Among the many outpourings of grief and horror in the immediate aftermath of last week’s election was the widespread and emphatic assertion that Trump’s return to office would doom Ukraine and decide the ongoing war in Vladimir Putin’s favor.
While it is evident to the point of obviousness that Trump is friendly to Putin and hostile to Ukraine for a host of reasons that we have spent much of the past 9 years talking about in one way or another, and that a reduction or cessation of US can only negatively impact Ukraine’s righteous struggle for survival, the problem with “hot takes” is that they are the product of emotion and sentiment, not fact and reasoned analysis.
It is my belief that Ukraine has a plausible – and perhaps even reasonable – chance of maintaining its independence through force of arms, even with Trump returning to power. Much like the piece that I wrote last week offering reasons why fascism may fail in the United States, this essay seeks to advance concrete reasons why all is not lost for our brothers and sisters in Ukraine.
Before I outline these and make my argument, I want to speak directly to the gloom-and-doom crowd that would call me naive and out-of-touch with reality. I understand as well as anyone that when you are anxious and depressed, it is difficult to try to take a view of a situation that is more positive than your prevailing emotions. We, and the whole world, are unquestionably in the most dangerous period in modern history. Many bad things can happen and if they do, it will be very, very bad indeed. Arguing that the worst may not happen is explicitly not the same as arguing that they will not happen. Rather, it is the mere introduction of alternative possibilities.
Below are 30 reasons to think that Ukraine is not doomed by a second Trump “presidency”:
1.)The Russian invasion, which was expected to succeed in three days, will soon be entering its third year. There is no indication that Ukraine is on the verge of political or military collapse.
2.) The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been plagued by corruption and incompetence at all levels since the outset of the conflict. This has led to – and will continue to lead to – significant losses of men and materiel that are increasingly challenging for Putin to replace.
3.) Incompetence and heavy losses beget incompetence and heavy losses. As trained and experienced men are killed and first-rate equipment is destroyed, Russian fighting power becomes even further diminished, such that renewed offensive efforts are likely to be bloodier and more costly still.
4.) Although Russia’s extensive pre-war stockpile of standoff weapons like cruise and ballistic missiles have caused significant collateral damage and civilian casualties, for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this article, Russia was not able to paralyze the Ukrainian command and communications or logistics infrastructure using long-range weapons.
5.) Russia has significantly depleted its stockpiles of advanced long-range weapons and while it continues to produce replacements, these are not available in the quantity necessary to conduct an effective strategic bombardment campaign. Further, Ukrainian air defenses are much better now than they were at the outset of the conflict, such as to make Russia’s perennial shortage of advanced long-range weapons even more acute.
6.) Putin’s theory of victory rests on outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and then using attritional warfare to subjugate the country. Even if he fully achieves the former, something that we have reason to doubt, we do not have evidence that he is inflicting military casualties on Ukraine at an exchange rate favorable to him.
7.) The Ukrainian Armed Forces have proven themselves to be determined and capable. They are increasingly well-trained. Further, they are fighting for their homes, families, and freedom. There is no incentive to surrender or negotiate a peace on terms favorable to Russia.
8.) Heavy losses during the initial invasion compelled Putin to announce partial mobilization of reservists. Many of these conscripts have since been expended in costly positional warfare. While further conscription would, in time, generate significant Russian combat power, Putin likely believes that the social and economic cost of further motivation would endanger his grip on power.
9.) Mobilization and clandestine efforts to coerce men into fighting have helped bring the war to broader Russian society, and pierce the regime’s veil of propaganda. Many Russians know that the war is not going as well as is being portrayed.
10.) Ukraine is receiving considerable aid from our European allies and other countries around the world sympathetic to its survival, including several notable modern, first-line weapon systems. A move by Trump to stop US military aid and not leave Ukraine without access to quality Western equipment.
11.) Ukraine has begun domestic manufacture of 155mm artillery shells, the standard NATO caliber, and has made investments in its defense industrial base. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall is currently constructing armaments plants there. Ukraine’s ability to replenish its own arsenal are better now than they were during the initial months of the war.
12.) It will be more than two months before Trump is sworn in. This gives all of the relevant actors – Biden, Zalensky, and our European allies – time to take concrete steps to bolster Ukrainian security. It also gives the Ukrainian military and populace time to prepare for a cessation of US aid, should it come. Finally, it gives us time to intensively lobby for the continuation of military aid.
