While Russia is concentrating its offensive on the central Donbas sector, it has remained on the defensive on its flanks. The war continues and the possibility of escalation continues even as the ground situation remains fluid. Logistics including the problems of standardized ammunition will become more vital as casualties increase on both sides. The disinformation battle remains complex even as diplomacy seems only a hope given the various stakes.
"...as soon as possible and that negotiations start that will allow not only the reestablishing of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also take into account a number of other very important elements, including transitional justice, the payment of...2/n
"...war damages etc. We also hope for, and its also important for us to be able to obtain this in the months to come, that when the war is over that we have a greater clarity of what is necessary for all of us...that's to say, the security and stability of Europe..." 3/n
"We are ready to give Ukraine security guarantees. We have said this to the Russians. The President has told Vladimir Putin this and will continue to speak to Putin for as long as is necessary, and after coordination with President Zelensky...4/n
"...with the aim of each time passing messages that are coordinated with our closest partners, particularly our German partners. The President's last discussion with Vladimir Putin took place around 15 days ago with Chancellor Scholz and involved simply saying...5/n
"...we are ready to engage in a form of robust peace that will be clear for Ukraine and for Europe. That is in the interest of Europe and in the interest of Ukraine....I'm sure you understand that the Russian demands in Ukraine are absolutely unacceptable...6/n
"...It is not acceptable that one can seize territory by force and it is not acceptable either that one can put this into a (peace) agreement because this would be a clear violation of the most important principles of international order, of the United Nations charter etc.,..7/n
"Russia must end its offensive. The integrality of the Ukrainian territory must be reestablished and we are ready to work with all our international partners, not only to end this crisis but to mitigate the effects of this crisis on each..."...8/n
This is a speedy translation and there's more, but you get the idea.
Does this sound like France is appeasing Putin?
Again, this is NOT a transcript of Macron speaking.
These are notes from an Elysée briefing.
• • •
- Russian officials are increasingly taking over governmental positions in occupied Ukrainian territory, advancing the Kremlin's likely efforts to annex occupied areas of Ukraine into Russia as an okrug (federal district).
- Russian forces continued to fight for the Azot industrial zone in Severodonetsk under the cover of heavy artillery fire.
- Russian forces made marginal gains north of Slovyansk but are likely to face difficulties assaulting the city itself because of the tactical challenges posed by crossing the Siverskyi Donets River.
- Russian forces made incremental advances to the east of Bakhmut and will continue efforts to cut Ukrainian lines of communication to the northeast of Bakhmut.
- Russian forces are likely engaged in limited fighting along occupied frontiers in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
- Russian forces continue to focus on strengthening defensive lines along the Southern Axis and are intensifying ground attacks in northeastern Zaporizhia Oblast with the support of troop and equipment rotations.
Russian forces continued efforts to advance on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and made marginal territorial gains north of Slovyansk on June 9. Russian forces are likely seeking to leverage their control of the area around Sviatohirsk to move southwards toward Slovyansk, but are unlikely to have seized the settlement as of June 9 due to Ukrainian resistance in the area and Russian milblogger Swodki claimed that Russian forces captured Pryshyb and Tetyanivka (both about 20 km north of Slovyansk) on June 9, though ISW cannot confirm this claim. Russian efforts to move toward Slovyansk are likely hindered by the Siverskyi Donets River, which they will have to successfully cross to the north (around Sviatohirsk-Tetyanivka) and east of Slovyansk (around Raihorodok) in order to push toward the city.
Russian forces continued ground, air, and artillery attacks east of Bakhmut and made incremental gains on June 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops had partial success in Komyshuvakha (northeast of Bakhmut) and Roty (southeast of Bakhmut). Russian forces additionally continued unsuccessful attacks on Nahirne and Mykolaivka.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued to defend their occupied frontiers and fire on Ukrainian positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are focusing on engineering, fortification, and mining to strengthen their defensive lines north of Kharkiv City. Russian Telegram channels additionally claimed that Russian troops re-took control of Ternova and Varvarivka, both settlements northeast of Kharkiv City near the international border. While ISW cannot independently confirm the status of Ternova or Varvarivka, these claims indicate that Russian forces are still engaged in fighting along the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Certain Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces may be conducting limited counterattacks in this area, which is consistent with Russian reports of continued positional battles in this area.
