“Because why the **** would Ukraine blow up its own dam?” is perfectly persuasive in my opinion.
However, there are a great many people who are not well informed. People who can be persuaded, but who on their own throw their hands up and say, “Well I guess we can’t really tell.”
I believe that supporters of Ukraine should be well prepared to be able to explain, in detail, why only Russia had any reason to detonate the dam, and why the dam’s destruction represents significant harm to Ukraine’s military and economic interests.
Here are some reasons explaining why that is true.
Russia Blew the Dam Primarily to Prevent a River Crossing Operation
The area downstream of the Dnipro River from the Nova Kakhovka Dam amounts to about 80km (50 mi) of territory defended by Russian forces. Blowing the dam significantly increases both the flow of the river’s speed and the river’s width, making any construction of a pontoon bridge impossible.
Ukrainian forces can probably still cross the river if they wanted in force, but they would not be able to set up a pontoon bridge. Without a pontoon bridge, Ukraine could not advance beyond the river.
Ukraine held a Dominant position over the Waters of the Dnipro River
Ukraine launched special forces operations over the Kinburn Spit on or around November 23, 2022.
At the time, the reasons for the operation were not known, but what is now known is that the forces raided Russian positions and supply convoys, but did not attempt to capture towns or cities. They are also still there.
It is believed that the operation was an area-denial operation aimed at preventing the deployment of Russian anti-ship batteries in the region.
If the Russians cannot safely deploy antiship missiles in that region, it becomes fairly safe for Ukraine to move shipping through the Dniprovs'ka Gulf to the north. Ukraine controls the northern shores.
This also serves to allow Ukraine to dominate movement into, or out of the gulf. Russian naval assets could not come anywhere near that area due to the threat of Ukrainian Harpoon antiship missile batteries.
Ukraine is known to have moved its force of 40 American Riverine Armored Assault Boats to Kherson Oblast and began operating in the Dnipro River. With grenade launchers and heavy machine guns, these fast and agile boats were the most powerful ships in the river, giving Ukraine dominance over the river’s waters.
Subsequently, Ukrainian forces could fairly freely move across the river nearly unopposed.
The first of many river-crossing special forces raids occurred on or around December 4th, 2022.
Russian forces could not conduct similar “plant the flag” operations, because Ukrainian dominance of the rivers makes such actions extremely risky..
The Russian forces could still attempt some moves to land small groups of infantry onto the islands in the Dnipro, but no large-scale movement would be possible without dealing with Ukraine’s assault boats. Due to Ukrainian dominance over the Dniprovs’ka Gulf, it would be very difficult for Russia to bring any watercraft of any size to the river.
In any case, Russia has yet to make a major amphibious river crossing operation across a river as wide as the Dnipro, and it is doubtful it can do so. Russia originally captured Kherson likely by treachery, not by some major river crossing amphibious operation. It has never demonstrated a similar ability in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
Russian Claims that Ukraine Blew the Dam to Shorten Its Front are Spurious
Ukrainian control over the Dnipro River meant that Ukraine was not worried about a major Russian amphibious crossing. Russia constructed numerous and extensive defenses on their side of the river. Ukraine did not. This can be verified by satellite imagery.
Ukraine had no reason to blow the dam because Russia could not conduct a major river crossing. Even if Russia could bring such vessels to the Dnipro undetected, Russia would need to gain control over the river itself. Russia had no easy way to bring large river combat vessels to the Dnipro to challenge Ukrainian control of the river.
Russia Moved Its Main Defensive Line 10km Back from the River
From December 2022-May 2023, Ukraine engaged in a systematic bombardment of Russian positions close to the river. Casualties from these bombardments were enough to convince Russian commanders that maintaining close positions was untenable.
Russia began withdrawing its main forces from the riverfront back 10km to the second line of towns and villages from February 2023 to April 2023. This also had the effect of removing the bulk of Russian defenses from any potential flooding zones. Only small sentry posts near the river that occasionally fought with Ukrainian raiders were on the riverfront.
