So there are a lot of confused and sometimes contradictory details coming out about Ukraine’s progress in the Tokmak area offensive. Ukraine’s push from Velyka Novosilka sounds like it’s going pretty well and making steady progress thus far.
However, it seems the strategic objective of both ongoing offensives are to cut the East-West rail connection between the Southern Front and the Eastern/Northern Fronts, splitting the Russian army into two wings that cannot support or supply each other.
This QE is speculative, but just to give my thought on something I’m watching out for right now is any news of a significant attack east out of Vuhledar.
Overnight, one thing that jumped out to me was news of increased shelling on Vuhledar itself, and in the Vuhledar area. It’s a little confusing, as many people refer to the “Vuhledar area” as including Novodonetske southeast of Velyka Novosilka, but UADeep State reported on fighting as far east as Pavlivka on June 8th, directly south of Vuhledar.
On June 1st, and again on June 2nd, Ukraine’s 68th Jaeger Brigade made probing attacks east of Vuhledar, with fighting reported on the outskirts of Volodymyrivka. These attacks likely represent reconnaissance missions. Although reconnaissance missions are not always followed by major attacks, major attacks almost always follow reconnaissance missions.
There are a few reasons why an attack in this direction makes a lot of sense.
First, from Vuhledar to the Russian East-West rail line that connects the Southern Front to the Eastern Front is only 20km, about 12 miles. Tube Artillery on the hills around Vuhledar can already hit targets within this entire battlefield. For example, the M777 can use its standard M795 155mm ammunition to hit targets 23km away.
The attacks south of Velikya Novolisk have already advanced close to 10 km in less than four days, which gives an idea of how close 20km is.
The Russian Army currently only is defending this area with two naval infantry brigades, the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry. This would normally indicate a powerful defense of the sector with elite Russian troops—except both these units were utterly devastated in the attacks on Vuhledar from February to May 2023.
Both units suffered horrendous losses of men and materiel, and these have not been reconstituted according to UK intelligence, Neither unit is believed to have received a significant infusion of new men or materiel, as Russia prioritized reinforcements for the Bakhmut sector and strengthening the Tokmak/Melitopol areas.
For example, a full-strength Russian Brigade is ordinarily around 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The 155th Naval Infantry Brigade was already badly mauled in the Battle of Kyiv. Even after receiving numerous mobiks as replacement troops, the 155th Naval Infantry arrived at Vuhledar under-strength with only around 5,000 troops. It is believed to have been further and severely mauled at Vuhledar, as the 155th Naval Infantry troops appeared again and again during the infamous Vuhledar frontal assault video clips. The 40th Naval Infantry Brigade is not in any better shape.
Knowing the weakness of this position, Russia brought in two brigades from the Third Army Corps to reinforce this position, until Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks of Bakhmut convinced the Russian command to rush those brigades to Bakhmut. Both brigades are believed to now be heavily engaged with Ukrainian forces in that area.
Apart from some minefields and some trenches, only two severely understrength and demoralized Russian brigades, and just 20km of space stands between Ukraine and cutting the East/West Russian rail-line at Olhynka.
Brady Affick’s fortifications maps show this area is relatively lightly fortified compared to Russia’s main fortification lines towards Tokmak or Velykia Novosilka. As a further plus, the rail-line runs just west of the city of Olhynka, meaning Ukraine could cut that position without needing to actually capture the city (although the severing of the supply line would be more secure that way).
As Ukraine’s attacks from Velykia Novosilka draw Russian reserves west from around the Vuhledar area, I would not be surprised if Ukraine launched a sudden offensive to cut the rail line at Olhynka.
This would greatly support the offensive from the Velykia Novosilka direction, as supplies in this area are almost undoubtedly flowing from the northeast.
Russia could try to move supplies all the way around, over the Kerch Bridge, through Melitopol and Tokmak, but Ukraine has been launching storm shadow attacks aimed to disrupt rail transport.
Russian attempts to move supplies over the Sea of Azov will be difficult. Ukraine has also repeatedly struck Berdyansk, including its rail and port facilities, making it harder for Russia to move supplies by sea. It’s unclear how functional the port and rail facilities in Mariupol are, but it’s only 10km from Olhynka to Volnovhaka, where the rail junction to Mariupol lies.
As an added wrinkle to help strengthen Ukraine’s “left hook,” it makes a lot of sense to try to cut Russia’s flow of supplies and reinforcements through Olhynka. It also makes a lot of sense to try to draw Russian reserves in the area to be committed to a fight near Velyka Novosilka, before trying to make one decisive punch to slice right through to the rail-line.
This is just something I’m keeping my eyes on.