The RU oil refinery in Kamensky, Rostov region is designed to detonate the UKR drone upon impact and then completely engulf the drone in flames for days ensuring its complete destruction. /s
Ukrainian UAVs attacked the Atlas oil depot in the Kamensky district of the Rostov region.
he 'Atlas' oil depot is on fire in the Kamensky district of the Rostov region. Four drones were flying at 1 a.m., three were shot down, one crashed into a tank, eyewitnesses report. The depot was previously attacked by a UAV's in summer.
A total of 157 combat clashes have occurred on the battlefield over the past day, with Ukrainian forces repelling the highest number of Russian attacks on the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove fronts. The Russians, in their attempt to break through the Ukrainian defense, have lost 1,220 soldiers killed and wounded.
A Russian soldier has an average life expectancy of two weeks to one month after signing up for the war in Ukraine, Estonian analyst Artur Rehi said.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a phone conversation with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on Nov. 28, following Russia’s latest massive missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Zelenskyy detailed the conversation in a post on Telegram.
According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders discussed the recent barrage of over 90 missiles and nearly 100 drones that targeted Ukraine’s energy and civilian facilities. The discussion also focused on bolstering defense cooperation.
"I am grateful to the United Kingdom for its extensive support, particularly for its commitment to provide at least £3 billion annually for Ukraine's needs," Zelenskyy wrote.
english.nv.ua/…
@Heroiam_Slava reports that Ukrainian Electronic Warfare (EW) units are now “spoofing” incoming Shahed suicide drones, recently sending 43 of them back into Belarus to detonate near their launch points.
Following a major Russian air strike on energy infrastructure in western Ukraine, water supply and central heating have been restored in Lutsk, but the city is still in blackout, Mayor Ihor Polishchuk said on Nov. 28.
“All of our Lutskteplo’s [municipal central heating provider] boilers are operational,” said Polishchuk.
“Some are connected to the primary electrical supply, while others are running on diesel generators.”
Water pumping stations in the city switched to backup generators during the blackout. According to the mayor, water supply and sewage services are operational. However, residents living above the fourth or fifth floors may experience low water pressure.
english.nv.ua/…
After Russia’s massive missile attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on Nov. 28, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported strikes in multiple regions targeting civilian infrastructure with Kalibr missiles carrying cluster munitions.
“The target is our energy infrastructure. In total, around 100 attack drones and over 90 missiles of various types were launched. In several regions, Kalibr missiles with cluster munitions struck civilian infrastructure. These cluster components significantly complicate the work of our rescuers and energy workers in addressing the aftermath. It’s a deeply cynical escalation of Russia’s terrorist tactics,” Zelenskyy stated on Telegram.
-
Russia’s acts of sabotage against Western targets may eventually prompt NATO to invoke the alliance’s Article 5 mutual defence clause, Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence service, has said.
en.wikipedia.org/...
- Donald Trump has tapped Keith Kellogg, a retired US lieutenant general who presented him with a plan to end the war in Ukraine, to serve as a special envoy for the conflict, the president-elect has announced. Kellogg was chief of staff for the White House National Security Council during Trump’s 2017-2021 term and national security adviser to then-Vice President Mike Pence.
- Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov has said he discussed joint steps to strengthen security with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol while on a visit to Seoul this week, during which Kyiv’s delegation reportedly requested military assistance.
- Poland has detained a German citizen and charged him with brokering and exporting dual-use goods to Russia that were “illegally sent to Russian military plants involved in the production of weapons”.
- Russia’s Foreign Ministry has said an idea reportedly being floated in the West that Washington should give Ukraine nuclear weapons is “insane” and preventing such a scenario was one reason why Moscow went into Ukraine.
- Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned the US to halt what it called a “spiral of escalation” over Ukraine, but said it would keep informing Washington about test missile launches in order to avoid “dangerous mistakes”.
- Russia has said the stationing of US missiles in Japan would threaten Russian security and prompt Moscow to retaliate after the Kyodo news agency reported that Japan and the US aim to compile a joint military plan for a possible Taiwan emergency.
- Moscow district councillor Alexei Gorinov, who is serving a seven-year sentence for criticising Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, staged an antiwar protest from the courtroom cage at the start of a new trial against him on charges of justifying terrorism.
