UPDATE: Wednesday, Mar 29, 2023 · 7:56:20 PM +00:00
·
Mark Sumner
A Ukrainian Leopard 2A4, now updated with standoff armor, a roof to protect against bombs dropped by drones, and extra bricks of armor to the front upper and lower hull. Ukrainian tankers know what they want, and Ukrainian welders have complied.
Now it looks like it’s ready for this war.
UPDATE: Wednesday, Mar 29, 2023 · 7:14:59 PM +00:00
·
Mark Sumner
There’s a disparity in reports from Bakhmut today. Wagner is reporting that they are staging widespread assaults from the south, north, and east and one widely following OSINT site has Wagner forces “storming the city center.”
However, this news is currently not being reported elsewhere, including on Ukrainian Telegram channels that feature on the ground sources. It’s possible this has happened in the last few hours and is moving quickly … or that it’s not happening at all.
Searching for more information.
Last Saturday, we looked at what appeared to be a decline in Russia’s daily assaults along the front during the month of March. As reported by the Ukrainian General Staff in their 6 AM morning briefings, a high of 170 assaults were launched by Russia at various locations back at the beginning of the month. That number fluctuated up and down during the next three weeks before hitting a low of 59 on March 24. Even so, it wasn’t clear that there was an actual trend. That single entry at the beginning of the month may have been a fluke high, that final number on the chart at the time an exceptional low. Taken together, the two could create the impression of a trend where none existed.
Then we got data for the next four days, and it became clear that the trend is real.
Reported Russian assaults per day on Ukrainian positions.
Now, what does that trend actually mean?
It would be nice to read this as proof of the “c” word: culmination. It’s been clear over the last month that Russia has been moving forces around as it sought to continue its major attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka. That included taking forces from the north and sending them to Bakhmut even as some of the Wagner mercenaries at Bakhmut were reportedly being redirected to Avdiivka.
Reduced Russian assaults really could represent a decline in their ability to launch assaults. From the beginning of the invasion, Russia doesn’t seem to have factored the probability of success into the small-unit assaults it has staged. If they’re not attacking, maybe it means they can no longer scrape together enough men and materiel to launch an attack. Or, considering the number of videos that have come out with Russian units begging “Vladimir Vladimirovich” to please stop sending them into the meat grinder, maybe Russia is running out of units willing to make such attempted advances.
Here’s how the Ukrainian Telegram channel DeepState put events on Wednesday.
No significant changes and events were recorded during the day. Globally, the enemy is slightly slowing down the pace, but does not reject plans to capture Bakhmut, improve the position near Kreminna and Donetsk, as well as the encirclement of Avdiivka.
It’s not just Bakhmut where Russian advances have obviously slowed. At Kreminna, Russia has been unable to dislodge Ukrainian forces from positions adjacent to the city despite a whole winter of concerted efforts. The fight is still happening right on the edge of the city, and the Russian fighters only appear to be getting more inexperienced and poorly equipped over time.
Russian attacks really could be trailing off because their ability to stage these attacks is declining for a combination of reasons. On the other hand, they may not be attacking because they, like everyone else, are bracing for what Ukraine does next. Because the talk of that Ukrainian counteroffensive is everywhere.
For weeks now, reports of the area around Zaporizhzhia have noted that Russian forces are “on the defensive.” That increasingly appears to be the state of things from Kreminna north to Svatove, and on the eastern front everywhere except at Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka. Russia is no longer trying to advance. They’re preparing to receive Ukraine’s counter.
It’s worth mentioning that as often as we talk about Bakhmut, Russia announced that they had captured Marinka a full year ago. They still haven’t taken Marinka. And now fighting there is back to little more than Russia throwing a desultory round of shells at Ukrainian positions.
Here’s Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksi Rezniko appearing last night on Ukrainian TV addressing how Western tanks will be used in Ukraine.
Rezniko: “You will see them on the counter-attack according to the decision of our General Staff. It is already being planned in several directions. It depends on what the most suitable moment is, how they decide. Also, everything depends on weather conditions. In spring, our land is very wet. Only tracked vehicles can be used. I think we can see them in April-May.”
So Ukraine’s counteroffensive will begin next month. Or maybe the month after that. And it will be “in several directions.”
Russian officials may dismiss the presence of Western tanks and fighting vehicles in Ukraine. Russian propaganda sites may have been claiming that these tanks were captured by Russian forces weeks before they ever reached Ukraine. But you can bet that in the minds of Russian soldiers and not a few Russian officers, each Challenger 2 is now 100 meters long. Every Leopard capable of sinking a battleship. The time it has taken for these weapon systems to actually reach the front lines has only made them grow. The thought of these things coming over the low, muddy, crater-pocked horizon is the kind of thing that definitely makes a Russian soldier reach for a trenching shovel rather than a rifle.
Russia’s winter offensive failed. Now Russia’s assaults are slowing as it prepares for the tide to start turning the other way.
Everyone is anxious for the counteroffensive to begin, but the most important thing may be that Ukraine’s first assault be successful, because Russia isn’t just looking spent—they’re looking fragile.
Meanwhile, here’s something else that’s been happening. Or rather, not happening.
