a question of who can take them for longer.
- Btw, Ukrainian estimates of Russian losses paint a pretty clear picture that any Russian offensive can’t last that much longer. Even if actual Russian losses are only 2/3 of those claimed, since Apr 18 the Russians would have lost 212 tanks (319 claimed) and 416 APC (625 claimed)
- That’s almost 12 tanks and just over 23 APC per day. Something equivalent to the fighting vehicle component of a full strength BTG every day for 18 days. If Ukrainian estimates are accurate; it would be 27 full strength BTGs in that time.
- Considering that Pentagon estimates were that many of the Russian BTGs rushed into the Donbas were below strength, you can see why such loss rates can’t continue for much longer.
- Only question is whether Ukrainian losses have weakened them to such a degree as well.
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I'll write more on this another time, but it is astonishing that Russia - a nation also capable of remarkable feats of heroism and achievement - has never been able to overcome its own political culture. You can blame the Soviets for a lot of this - I do - but not all of it. /2
Other nations have managed to overcome ugly histories. Sometimes through defeat in war, sometimes through development and progress. Russians, ardently embracing a sense of victimhood, claim a special exemption, especially after WW II. They cling to it. /3
And yet Russians themselves have had the same debates for centuries: Why are we so backward, are we really Europeans, why are we always on the outside, etc. Russia experts debate the same things: Is it the sheer geography? History? and so on. But I wonder if it really matters. /4
At some point, you cannot keep blaming "history" as a culprit. Cultures are the sum of individual choices as much as they are the sediment of history. Many Russians blame "history" as a kind of generic excuse. I have called bullshit on this while in Russia talking to Russians. /5
And so much projection. Russia's Putinists claim to be fighting against immorality and decadence, but Russia is a deeply decadent state; it is a country where even the nationalist, hawkish elite (including Putin, his family, and the Patriarch) live swanky, luxury-filled lives. /6
In any case, the great promise at the end of the 20th century was that we no longer had to be prisoners to our histories. Two world wars and a Cold War gave way to a world with choices, including in Russia. And yet, we're going backward, Russia murderously faster than anyone. /7
Ironically, one of the greatest Russian literary works of all time (The Grand Inquisitor) includes a chapter on why freedom is a burden.
Maybe it is. Maybe too much so for many of us. But it is also a responsibility. A test. Many of us are failing it, as people and nations./8
The Russians have never faced up to this responsibility. I thought after 1991 they would; really, I was almost certain they would.
Americans (to change the subject) always met this challenge head-on, even when we fell short. But millions of us no longer seem to care. /9
This is a dark time for democracy.
#Ukraine - a place I would not have expected to lead the way, given its early post-independence history - is now fighting for freedom. I'm glad Americans are united in supporting the Ukrainians. But I hope we have the fortitude to stay.
/10
We need to know that this isn't a struggle that will end tomorrow, or end in Ukraine. And I'd hope that this realization would wake the rest of us up.
But I guess if gas is four bucks a gallon, we'll call it a day on democracy. /11x
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