- US President Joe Biden’s administration is preparing a $725m weapons package for Ukraine, the Reuters news agency reports, citing two unnamed US officials. The package will reportedly include antitank weapons, including antitank land mines, drones, Stinger missiles and ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS).
- The leaders of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Sweden have said in a joint statement they will step up their support for Ukraine and make more ammunition available to it in the coming months.
- Russia’s deputy UN ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy has told the United Nations Security Council any decision by President-elect Donald Trump’s incoming administration to cut support for Ukraine would be a “death sentence” for the Ukrainian army, while accusing Kyiv of trying to drag NATO countries into direct conflict with Russia.
- President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he will sign Ukraine’s 2025 budget on Thursday, a document that will call for the country’s first wartime tax increases.
Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies
Cyprus could become a member of NATO when conditions permit, the country's president says.
https://t.co/c2feXYvt7Q
@JominiW 1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1008): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, since November 5, the ZSU has managed to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors of the Strategic Front while effectively transitioning to a delaying operation in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction.
3/ Northern Strategic Direction: After approximately 104 days since offensive operations started in Kursk, the Biden Administration (with the governments of France and the United Kingdom closely following suit) has finally been compelled to lift restrictions on the use of long-range strike weapons (like ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP) on targets within the Russian Federation. However, the United States has not committed to President Zelensky’s request for Tomahawk cruise missiles and other long-range missile systems. Due to the limited quantity of ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP stockpiles, ZSU strikes on logistics facilities, airfields, and command posts inside the Russian Federation have been limited in scope and have had negligible effects on VSRF operations.
5/ Operational Direction Kursk: OUV Kursk retains initiative over OTU Siversk(?). Although the first and second OUV Kursk counteroffensives into the western flank of the Sudzha Lodgment regained half the ground lost to the initial ZSU incursion of early August, the reduced size of the ZSU lodgment improved OTU Siversk(?) ability to defend against large-scale Russian attacks. Shortened interior lines of communication have allowed ZSU units to provide more effective mutual support and rapid response for reserves to block penetrations of defensive lines. Concurrently, a more compact lodgment perimeter has shortened resupply cycles, casualty evacuation, and unit movement in and out of the Sudzha Lodgment.
6/ Operational Direction Kharkiv: There is no significant change to the assessment of Kharkiv as a low-priority Operational Direction. Russian attacks remain small in scale. ZSU activity is limited chiefly to localized defense supported by indirect fire attacks, FPV strikes, and positional assaults when opportunities arise. The 18th Guards Motorized Rifle Division is still focused on retaining control of Hlyboke while the 69th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operate jointly from Shebekino. Fixing forces in the Northern SD creates opportunities for Russian forces in the Donbas Industrial Area to exploit exhausted defenses before newly formed ZSU brigades are deployed to critical sectors of the strategic front. Russian control of the Kharkiv Oblast territory is enough to produce and sustain the desired strategic effects.
7/ Donbas Strategic Direction: There is no change to the assertion that the Donbas Strategic Direction (SD) is the decisive SD of the Ukrainian TVD. The SVRF will maintain its Main Effort toward Pokrovsk. However, the focus of operations will be the penetration of the strategic flank of OSUV Tavriya between Selydove and Velyka Novosilka. OSV Zapad will continue reinforcing its success in the Kolisnykivka, Pershotravneve, and Terny areas. OSV Yug will place priority effort in the Chasiv Yar area, reinforcing the success of the 98GABD assault into central Chasiv Yar while threatening Kostyantynivka by advancing SW on H32 HWY. In the Siversk area, elements of OSV Yug will continue to improve positions to the east of Hryhorivkaand north of Verkhnokamyanske. OSV Tsentr and OSV Vostok will almost certainly continue to coordinate offensive actions in southern Donetsk Oblast to complete the conquest of that area.
8/ Operational Direction Kupyansk: 1st Guards Tank Army has completed a well-coordinated multi-division offensive along a line of operations at the seam of the OTU Kupyansk and OTU Staroblisk areas of responsibility. with the lead elements of the 47th Tank Division now positioned on the OskilRiver at Kruhlyakivka, OSV Zapad has tactically isolated OTU Kupyansk and OTU Staroblisk. As the 47th Tank Division reconstitutes its combat power from its drive to the Oskil, priority of effort will likely be placed with the 4th Guards Tank Division as it assaults Ukrainian defenses around Lozova and advances west towards Borova. 2d Guard Motorized Rifle Division’s attack into northern Kupyansk was limited in scope and scale due to detaching most of its units to the 47th Tank Division for its drive to the Oskil. The attack on Kupyansk demonstrated that Ukrainian defenses in this sector of the front are vulnerable to infiltration. However, the 2GMRD does not have the combat power to execute or sustain a division-sized attack to seize the city.
