Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces carried out limited assault operations southeast of Izyum and near Barvinokove (southwest of Izyum) but did not make any territorial gains on June 4. Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize Virnopillya, approximately 20km southwest of Izyum.[8] Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults on Bohorodychne in a likely attempt to link up with units attempting to seize Sviatohirsk from the east—two settlements approximately 25km southeast of Izyum.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued to shell Sviatohirsk and its surroundings.[10] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian artillery fire started a fire that destroyed the Sviatohirsk Lavra (monastery) of the Moscow Patriarchate, but ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[11] The Russian Defense Ministry blamed the fire on Ukrainian forces and claimed that Russian forces did not launch assaults on Sviatohirsk.[12] Russian Telegram channels claimed that Russian forces seized Sosnove just north of Sviatohirsk and Brusivka, approximately 9km southwest of Lyman.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are still attempting to secure the eastern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in Staryi Karavan, approximately 1km northeast of Brusivka.[14]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Ukrainian and Russian sources confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack in Severodonetsk on June 3. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured 20% of Severodonetsk from Russian forces and inflicted significant casualties against Chechen units.[15] Some Russian milbloggers reported that Chechen units likely thought that they had successfully secured Severodonetsk and were unprepared for the counterattack.[16] The Russian Defense Ministry did not comment on the counterattack and falsely claimed that Ukrainian units are retreating to Lysychansk due to high losses of up to 90% of personnel.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued street fights in Severodonetsk and reinforced their units with reserves mobilized from the Luhansk People’s Republic’s (LNR) 2nd Army Corps on June 4.[18] Haidai reported that Russian forces continued to target the remaining bridges in Severodonetsk to cut off Ukrainian logistics routes to Severodonetsk.[19] Russian forces also reportedly launched an unsuccessful offensive operation on Ustynivka, approximately 16km southeast of Severodonetsk, likely in an effort to secure positions on the western Siverskyi Donets Riverbank.[20]
www.understandingwar.org/...
2. ISW is unable to verify Russian reports that Ukrainian forces crossed the Pechenihy Reservoir, established positions in Khotomlya, and are operating on the road spanning Primorskoye - Martovoye - Pershotravnevoye - Khotomlya as of June 2. We recessed Russian control in this...
area and recoded it as Russian advances on June 4 but will not advance Ukrainian counteroffensives until we observe more evidence to corroborate.
t.me/rybar/33544;
t.me/rybar/33349;
t.me/rybar/33458 ; https://argumenti ru/army/2022/06/774799
4. We expanded Russian advances near Yarova and Sviatohirsk on June 4 after seeing geolocated Russian forces in the area on June 4.
5. We recessed Ukrainian counteroffensive near Davydiv Brid given Ukraine’s Operational Command South stated on June 3 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck Russian forces near Davydiv Brid, indicating that Ukrainian forces may not control it.
6. We recessed assessed Russian advance from Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast after not seeing Russian forces in the area for several days.
7. We filled in the salient between Vyshneve and Rivnopil in Donetsk Oblast after not observing evidence of Ukrainian forces inside that interior area.
8. We recessed Ukrainian counteroffensives from Chkalovske, Kharkiv oblast, given reports from late May that Russian forces are still in the town. Source:
suspilne.media/243697-okupant…
9. We expanded Russian advances near Blahodatne in Mykolaiv Oblast after observing geolocated combat footage. Source:
10.We refined our assessment of the battle for Severodonetsk based on several sources from June 3 and 4. Luhansk Oblast Governor Serhiy Haidai reported on June 3 and 4 that Ukrainians forces regained 20 percent of the city on June 4.
Russian milbloggers Igor Girkin and Moscowcalling claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack resulting in high losses among Chechen units in Severodonetsk, but that the counterattack does not change the strategic situation because there is... only one remaining bridge to Lysychansk and Ukrainian forces might not be able to withdraw in time. Russian Telegram channel Voenkor Kotyenok Z reported that on June 3 that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack.
As always, we will continue to refine our assessment as we collect more information.
All of today's changes are live on the interactive map:
• • •
The Ukrainian military published a video of the destruction of an enemy helicopter.
Quote: "Another enemy helicopter has found the last shelter in Donbas!"