Ukraine had Sufficient Equipment for a Major River Crossing
Ukraine began receiving extensive river-crossing equipment starting in March 2023 from the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Among other unspecified river crossing equipment, Ukraine received the M3 Amphibious Rig, which can carry two Leopard 2 Tanks as a military ferry. The PFM movable bridge can also serve as a ferry capable of carrying 70-ton Western Main Battle Tanks (MBTs). US and Dutch NATO-specification pontoon bridges that can support the heavy weight of MBTs and heavy supply trucks, Mi-17 and Mi-8 transport helicopters.
In a prior diary, I established that Ukraine could likely bring 50 Tanks, 100+ Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) supporting artillery, and 6000+ soldiers across the river in two hours with publicly disclosed river crossing assets. In 4-5 hours, Ukraine could likely bring establish division-level strength.
There are several crossing points across the Dnipro where a pontoon bridge could be built that would be less than 500m. NATO forces constructed a pontoon bridge over the Sava River in Bosnian Peacekeeping Operations in 1995 that stretched over 600m in 3 days.
Due to the risks, one can debate whether such a move would be wise for Ukraine to conduct. It is without a doubt that it was within Ukraine’s capability to conduct such a crossing.
Blowing the Dam Frees Up Significant Russian Forces
Because Ukraine’s ability to conduct such a crossing was easy to establish from publicly available sources, Russian forces undoubtedly knew that Ukraine had such capabilities. This meant they had no choice but to leave significant forces to defend this flank.
Should Ukraine choose to make a push for Melitopol, the Dnipro River represents the “rear” of the Russian defensive position. Left undefended, a surprise crossing by Ukrainian forces could put an armored force capable of making a push on the Russian rear to cut off their supply line and line of retreat back to Crimea.
To prevent such a thrust, Russia maintained an estimated 4 Motorized Infantry battalions as well as the elite 11th, 83rd, and 108th Air Assault Brigades. Even assuming these forces are under strength, they represent probably 8,000~10,000 troops.
Given the desperate lack of reserve forces faced by the Russian Army, this represents a significant collection of forces.
The destruction of the dam likely allows Russia to redeploy the bulk of these forces to the Melitopol area to form a reserve.
Russia Could Not Wait for Ukraine to Cross Before Blowing the Dam
One argument presented by some Russian bloggers is the idea that Russia would not blow the dam to prevent a crossing, since it’s more beneficial to blow the dam to cut off a Ukrainian force that already crossed. This argument ignores military realities.
Nova Kakhovka is direct on the front lines, across the river from Ukrainian-held positions. in the event of a Ukrainian amphibious operation to cross the river, one of the first steps would likely be to secure the dam.
Ukrainian Special Forces armed with Javelins and Stingers could cross the river and fairly easily secure the city of Kakhovka—Russia abandoned its main defensive positions in and around the city in March 2023 due to Ukrainian shelling, much like most of its defensive positions along the Dnipro.
With only a small force left in Kakhovka, securing the town temporarily would be not a major challenge. Once secured, Ukraine could establish a perimeter, jam any electronic detonators to blow the dam, and with artillery fire support from across the river, hold the position against Russian counterattacks.
If Russia chose to wait, it would risk losing the chance to blow the dam at all.
Thus, to secure its flank along the Dnipro River, Russia had everything to gain by blowing the dam.
Ukraine would not blow the dam for military reasons. Simply by maintaining a threat to make a landing, Ukraine could pin down thousands of Russian troops. Even if they had only a token force across the river, Russia could not be sure and needed to maintain large defensive forces.
If the Russians left the area undefended, Ukraine could shift reserves to the area and cross.
Ukraine had nothing to gain military in the position by detonating the dam and losing the ability to cross the Dnipro.
