Pre-election demands from Moscow continue, as though current advances would be permanent and irreversible.
Reported details of Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations that occurred in Istanbul in April 2022 indicate that Russia has consistently envisioned a settlement for its illegal invasion of Ukraine wherein Ukraine would be unable to defend itself from a future Russian attack – an objective Russia continues to pursue under calls for Ukraine’s “demilitarization.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin has most recently emphasized the idea of a “demilitarized” or “sanitary” zone in Ukraine that would place Russian territory – including occupied Ukraine – out of range of both Ukrainian frontline artillery systems and Western-provided long-range systems.[4] Putin likely aims for the ”demilitarization” of Ukraine to allow him to enforce his will upon Ukraine without any substantial resistance.
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- Reported details of Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations that occurred in Istanbul in April 2022 indicate that Russia has consistently envisioned a settlement for its illegal invasion of Ukraine wherein Ukraine would be unable to defend itself from a future Russian attack – an objective Russia continues to pursue under calls for Ukraine’s “demilitarization.”
- Reported details of the draft treaty suggest that Russia intended to use the treaty to set conditions for future attacks against Ukraine while also prompting the West to make concessions on Ukraine’s sovereignty.
- Russian authorities suggested that the Kremlin has likely adopted a more extensive set of goals regarding Ukraine over the course of Russia's war against Ukraine.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to disparage Russian elites in his February 29 Federal Assembly speech, more closely aligning himself with the veteran and military community and drawing praise from ultranationalist milbloggers.
- Kremlin officials met with leaders of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia and emphasized Russia’s support for Gagauzia against perceived Moldovan “oppression” on March 1.
- Ukraine and the Netherlands signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement on March 1.
- Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City on March 1.
- Russian authorities will likely use annual combat training for Russian reservists to support crypto-mobilization efforts.
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Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec Head Sergei Chemezov stated on February 29 that Rostec plans to produce A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft on an unspecified schedule because Russian forces require more A-50 aircraft. http://isw.pub/UkrWar022924
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 1. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[29] ...Russian forces likely damaged stationary bridges across the Oskil River during a coordinated strike campaign in September and October 2023, although this effort did not succeed in isolating the Ukrainian defense northeast of Kupyansk at the time, and Ukrainian forces do not yet appear to be facing serious difficulties in supplying positions on the east bank of the Oskil River.[31] An increase in Russian strikes on Ukrainian crossings along the Oskil River would be an indicator that Russian forces may intend to intensify the ongoing Russian offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[32] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz ”Aida” group and the Russian ”GORB” detachment are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[33]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
As Russian forces have seized the battlefield initiative following the end of the counteroffensive, Russian troops appear to be trying to drive southwest of Donetsk City while simultaneously driving northeast from the Velyka Novosilka area on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. This Russian effort appears to include settlements along the O0532 Marinka-Pobieda-Vuhledar route. ISW will further restructure the Donetsk Oblast axis if Russian operational objectives in this area appear to change in the future.
Positional fighting continued near Bakhmut on March 1. … Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Berestove and Rozdolivka; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka; and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne and Niu York.[35] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 11th VDV Brigade reportedly continue to operate in the Bakhmut direction.[36]
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Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash indicated on March 1 that Ukrainian forces have established significant defensive positions near Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut). Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces began to prepare Chasiv Yar for defense immediately following the Russian seizure of Bakhmut in May 2023 and that there are several Ukrainian defensive “rings” around the settlement.[37] Yevlash stated that Ukrainian forces have established dozens of squad-sized defensive positions and dozens of platoon-sized defensive positions near Chasiv Yar as well as fortifications and firing points within Chasiv Yar itself.[38] Yevlash also stated that Ukrainian forces have created minefields and other defensive obstacles in the Chasiv Yar area.[39] Available imagery, which ISW will not present or describe in greater detail at this time to preserve Ukrainian operational security, shows that Ukrainian forces have established significant fortifications in a ring shape in the Chasiv Yar area. Yevlash stated that the potential Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would offer Russian forces routes of advance towards Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) and that Russian forces’ main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast remains the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration (about 35km northwest of Bakhmut).[40]
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Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on March 1. Geolocated footage published on February 29 indicates that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) recently advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[41] Additional geolocated footage published on March 1 indicates that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) recently advanced into eastern Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka).[42] ... Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka and Semenivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[44] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are intensifying indirect fires and increasing the size of their assault groups up to the size of a ”battalion tactical group” in the Avdiivka direction.[45] Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are committing reinforcements to offensive operations in the Avdiivka area and acknowledged that Russian forces have recently achieved unspecified localized successes.[46]
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 1. Geolocated footage published on March 1 indicates that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently made a marginal advance in southern Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[47] Additional geolocated footage published on March 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[48] … Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda and Novomykhailivka.[50] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[51]
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At the same time, the next three years will be crucial for the success of these assumptions. This is indicated by, among other things, the structure of the budget, under which arms expenditure will be kept high until 2026. After this time, Russia may start to feel the effects of economic problems and the Russian military industry will face increasing challenges related in part to the lack of technology, materials, and spare parts.
If Russia succeeds in implementing “Shoigu’s reform” and the military action in Ukraine does not cause significantly more losses, the Alliance could face a Soviet-style mass army that is technologically weaker (with the exception of electronic warfare, and long-range strike capabilities), but with significant military capability and relatively good training. Hence, NATO and its member states should implement defence plans that take into account the changes in the Russian armed forces, including their size, combat experience, and reserve potential. That is one reason why the development of a joint NATO-Ukrainian centre for analysis, training, and education, to be established in Bydgoszcz, Poland, will be important. Increasing armaments production will also be key, as the amount of assets on hand will be a necessary factor for a successful defensive operation in a potential confrontation with a mass army. Growing the credibility of a potential NATO response should also involve political-military signalling, including the organisation of a series of exercises that incorporate the specifics of Eastern Flank defence, for example along the lines of this year’s Steadfast Defender. In addition, individual NATO countries should consider expanding their presence on the Eastern Flank.
Russian calculations regarding a potential confrontation with the Alliance will be influenced by the course of the war in Ukraine, including the need to maintain significant forces and resources there. Thus, assistance to Ukraine is of direct relevance to the security of NATO countries. Particularly important will be the transfer to Ukraine of systems that will give it an advantage in the confrontation with Russia and enable it to take counter-offensive action, such as aviation, communications, radio-electronic warfare systems, and drones. It will also remain crucial to help train as many Ukrainian soldiers as possible to make appropriate use of Western armaments, to support the overhaul of military equipment, and to increase arms production. Also very important will be the bilateral agreements announced by the G7 and at least 25 other countries (already signed by the UK, Germany, and France) with Ukraine increasing the chances of maintaining long-term support for the country.[26]
In turn, in order to weaken the potential of the Russian military industry, it will be important to maintain sanctions and take measures to counter Russian attempts to circumvent them by strengthening the monitoring and controls of items exported to third countries. This is all the more important since Russia obtains some of its dual-use technologies and products through intermediaries operating in China and Central Asian or Middle Eastern countries.
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