9/ Operational Direction Kreminna: Operational-Tactical Group (OTU) Lyman(?) has centered its defense along the Zherebets River, focused along the barrier presented by the Lymanskyi Reservoir between Novolyubivkaand Torske. The 3d Motorized Rifle Division will defend Makiivka and Nevske as it rebuilds combat power. The 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 67th Motorized Rifle Division will likely continue coordinated attacks to seize Terny and breakthrough to the west side of the Lymanskyi Reservoir. The 67th Motorized Rifle Division will likely complete the capture of Torske before the end of 2024 and then pause for refit and reconstitution before resuming operations in the spring of 2025. OTU Lyman will hold its positions in Ternyand only withdraw is it is operationally necessary. Ukrainian forces could likely counterattack in the Makiivka and Nevskeareas. However, they will require bridging equipment to assault on a broad frontage. Positional engagements will continue in Serebryanski Forest.
10/ Operational Direction Donetsk: The Donetsk Oblast is the decisive Operational Direction for the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation (SVRF). The conquest of southern Donetsk Oblast is the main effort of OUGRV-Ukraine operations.
11/ Operational Direction Siversk: Siversk has been a pivot of operations since the fall of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Popasna. It is a central position within the OSUV Khortytsia area of responsibility and a coordination point between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk for the defense of the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, the decisive strategic point of the Donbas SD.
12/ Operational Direction Chasiv Yar: OTU Luhansk(?) has managed to operationally block OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka, which would threaten to unhinge OSUV Khortytsia’s defense of central Donetsk Oblast. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal has been an effective barrier inhibiting Russian maneuver, made more so by constructing field fortifications in successive belts to the west of the canal and north of Toretsk. However, in recent weeks, the 98th Guards Airborne Division has made notable gains along the breath of the Siverskyi-Donets Canal opposite Chasiv Yar. Specifically, VDV-supported forces have established a sizeable bridgehead over the canal south of Chasiv Yar along the H32 highway.
13/ Toretsk/Nui-York Operational Direction: Although the Torestk Operational Direction has been under intense SVRF assault, the ZSU has been able to prevent a deep penetration of defensive lines along this critical sector. With winter fast approaching, an assault through the city will be a long and difficult fight; there is no indication Russian forces will be able to take the city before the 2024-25 winter season sets in, leaving the likely timeframe the Russians can accomplish this to be sometime in the spring of 2025. However, if the Russians can seize control of Toretsk during the 2024-25 winter season, they will have new operational axes to exploit. The first is to advance northeast and attack Chasiv Yar from the SW. The second is a direct assault against the lightly fortified southern avenues of approach to Kostiantynivka. The third is to advance north and turn southwest down the H32 highway to support the isolation of Pokrovsk from the north. Either of these options may have dire impact on the ZSUs ability to maintain a coherent defense of central and western Donetsk Oblast.
14/ Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction: OTU Donetsk has effectively transitioned to conducting a Corps-sized delaying operation. OTU Donetsk does not have enough forces within its Area of Responsibility to defend Kurakhove and the Sukhi Yaly Riverline effectively. It is trading space for time in-depth to slow down OSVs Tsentr and Vostok momentum without becoming decisively engaged. While coordination between ZSU brigades has been challenged by the atomization of brigade cohesion and hasty task organization, it has still been effective enough to force the Russians to repeatedly concentrate forces to fight through a series of defensive positions, exposing them to mass sUAV / FPV strikes and artillery barrages. Although the 36th Combined Arms Army is posing a serious threat to the strategic flank of OSUV Tavriya in the Velyka Novosilka area, the continued threat posed by units defending west and north of the town, as well as saturating the area with FPV strikes, is forcing the Russians to adjust their axes of advance, delaying meaningful progress constantly. The Russians may reach the Solona River and the western border of the Donetsk Oblast during the 2024-25 Winter season, but OTU Donetsk will have set conditions for its own spring offensive.