Ukraine has no Military Reason to Attack the North Crimean Canal
Russian-occupied Crimea draws much of its water from the Dnipro River through the North Crimean Canal, which draws its water from the Kakhovka reservoir upstream from the Dam. Destroying the Dam will lower water levels in the reservoir to the point where water may no longer reach Crimea, or would be greatly reduced.
Russia argues Ukraine blew up the dam to harm Crimean water access. This argument is also spurious.
First, Crimean water access is an economic and not a survival issue. From 2014 to 2022, the North Crimean Canal was cut off. When Russia illegally occupied the peninsula, Ukraine cut off the canal with sandbags at the mouth of the canal.
Crimean agriculture suffered greatly, as the water from the canal is primarily used to irrigate the farmland of Crimea in the North-Crimean Plains. Crimea’s largest city, Sevastopol in the southwest of the peninsula, does not even connect to the canal system.
Thus, the destruction of the canal would represent an economic blow to Crimea. There would, however, be no major water shortages or Russian soldiers dying of thirst.
Crimea has approximately two million residents. The addition of even 70-80,000 Russian Troops is unlikely to increase water consumption to the point where residents would be faced with life-threatening water shortages.
The idea that cutting off the water to the canal would force a Russian retreat from the Crimean Peninsula is a fantasy. Therefore, destroying the Kakhovka Dam to eliminate water flow to the Crimean Canal is militarily pointless.
There is no urgency to this action as well. If Ukraine wished to do economic harm to Crimea, Ukraine could conduct an attack on the dam at any time. Due to the lack of any positive military effect, Ukraine has no reason to conduct the attack just as its counterattack is beginning.
Considering the severe ill effects of eliminating the threat of a river crossing across the Dnipro, the military effects are a clear and overwhelming net minus for Ukraine—and a net plus for Russia.
Crimea’s Geopolitical Value is in its Location and Ports
This also feels like it should go without saying, but Crimea’s geopolitical strategic importance is in its location, as a peninsula jutting out into the center of the Black Sea. the ability to station anti-ship missile batteries in all directions allows a nation that controls the Crimean Peninsula to project power to nearly every corner of the Black Sea without deploying a single ship.
The port of Sevastopol is renowned for its large and commercially important port facilities and provides an ideal base for a fleet to dominate the Black Sea.
The total size of the Crimean economy is less than 1/500th of that of Russia. Local agriculture is an even smaller fraction of that already small total. The reason that Russia is intent on holding Crimea is due to the geopolitical effects of holding Crimea on Black Sea dominance, not agricultural production.
I only bring this up because a tankie argued to me that losing the Northern Crimean Canal’s waters essentially eliminates all geopolitical value of Crimea, thus Ukraine had every reason to destroy the dam. This argument is also spurious.
Lower Water Levels in the Kakhovka Reservoir may be Devastating to Ukrainian Agriculture
The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam reduces the water levels across the Kakhovka reservoir.
The Kakhovka Reservoir has been described as “the heart of one of the largest irrigation systems in Europe.” Ukrainian towns and agricultural communities draw drinking water and irrigation water from the reservoir in every direction through a system of pumps and irrigation canals.
A significant drop in water levels is likely to cause the water to recede from the pump access points.
Ukrainian agricultural think tank EastFruit reports that a lowering of the reservoir’s water levels by just 1m would cut off the irrigation systems of 80% of Ukraine’s vegetable production and over half of its fruit production. Wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and soybean production are also expected to be impacted.
As of the evening of June 6th, 2023, the reservoir had already dropped well over 1m and was still dropping at a rate of 35cm per hour.
Disaster might be averted by rapidly constructing new pumping stations to draw water further up depending on how far the water recedes. But if the water must be pulled for great distances, it may be infeasible in the shorter term. Furthermore, the Dnipro River area remains a war zone, subject to Russian shelling—it’s not clear any major construction can be conducted safely.
Ukrainian agricultural exports are so extensive, they affect the global food economy. A lack of Ukrainian food exports can trigger higher prices that lead to famines in Africa.
