Olexander Syrskyi, prior to his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, served as the Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Currently, it remains unknown who will replace him as the head of the largest branch of the Ukrainian army.
Previously, the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was held by Valerii Zaluzhnyi. He was appointed to this post back in 2021, prior to the start of the full-scale invasion by Russia.
Lieutenant General Oleksandr Syrskyi was born on July 26, 1965, in the village of Novinky in the Volodymyr Oblast of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. He received his education at the Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Defense University. He graduated with honors from both educational institutions.
Syrskyi has gone through all stages of military service - from platoon commander to deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the early 2000s, Syrskyi commanded the 72nd Mechanized Division in the city of Bila Tserkva. In 2013, he held the position of deputy chief of the Main Command Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, responsible for cooperation with NATO. At the beginning of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Syrskyi headed the Anti-Terrorist Operation headquarters.
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In 2022, @DavidCornDC uncovered a secret memo confirming the Kremlin encouraged its state-run media to feature clips of Tucker Carlson justifying its position on the Ukraine war. Carlson was just offered a position at R/T.
Russian forces conducted the second largest combined drone and missile strike of 2024 on the morning of February 7. Ukrainian military sources stated that Russian forces launched 64 drones and missiles at Ukraine: 20 Shahed 136/131 drones; 29 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles; four Kh-22 cruise missiles; three Kalibr cruise missiles; three Iskander-M ballistic missiles; and five S-300 surface-to-air missiles.[1] Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 44 of 64 targets: 26 Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles; three Kalibr cruise missiles; and 15 Shahed-131/131 drones.[2] The Kyiv City Administration reported that Russian forces launched at least two dozen of the Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles at Kyiv City and damaged residential infrastructure in several neighborhoods.[3] Ukrainian sources additionally stated that Russian forces hit Kharkiv City with S-300 surface-to-air missiles and Kh-22 cruise missiles and confirmed that two missiles that struck Kharkiv City were North Korean-provided Kn-23 (Hwasong-11 Ga) missiles.[4] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources in Ukrainian law enforcement suggested that Russian forces may have additionally launched 3M22 Zircon ship-launched hypersonic cruise missiles at Kyiv City but that they are still working to confirm this information.[5]
The February 7 strike package is emblematic of the constant air domain offense-defense innovation-adaptation race in which Russia and Ukraine are engaged. Ukrainian air defense managed to shoot down the majority of the Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles and Shahed drones, which may suggest that Russian forces fired the Kh-101 series missiles and Shaheds in order to distract Ukrainian air defense. Ukrainian forces did not shoot down any of the Kh-22 cruise missiles, Iskander-M ballistic missiles, or S-300 surface-to-air missiles, by contrast. Russian forces may have specifically designed this strike package to distract Ukrainian air defense with the Kh-101s and Shahed combination with the intention of helping the other missiles make it through to their intended targets. The unconfirmed reports of 3M22 Zircon strikes are also noteworthy as Zircons are typically fired from naval vessels at other vessels or coastal targets, so Russian forces may have had to adapt the Zircon launchers to strike targets so far inland.[6] Russian forces additionally appear to have integrated North Korean missiles into their strike packages, which may have been harder for Ukrainian forces to detect and shoot down. ISW has previously assessed that Russia is experimenting with the strike packages it can launch at Ukraine to achieve the maximum desired effect, and that Ukraine in return continues efforts to adapt and respond to new Russian strike packages.[7]
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Phillips O’Brien:
This is going to be a piece that takes an overview of how wars are won and lost, and engages in particular with the publicly stated ideas of Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s Minister of Strategic Industries.
I was lucky enough to have a meeting with Kamyshin when I was in Ukraine as part of a University of St Andrews delegation last Spring. At that time he had just taken over as the Minister of Strategic Industries, after having done an extraordinary job keeping the Ukrainian rail system running during the first few months after the full-scale invasion. In his job overseeing Ukrainian railways through the worst moments of the full-scale invasion, Kamyshin not only kept Kyiv linked to the outside world, he helped knit together all Ukrainian cities. Since then the Ukrainian railways have played a massive role keeping Ukraine in the fight. They both handle an enormous amount of freight and passenger traffic from the border (the airports have been closed for commercial flights since 24 February 2022), they also ferry Ukrainian troops almost to the front line itself. Most people who come to visit Kyiv from outside, seem to arrive by rail—including President Biden.
Now Kamyshin was obviously considered an enormous asset by the Ukrainian state, and so it was decided to move him from the railways and give him control of a new ministry (which as far as I know might have been set up just for him). This was the ministry of strategic industries, which has as its remit the establishment of a homegrown Ukrainian war industry to make the most important equipment Ukraine needs to fight the war.