Start with these Russian television hosts mourning how Russia is simply failing to make all Ukrainians suffer with constant attacks on the infrastructure. People in Kyiv actually have their lights on, and Russians know it.
Why aren’t they suffering, Vladimir Vladimirovich? Why? Well, the biggest reason is that even though Russia has launched some number of missiles or drones against Ukrainian civilian targets almost every day, it’s been 20 days since the last major overnight missile strike. That was back on March 9, when Russia launched an attack using at least 81 missiles and drones. In comparison, last night Russia appears to have launched a single missile and 15 Iranian drones, 14 of which were shot down short of their targets. This is only the second time there has been such an extended gap between large-scale attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure since the series of such attacks began last October.
There are two good reasons for this. One is that as one analysis after another has shown, Russia is burning through its supply of missiles. There’s only so many more times it can manage a stunt like the one on March 9, where it deployed multiple costly missiles like the Kalibr. The attacks over the last six months have consumed supplies of these missiles that it took years to build. Russia will be a long time replacing its stores of these weapons, and that’s assuming they can even build them under the current sanction regime.
The other big reason these missile attacks against infrastructure have slowed is simpler: It’s because they failed.
The whole reason that Russia was attacking Ukrainian cities was never a secret. The relentless fall of missiles and drones was intended to diminish Ukrainian morale, but more importantly it was intended to cripple Ukraine’s infrastructure, leaving people cold, miserable, and ready to sour on the whole idea of fighting Russia’s clearly superior force. That didn’t happen.
The second thing that was supposed to happen over the winter was a major Russian offensive, one that would land them control of Bakhmut, allow them to reoccupy Lyman, and push Ukrainian forces in the north back across the Oskil River. With Ukraine losing both the most fought over city in the nation and being forced to surrender significant gains made during the Kharkiv counteroffensive, not only would Ukrainian forces be in despair, but Western supporters of Ukraine would see that the situation was hopeless. That didn’t happen either.
What did happen last night? This happened.
Melitopol is located at least 75 kilometers from the nearest area of Ukrainian control. Many recent distant strikes, hitting Russian locations near Mariupol and in Crimea, appear to have been made using drones. That may also be the case at Melitopol. However, some videos of the strikes appear to show contrails, suggesting that the damage was done using some sort of missile, with speculation centered on the GLSDB that the U.S. has pledged to Ukraine.
Location of Melitopol. Open image in another tab for a larger view.
The number of locations hit in Melitopol overnight isn’t clear, but the answer appears to be at least “several.” Explosions were reported at the airport, at the rail depot, at a former technical school being used as a barracks for Russian forces, and in buildings housing regional Russian officials. (Note: That little blue square on the south side of the river in the upper left isn’t actually a point of Ukrainian control. It’s Enerhodar, location of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which was visited again this week by IAEA officials.)
Viewing Melitopol on the map makes it clear that this is a transportation hub. It’s also the site of a major rail depot with lines that lead north to Vasylivka and south back into Crimea. In fact, that southern rail line out of Melitopol runs through the Crimean city of Dzhankoi, which was also the site of a recent Ukrainian strike. It appears that these strikes may already be forcing Russia to do more transportation by road, resulting in some … difficulties.
It’s unlikely, between the obvious mud and the still-arriving Western equipment, that Ukraine is going to launch any sort of major assault in the next few days. However, the actions at Melitopol and other points in the south certainly have the look of “shaping the battlefield.” Ukraine is striking transportation hubs, driving Russian forces from established positions, and creating chaos behind the lines. Which is all the sort of things that often come in advance of a major push into an area.
So maybe that big counteroffensive won’t come at Bakhmut, as officials were all but stating last week; it will come south from Zaporizhzhia and cut through the occupied south. That has always seemed like a plan that makes sense.
Or maybe this is the feint, and the real counteroffensive will be at Kupyansk. Or Kreminna. Or Svatove. Or …
What’s clear today is that Russian operations have slowed. They are drawing back, waiting to receive a punch. Ukraine is in the position of being able to maneuver and place its forces where it wants. It can decide where and when the counteroffensive really starts.
That’s a great position.
But if Russia commanders are worrying themselves sick over what Ukraine does next, Ukrainian commanders have to be worrying about the same thing. Because about the only thing that could hurt Ukraine worse than a big Russian success would be a big Ukrainian failure. The best way to make sure that Ukraine keeps getting the support of the West, and to see that it doesn’t have to go into next winter worrying about what Russia will do, is to deliver a big success from the spring counteroffensive. And that’s a huge responsibility for everyone involved in turning verbal sparring into kilometers gained on the ground.
Today’s Washington Post contains a detailed debunking of all the claims Russia—and right-wing media—have made about “American biolabs” in Ukraine. In the process, they cover the impact of disinformation campaign in general.
Information can be poison, a dangerous weapon. Disinformation, or organized lying, can be used to wage political warfare. As the historian Thomas Rid wrote in “Active Measures,” his book on the subject, disinformation can weaken a political system that places its trust in truth. “Disinformation operations, in essence, erode the very foundations of open societies,” he wrote.
A reminder: What’s happening to Twitter is turning a large part of the site into a distribution center for disinformation.