The destruction of the Kakhofka Dam could lead directly to the deaths of Africans from starvation in the coming years.
The impact of the dam’s destruction extends well beyond simply the flooding (which is already devastating)—it will impact Ukrainian water access and agriculture through large swaths of the nation.
Nuclear Concerns at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
The drop in the water levels of the reservoir will also likely affect the pumps at the ZNPP. Without access to water, the ZNPP will have to rely on its storage pond. Due to the low level of reactor activity, the ZNPP is not currently requiring large quantities of additional water, so there is at present no immediate risk of a nuclear meltdown.
However, the water reserves at the ZNPP will not last forever, and unless new water access is obtained or large quantities of water are shipped in, the ZNPP may be facing a crisis within several months.
A major meltdown at the ZNPP could not only leave an impact on the local community but radioactive fallout from a meltdown might also make large quantities of Ukrainian agricultural products unexportable. This could lead directly to a global food crisis.
Russian Arguments that the Damage from the Dam’s Destruction Primarily Affects Russian-Held Territory are Misleading
As should be clear from my points above, the Russian argument that flooding centers primarily upon Russian-held towns and villages on the east bank of the Dnipro, therefore Ukraine must have detonated the Dam is false.
Leaving aside the point that Ukraine regards the citizens of Ukraine held by Russian forces as subjects for liberation, not foreigners to be treated punitively, the impact of the dam’s destruction will resonate throughout Ukraine’s agricultural community. The negative impact may last for decades, even possibly permanently changing agricultural production in Ukraine.
Reconstruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam (and thus the reservoir) is estimated to cost $1B and take 5 years.
Russia Controlled Water Levels at the Kakhovka Dam and Raised them Maximally
The controls for the Kakhovka Dam were located on the Russian-occupied side of the Dnipro, thus Ukraine had no access to the dam’s controls.
Ordinarily, the dam decreases the amount of released water during the drier summer months, while increasing released water during the rainy and wet winter and spring months.
Under Russian control, the Kakhovka Dam did not increase water flow from the Dam during the winter and spring months, leading to water levels of the dam reaching critical levels by mid-May. A May 17 New York Times article details concerns about damage to the dam from high water levels.
Satellite data indicates damage already caused to the dam from the high water levels by early June, days before the explosions that destroyed the dam.
Russia was in a position to maximize the amount of damage caused by the destruction of the dam. Russia increased the amount of water held in the reservoir beyond what the dam was capable of maintaining.
Destruction of the dam occurred at a time when devastation to Ukrainian communities would be at their worst.
All Signs Point to Russia
For all the reasons listed above, Ukraine had every reason NOT to destroy the dam, particularly as its counteroffensive was starting. The only “positive” effects that can be identified are economic damage to Russian-occupied Crimea, a matter of no particular urgency.
The negative effect of the timing of the dam’s explosion is ideal for Russia, It protects its flank just as the Ukrainian counteroffensive is beginning, freeing thousands of troops to use as a reserve. Under Russian control, the reservoir of the dam was filled beyond its capacity, maximizing the harm to Ukrainian communities.
Furthermore, the economic harm to Ukrainian agriculture is potentially devastating, not to even mention the risks to the ZNPP and nuclear disaster.
The only party that benefits from the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam as of June 6, 2023, was Russia.
There is no doubt about who is responsible for the attack.
Additional Detail From Comments:
According to Ihor Syrota, head of Ukrhydroenergo, the Ukranian state hydroelectric company, the Nova Kakhovka Dam was designed to withstand being struck by an atomic bomb. Catastrophic destruction of the Dam could only be achieved through setting explosives inside the dam.
The control facilities where the detonation took place are on the Russian side of the river. Only the Russians had access to the interiors of the dam where the explosions would have had to have taken place.
I do not have other sources corroborating Ms. Syorta’s assertion about the dam’s design, but if true, that would represent powerful direct evidence against Russia.