(2022)
“I am about efficiency,” said the 38-year-old chief executive. He worked in private enterprise before taking the reins in 2021 of the state-owned rail company, Ukraine’s largest employer, with 231,000 workers and more than 16,700 miles of track.
One of his rules, he said, is: “War is not an excuse.”
Another rule is that he won’t send rail workers up against dangers that he’s not prepared to face himself. His dash to Kherson as the first Ukrainian troops were entering the southern city involved considerable risks, including driving along dirt tracks that de-miners hadn’t yet cleared, he said. He posted videos and photos of the odyssey on Twitter, showing wrecked and derailed rolling stock, torn up tracks and an impromptu breakfast of eggs fried outdoors with a camping stove. “Boots on the ground is our way,” he wrote.
[...]
“The whole country should rely on the railways,” Kamyshin said. Passengers will “always be transported and [at] the station they will always get hot tea, medical first aid and all the rest.”
The network is targeted so frequently, with infrastructure damaged daily and thousands of times, that the rail company has largely given up talking publicly about attacks, Kamyshin said.
“We don’t want to be the most boring guy in the party, constantly reporting that we’ve been shelled,” he said. “We just go and fix it.”
[...]
“We always have Plan B,” he said. “Stations are always supplied with electricity, always light on, always warm, and it will be so even in the winter. That’s my job. That’s our goal. That’s what we fight for.
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- Russian forces conducted the second largest combined drone and missile strike of 2024 on the morning of February 7. The February 7 strike package is emblematic of the constant air domain offense-defense innovation-adaptation race in which Russia and Ukraine are engaged.
- Russia targeted Kyiv City during the February 7 strike for the third time thus far in 2024, notably coinciding with EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell’s visit to Kyiv.
- Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev continued his nuclear saber-rattling rhetoric likely aimed in part at deterring Western aid to Ukraine.
- The Russian Federation Council approved a bill on February 7 that allows the Russian government to confiscate property from individuals convicted of spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, likely as part of ongoing censorship efforts to limit criticisms of Russia’s war effort ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential election.
- Yandex NV — the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex — announced that it will sell all of its Russian assets for 475 billion rubles (about $5.2 billion) to a purchasing consortium consisting of five Russian companies.
- Russian forces made confirmed gains west of Horlivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
- The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on February 7 that Russia is mobilizing citizens from Syria who come to Russia under the guise of security guard jobs at oil refineries.
- Russian occupation authorities continue to militarize Ukrainian children and youth in occupied Ukraine.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Select Rosgvardia elements have reportedly conducted an operational redeployment to Belgorod Oblast border areas. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 7 that elements of Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose Brigade, namely its 900th and 902nd Regiments, redeployed to Belgorod Oblast from occupied Donetsk Oblast in the first week of February.[22] Mashovets noted that these regiments have a particularly powerful artillery complement, which is likely why they have been redeployed to the Belgorod Grouping of Forces. ISW previously observed that Rosgvardia’s 116th Special Purpose Brigade and its new constituent regiments deployed to occupied Donetsk Oblast in late December 2023 to serve law enforcement purposes in occupied Ukraine, so their rapid redeployment away from occupied Ukraine is noteworthy.[23] ISW also previously assessed that Russian forces may launch tactical diversionary cross-border raids into Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast to distract and pin Ukrainian forces away from the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna axis, where Russian forces are currently pursuing offensive operations, and the deployment of at least two Rosgvardia regiments may be in support of such future diversionary activities.[24] Russian forces remain unlikely to be able to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Kharkiv Oblast from Belgorod Oblast, however.[25]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Limited positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on February 7, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional fighting northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[30] Elements of the Russian 11th Separate Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating west of Bakhmut, and elements of the 51st Guards VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar.[31] Geolocated footage posted on February 7 shows that Russian forces recently made a marginal advance northeast of Niu-York (west of Horlivka).[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Horlivka near Shumy and Pivdenne.[33] Drone operators of the “Russkiye Yastreby” (Russian Hawks) detachment (33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps] are reportedly operating near Horlivka.[34]
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Russian forces reportedly continued advancing in northern Avdiivka, although there were no confirmed control of terrain changes in this area on February 7. ...Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have reached the northern part of a gardening partnership on Zaliznychnyi Lane.[37] … Mashovets stated that Russian forces are now focusing on interdicting Hrushevskoho Street, the remaining Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) that runs west of the Coke Plant and into Avdiivka via the northwestern part of the settlement.[39]
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