2/ Weather Outlook. Forecast for the next ten-days will see an initial 4-day period of thunderstorms in the Donbas that may slow operations in non-urban terrain. Temps will range from 31-14 C with higher humidity. Cloud cover & wind speed will make toss bombing problematic.
3/ Kharkiv OD. This remains a critical front and has become an unstable region over the past week. The RAF needs to expand its northern enclave to maintain pressure on Kharkiv & pin down UAF units still defending here. #Kharkiv
4/ For the UAF it is unclear if they will have the combat power to renew their offensive to push remaining RAF units over the international border. At a minimum UAF forces in the Kharkiv metro area will be able to contain RAF activity to its present enclave.
5/ Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. The strategic importance of Severodonetsk has grown out of how the RAF & UAF have arrayed their forces in relation to each other to achieve a clear operational advantage relative to each sides war aims throughout the Donbas. #Donbas #Izyum #Popasna
6/ The RAF must secure the Severodonetsk Salient to achieve a true general breakout into the relatively undefendable terrain of western Donetsk. Penetrating the remaining UAF defenses on the Siverskyi Donets north of Slovyansk and expanding the Popasna Bulge shapes this.
7/ Improved Russian artillery survivability tactics & VKS support to ground operations is allowing sustained Russian maneuver success. Improved artillery & VKS strikes against UAF troop concentrations & logistical infrastructure are facilitating RAF momentum.
Severodoentsk AO. Momentum has swung back in favor of the RAF in Severodoentsk, but the UAF is still holding their ground in the western part of the city, particularly in the industrial sector centered on the Azot Chemical Plant. #Severodonestk
9/ However, the UAF is struggling to keep its artillery units supplied, hindering their ability to deliver timely counter-battery fire against the Russians. With losses mounting the UAF will face a difficult choice in deciding to maintain the defense of Severodonetsk or pullback.
10/ Zaporizhzhia OD. RAF & UAF activity in the Zaporizhzhia OD remains limited to localized attacks to improve tactical positioning. There are indications that both the RAF & UAF are preparing to renew offensive action in the Hulyaipole-Orikhiv area. #Melitopol #Mariupol
11/ Odesa-Kherson OD. The UAF counteroffensive into northern Kherson has met with little success so far. Despite the significant number of forces allocated to the operation, UAF units were only able to establish an 8km wide & 10km deep lodgment on the east of the Inhulets River.
12/ RAF units under the control of the 7th Guards Air Assault (Landing) Division have been able to successfully contain the breach in their NW defensive line and halt the Ukrainian advance for now. The UAF still have enough forces on hand to expand these lodgments.
13/ Black Sea OTMO. The Russian blockade of Odesa continues. However, improved Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities have forced the majority of Black Sea Fleet surface activity to be pushed back 100km from the southern Ukrainian coast. The NW region of the Black Sea is now contested.
14/ Aerospace Assessment. VKS & Naval cruise missile strike effects remain negligible for ordnance expended. Both the quantity of strikes against critical infrastructure & the overall accuracy of the missiles employed are not impeding the delivery of Western aid.
15/ Improved Russian electronic warfare is causing havoc with Ukrainian recon UAVs, C2 nodes, counter-battery radar, and radio network communications. With their heavy reliance on UAVs for targeting, RAF EW is hindering UAF artillery operations.
16/ Battle Damage Assessment. The Ukrainian Government Authorities have acknowledged the heavy toll current combat operations in the Donbas is having on UAF manpower. The UAF is reportedly losing 100-200 KIA and 400-500 WIA a day.
17/ The continued loss of a battalion equivalent a day will erode UAF overall combat effectiveness faster than it will the RAF, even with Russian force generation issues. The RAF cannot ignore growing resistance to coercive mobilization practices if it hopes to replace losses.
18/ Ukrainian TV, Day 98-107. There is a growing unevenness to support of Ukraine. Britain, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic States are the most supportive while Germany, France, Italy, & Hungary voice support but show little by way of their actions.
19/ Tension continues to rise as a global food crisis appears likely due to the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports & sanctions on Russian grain exports. Turkey intends to act as a mediator but not without its own suspicious activity in grain exports.
20/ Humanitarian Impact. Ukrainian refugees total 9.87+ million with 7.23+ million in countries bordering Ukraine, another 2.64+ throughout Europe. Internally displaced people throughout Ukraine are now at 6.76+ million (1.7+ million in east & 562K in south Ukraine).