Source: Operational Command "North" (Pivnich)
Russians are not cornered. The Russian army is not cornered. It is an invading force. When defeated, units just retreat across the border to Russia. 2/17
Putin rules in virtual reality, where there is always an escape route. He cannot be cornered in Ukraine, because Ukraine is a real place. 3/17
It is hard for people in other societies to grasp that Putin is a dictator who controls his country's media. He rules by changing the subject. 4/17
Putin changes the subject all the time. The last time Russia invaded Ukraine, its media changed the subject to Syria from one day to the next, and Russians went along. 5/17
When Russia invaded Ukraine this February, the media quickly adjusted from saying that invasion was impossible to saying it was inevitable. Russians went along. 6/17
If defeated in reality, Putin will just declare victory on television, and Russians will believe him, or pretend to. He does not need our help for that. 7/17
It is senseless to create an "off-ramp" in the real world, when all Putin needs is one in a virtual world he completely controls. Talking of "off-ramps" just gives Russian leaders something to laugh about in what are otherwise difficult times. 8/17
To be sure, Putin might err and wait too long to declare victory in the virtual world. In that case he loses power. We cannot save him from such a misjudgment, and it is misguided to try. 9/17
Putin's power over media will be complete until the moment when it ceases. There is no interval where our actions in the real world will make a difference. Either our off-ramps are unnecessary or they are irrelevant. 10/17
It is grotesque to ask the Ukrainians to make decisions about the war for the comfort of Russian television producers, who don't take direction from the real world anyway. 11/17
Misunderstanding Russia through clichés of "cornering" and "off-ramps" will make the war last longer, by distracting from the simple necessity of Russian defeat. 12/17
Ukraine is a very different story. Zelensky, unlike Putin, is democratically elected, feels responsible for his people, and governs in a world where others matter. 13/17
Ukraine has a press that the government does not direct. Zelensky cannot simply change the subject. He has to bring his people along on any major decision. 14/17
Unlike Putin, Zelensky has to make a case to his people to end this war. He therefore does need help, both to win the war and in telling Ukrainians what comes next. 15/17
Unlike Russian soldiers, Ukrainians have nowhere else to go. They cannot just go home. The war is fought in their country. They will return to their homes and rebuild. 16/17
Ending the war means thinking more about the Ukrainian people and their future, and and worrying less about problems that Putin does not in fact have. 17/17
When this war began, I was doing my German homework. I just started crying and shrieking when the reports began. “He did it. He did it.” I didn’t go to class the next day. I realized the immensity of what was happening. This country I loved was being invaded. 2/
My distress became and has remained, anger. The immediate refugee crisis, instances of racism at the border, the bombardment of Sumy. So many facing the unknown. The initial upswing of Western solidarity for Ukraine. Blue and yellow everywhere. Everyone is Ukrainian. Unless 3/
Unless you believed that Ukraine deserves this. Believed Russian narratives of Nazism. Russian narratives of NATO and US encirclement. These narratives have become more popular since February, despite Bucha, Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk. Never mind Luhansk and Donetsk since 2014 4/
This war has crystallized so many things: Western selectivity in helping countries being attacked, in helping refugees, in putting capitalism before alleviating human suffering (re: purchasing Russian oil and gas). Russian colonialism is now in popular parlance 5/
Yet, as I feared, it is 101 days, and Ukraine still fights alone. Like in 2014, Western media and audiences are getting exhausted (just from watching!). Calls for Ukraine to just give up territory to appease Russia. It’s a replay. It’s Crimea and Luhansk and Donetsk in 2014 6/
Children stolen and killed, thousands of women assaulted and violated, civilians butchered. But Russia’s concerns should be considered? We’re all Ukrainians unless the war goes on too long. 101 days, over 3000 days since Crimea was stolen 7/
3000 days or 101 days-Ukraine still stands. As I have said since day one, this war is existential for Ukraine. Appeasing Russia means sacrificing Ukraine and Ukrainians to a country that has raped and killed 1000s of Ukrainians. Understand this-because it will never happen. Fin.
• • •
2/ Gasoline and oil have moved asymmetrically recently, with prices at the pump soaring to a new record even as crude has come off its multiyear high. (
@MktsInsider)
3/ On Wednesday, the average gallon of gas in the US hit $4.40, according to AAA. Meanwhile, the cost of West Texas Intermediate crude surged in March to $123 a barrel, the highest since 2014, but has since fallen back to around $106. (
@MktsInsider)
4/ Given that 59% of gas prices come from the cost of crude, a 22% decline in oil should've translated to a 13% dip at the pump — but that didn't happen. (
@MktsInsider,
@BusinessInsider)
5/ This disconnect, stems not from the crude oil market, but instead reflects frictions in the gasoline market, wrote economists at the Dallas Federal Reserve.
6/ They said gas stations could be moving to recapture "margins lost during the upswing, when gas stations were initially slow to increase pump prices." (
@MktsInsider,
@BusinessInsider)
7/ Another reason is that consumers tend to search for cheaper gas more intensively as prices rise than when they fall, providing more pricing power to gas stations and causing prices to fall more slowly than when they rose. (
@MktsInsider)
8/ Plus, warmer weather tends to increase demand, boosting retail prices, the economists explained. (
@MktsInsider)
9/ And don't expect an increase in US oil supplies to come to the rescue. "US production increases would likely add only a few hundred thousand barrels per day above current forecasts," the Dallas Fed economists wrote. (
@MktsInsider)
10/ "This amounts to a proverbial drop in the bucket in the...global oil market, especially relative to a looming reduction in Russian oil exports due to war-related sanctions that could easily reach 3 million barrels per day." (
@MktsInsider)
• • •