Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 8 and 9.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 9 that Russian forces launched three Iskander M/KH-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 22 unspecified drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones over Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Kyiv oblasts and that one drone returned to Russian airspace. Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov stated on October 9 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City twice with glide bombs. [81] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on October 8 and 9 that Russian Shahed drones caused a fire at a multi-story apartment in Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast and that Russian drones struck a nine-story building in Odesa City.[82]
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 8 that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles launched from occupied Crimea and targeted Ukrainian territory with 19 attack drones launched from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 18 drones in Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Ternopil Oblasts while diverting one attack drone to Russia. Ukrainian officials reported on October 7 that Russian forces struck a civilian Palau-flagged ship in Odesa's port with a ballistic missile.[84] ….Ukrainian officials reported on October 8 that Russian forces struck a high-rise building and a school in Kostyantynivka with three KAB-250 glide bombs, Kharkiv Oblast with 11 glide bombs, and a civilian enterprise building in Kharkiv City with several unspecified missiles.[86] Head of the Kherson City Military Administration Roman Marchko stated on October 7 that Russian forces launched airstrikes on Kherson City using four glide bombs.[87] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 7 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot near Osoyivka, Sumy Oblast with an unspecified missile.[88]
Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on October 8 that an unknown air target flew into Ukraine from Belarus on the morning of October 8.[89]
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- The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties.
- US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly stated that the US is withholding several US weapon systems and other military communications networks from Ukraine that could support Ukraine's war effort.
- South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun stated on October 8 that a limited number of North Korean military personnel are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.
- Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation.
- Russia banned partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, likely degrading some frontline Russian forces' ad-hoc communications in the near term.
- Russian forces continue to use chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a party.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Robotyne.
- Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev stated on October 8 that Russian forces may have exhausted their preexisting stocks of aerial bombs for glide bomb strikes.
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued assaults in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 7, 8, and 9 but did not make any confirmed advances. …. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novy Put on October 9.[27] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in Glushkovsky Raion.[28]
Ukrainian forces continued attacks in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 7, 8, and 9. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks east of Korenevo near Olgovka; southeast of Korenevo near Lyubimovka and Plekhovo; and northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, and Marynovka on October 7, 8, and 9.[29]
Russian forces reportedly recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on October 7, 8, and 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 9 that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha) and Pokrovsky (southeast of Korenevo).[30] ... Russian forces reportedly attacked near Daryino (southeast of Korenevo), Lyubimovka, and Plekhovo.[32]
The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties. Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on October 8 that Russian forces are increasing their use of armored vehicles on the battlefield — specifically in the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions — in order to take advantage of dry road and terrain conditions before rainy seasonal weather causes muddy grounds conditions.[1] Russian forces have been conducting a high tempo of mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since late July 2024 and have conducted at least four observed battalion-sized mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine since July 25, 2024.[2] Russian forces have also resumed relatively large mechanized assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since late September 2024.[3] The Russian military command likely aims for intensified mechanized offensive activity to allow Russian forces to advance across open fields and consolidate in nearby frontline settlements that Russian forces can then use as a foothold for staging and launching offensive operations that seek to achieve operational objectives — such as the seizure of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast or the seizure of Pokrovsk.[4]
Fall weather conditions will also likely constrain Russian infantry maneuver, and the Russian military command likely hopes that mechanized advances that Russian forces can achieve now will limit the number of open fields that Russian infantry will have to cross after weather conditions deteriorate. Russian forces have relied on small infantry groups to advance under the concealment of windbreaks in open fields from settlement to settlement, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction.[6] Fall weather will cause many windbreaks comprised of deciduous trees to lose most of their foliage and will provide less concealment for Russian infantry groups during fall 2024 and winter 2024-2025 — leaving Russian infantrymen more vulnerable to pervasive Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and tactical fires.
Russian forces will likely not cease offensive operations following the fall mud season, though adverse weather conditions will likely degrade Russian infantry effectiveness. Russian forces made a concerted effort to regain the theater-wide initiative during the period of the most difficult weather conditions for mechanized offensive operations in fall 2023, however, and may seek to retain the theater-wide initiative though consistent offensive pressure in fall 2024 under similar weather conditions.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command are pursuing a strategy that aims to prevent Ukraine from accumulating manpower and materiel to contest the theater-wide initiative by maintaining consistent offensive pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline and will likely continue to pursue this strategy despite seasonal constraints on mechanized and infantry maneuver.[8] Russian forces have exhausted many of the reserves that they established for their intensified Summer 2024 offensive operation that has heavily focused on advancing in Donetsk Oblast, and ISW continues to assess that the ongoing Russian offensive operation will likely culminate within the coming months.[9] Poor weather conditions that constrain battlefield maneuver will likely contribute to culmination, but the culmination of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive operation will not necessarily result in a complete end of consistent Russian offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025. Russian forces have an established pattern of fighting beyond their culmination points as well as fighting through adverse weather conditions.
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