13.) Russia has not shown the ability to conduct successful maneuver warfare against a determined opponent, but rather has settled for a strategy of expending considerable combat power to make tactical territorial gains. Even if US aid were to stop, it is highly unlikely that they would be able to launch an offensive that would result in a dramatic and immediate change of the military situation.
14.) Were we to authorize Ukraine to use the ATACMS missiles that we have provided – as well as the Storm Shadow cruise missiles that the British and the French have provided – Ukraine could likely significantly degrade Russian combat power and/or destroy valuable military targets deeper within Russia, thereby impeding Russia’s ability to sustain and rebuild its combat power.
15.) Although MAGA itself is pro-Putin, “traditional” Republicans were long vehemently anti-Russian. Further, our ongoing support of Ukraine is a significant source of revenue for American defense companies, many of which have significant operations in red states. It’s reasonable to expect them to lobby hard to maintain the flow of aid and thereby, revenue.
16.) European support of Ukraine offers an excellent return on investment, irrespective of moral convictions and political imperatives. Military aid directly weakens Russia, increases European political leverage, and generates invaluable combat experience and operational insights. These are reasons that European aid is likely to continue and perhaps even increase.
17.) The military hardware we have provided, while modern and capable, is neither singularly modern nor singularly capable – European and other foreign aid is of comparable quality and capability; Ukraine is not relying on “superweapons” that only we can provide.
18.) Russia’s reliance on North Korea to provide munitions and manpower is a clear sign on the strain the war has placed on Russia. North Korean support of Russia has generated the prospect of South Korean support of Ukraine. South Korea has a highly developed defense and electronics industry.
19.) Withdrawing support from Ukraine - similar to bashing NATO - costs Trump political capital outside of his base and gets him literally nothing in return. Now that he’s been elected and cannot run again, Putin and his help are of less value to him. Trump is not the type to repay favors out of personal loyalty or obligation.
20.) Trump will have his hands full with his numerous other evil plans, and foreign policy resonates far less with his voters than does his domestic agenda of hate and terror.
21.) Providing large quantities of arms to Israel while arbitrarily refusing to support Ukraine creates an obvious opening to criticize Trump’s solicitous relationship with Putin.
22.) In contrast to Putin, who must be mindful of the costs of the war and more extensive mobilization in particular, Ukraine can mobilize a much higher share of its population and implement the types of wartime expediencies like rationing, nationalization of manufacturing assets, and borrowing that will help sustain its military potential.
23.) To win, Ukraine only has to not lose. Putin’s maximalist objectives require conquering the whole of the country and overcoming what is likely to be a well-organized and widespread insurgency.
24.) There are significant labor shortages in Russia, and the harder that Putin pushes conscription and the more casualties Russia takes, the greater the strain on the labor force will be. This risks creating a self-reinforcing wage-price-inflation spiral that limits his practical ability to escalate.
25.) Putin will not use nuclear weapons, despite his saber-rattling to the contrary. Even with the US out of the equation, Britain and France maintain credible nuclear deterrents and the world will not simply stand by as a nuclear power subjugates a non-nuclear power.
26.) Because the Ukrainian Armed Forces are not preoccupied with hiding corruption and incompetence at every level, and because their operations do not rely on catastrophic casualties, their ability to innovate, adapt, and institutionalize best practices is superior to the Russians’. Simply put, they are far better positioned to capitalize on opportunities.
27.) If the war were to escalate such that the amount of non-US military aid increased or such that NATO countries became active belligerents in the conflict, there is little question that Western forces and weapons would significantly outperform the Russian military in its current, weakened state.
28.) Putin relies on oligarchs to stay in power, and although repression and palace intrigue have thus far kept them in line, this war has been a big hit to their finances.
29.) Authoritarian regimes often suffer from a “shoot the messenger” problem in which critical information and honest assessments are not pushed up the chain of command. This inhibits even competent leaders from making sound decisions. These factors are not present in Ukraine.
30.) Russian aggression is highly likely to result in further brutalization of civilians and war crimes which may help keep public opinion on the side of Ukraine.
If Russia, in contrast, is to prevail, it will be because:
-
It has vastly superior resources in terms of men and industrial capacity and therefore more military potential. Political will, public sentiment, and time are however all necessary to develop this potential into power.
Ukraine’s survival is – and has always been – first and foremost dependent upon the Ukrainian people’s readiness to sacrifice and die in support of it. As long as the will to fight remains, victory is a realistic outcome. While the US President can play a role in the conflict — positive or negative — I believe that we are past the point that everything hinges on the speed and nature of our response.