21/ Information War. While speaking to Russian entrepreneurs President Putin made clear his goal in Ukraine is to “restore” supposed “lost territory” in the same way Peter the Great did in his 21-year war with Sweden (Great Northern War, 1700-21).
22/ This rhetoric is meant to justify 1) the historic right of Russia to wage war in the Ukraine to restore “New Russia” to the Motherland, 2) all and any means to accomplish this, 3) the length of time this may take, 4) greater sacrifice required by the Russian people to do this
23/ Overall Assessment. The character of the war has turned more favorably toward Russia, a grinding attritional war of positional battles in which RAF ground forces can make steady incremental progress behind their advantage in artillery & close air support.
24/ The UAF will struggle to gain offensive parity or localized superiority in a war based off this character, as evident by the limited success of the northern Kherson counteroffensive, despite the UAF advantage in maneuver units. More Western artillery & EW are needed.
Time remains the ultimate enemy of both belligerents. The UAF needs to contain the RAF to the occupied areas, acquire more modern Western weapon systems & train enough forces to turn the tide. The RAF needs to complete its conquest before the UAF can defeat it. #SlavaUkraini
• • •
M109 self propelled howitzers, preferably paladin level guns have good armor, they are tracked and highly mobile and not too expensive. Because of good armor, low profile and fairly short barrel (shorter range) they are perfect to provide support for mechanized and tank brigades.
Ukraine operates roughly 10 mechanized brigades and 5 tank brigades. Each brigade has 2 SPG artillery support battalions(divizion). Each battalion operates 18 SPGs.
Ukraine needs 648 m109 SPGs.
Wheeled self propelled howitzers. Ukraine now has two types of wheeled SPGs zuzana-2 and Caesar howitzers.
These are most mobile SPGs, easy to hide, have high range, very fast displacement and emplacement times. Both have low fuel consumption. They belong to artillery brigades.u
Ukraine has 2 artillery brigades that need to switch towed guns to wheeled. Each brigade can scale down to 3 battalions, 15 SPGs each.
15*3*2=90 wheeled SPGs. The choice eventually will be zuzana-2 because France isn't a good partner for Ukraine.
Ukraine needs 90 wheeled SPGs
AHS Krab, Pzh 2000, AS90. These are heavy sophisticated long range tracked SPGs. They are heavy, hard to maintain and master guns. They consume more fuel, have good off-road capabilities, carry more rounds, fast rate of fire, and MRSI features.
Ukraine has 2 artillery brigades and 1 coastal artillery brigade that require these. Specifically due to its off-road capabilities compared to wheeled guns.
Each brigade has 3 battalions consisting of 18 guns. 3*3*18=162 SPGs.
Ukraine needs 162 AHS Krab or similar SPGs
M777 or similar howitzers. These are lightweight towed guns, because they are just as mobile as wheeled SPGs, but have lesser off-road capabilities. Its big disadvantage is very long displacement and emplacement times. Air assault, motorized and mountain brigades need them.
In total 18 air assault, motorized and mountain, marine brigades with 1 towed artillery battalion each with 18 howitzers. 1*18*18=324
Ukraine needs 324 towed howitzers such as m777.
I've assembled this amateur image to give you a high level understanding of Ukrainian 155mm artillery systems structure. Keep in mind these are estimates, not report from MoD
• • •
"Russian forces are continuing to deploy outdated military equipment to Ukraine to replace losses."
In 1991, Leonid Kravchuk became President of Ukraine.
As was seen time and time again throughout the old union, Ukraine was looted for all it was worth by the U.S. and NATO. The standard of living plummeted in what was once one of the most prosperous regions of the Soviet Union, and crime ran rampant. Gangs went to war over table scraps, and the situation became so dire that many women were forced into prostitution to support themselves. Many more were simply kidnapped and trafficked from the country.
Inflation spiked by more than 4000%, making savings accounts worthless overnight. Bank defaults meant government employees often went without salary for years. State-owned industries were sold off for pennies on the dollar, and with them jobs vanished with nothing to replace them. This left even highly trained and educated people destitute to such an extent that many died from hunger and exposure. Ukraine became one of the poorest and most corrupt nations in Europe and remains so.
Kravchuk was an acolyte of Yeltsin, and so everything not bolted down was stolen or sold off. One of the more egregious examples was the Black Sea merchant fleet, which was privatized in 1992 and its ships transferred to offshore holding companies beginning in 1993. In 1991, the fleet of 280 ships was the third largest in the world. By 2004, only six remained.