Per results of the poll from the first of these reviews last quarter (96% Yes), it seems at least 700 people are interested in this kind of thing, so here is a review of the ground war for the last three months. You other 30 or so folks who said ‘No’ can go read something else, now. Or tag along. Whatever.
Purpose:
With the to-and-fro of the war, it is easy to lose sight of the overall progress of the battle on the ground itself. This area changes hands and that field gets taken and, what does it mean? How good or bad is it? There are not many maps on DKos anymore.
There are many ways to measure what is happening: equipment, casualties, major events, … All of these are discussed in detail elsewhere on DKos. The data on these are often unreliable and the analyses are open to opinion and bias, so who you wish to believe is your choice. Meanwhile, reporting of the back-and-forth on the ground itself is uneven and incomplete possibly because the ground war is pretty boring.
This is a presentation of who has attacked where and who has captured what ground. It is not an attempt to pass any sort of judgement. It is simply a listing of results. Anything that is opinion here is pretty obvious and often presented with a heavy dose of snark. (Who, me???)
Before someone says “What about xxxxxx?” This also intentionally ignores the successful long-range attacks going on that are amply covered elsewhere, e.g. Black Sea, Crimea, oil facilities, etc. This is the ground war only.
Method:
As with equipment and casualties, there are various sources for what happens on the ground (the mappers). However, with some exceptions, many of these sources pretty closely agree with each other within a few hundred meters with the main difference between them being WHEN each mapper makes a change in the location of the “front lines.” For this effort, I regularly followed three mappers and, since they largely agreed, used one as the baseline for the details. That baseline map is the Ukraine Control Map by Project Owl OSINT.
Daily, the Ukraine Control Map and others update to my GoogleEarth automatically. On 31 Dec, I saved the location of the front line. Over the course of the last three months, each day, I compared this front line with the previous day’s line noting movements. On 30 March (a day and a bit early since I am largely unavailable next week), I again saved the front line. In the map photos below, the PURPLE line is 31 Dec and the GREEN line is 30 Mar. The difference is recorded as RED (Russian advance) or BLUE (Ukrainian advance). I will show these in segments and discuss from N to S.
All map photos below are the same scale except MAR’INKA/NOVOMYKHAILIVKA, which would not fit at the scale the rest are shown. I’ve done this to make rough visual comparisons between sections possible.
Finally, there are a number of VERY minor (usually less than 2 sq km) isolated movements that I won’t bother showing since they amount to almost nothing and may even represent adjustments by the mappers rather than actual movement. They are included in the totals presented at the end, though.
New:
I saved the front line every week, so WHEN things happened is now trackable. The short version is as follows:
- The first six weeks was a continuation of last quarter’s snail’s pace (about 1 sq km per day).
- Most of what happened this quarter took place in the 7th & 8th weeks of the quarter (Avdiivka – 9 sq km per day).
- Week’s 9-11 slowed down again to the previous snail’s pace everywhere except that the area W of Avdiivka continued to settle out at the rate of about 4 sq km per day.
- By the end of the quarter (Wks 12 & 13), even that had pretty much stopped and things were again creeping along at about 1 sq km per day.
So, here we go:
KUP’YANS’K AND VICINITY:
Kupyansk and Vicinity
While Russia threw various relatively small units into assaults very often trying unsuccessfully to take the tiny town of Syn’kivka NW of Kup’yans’k, very little actual movement happened here. The only reason I show it at all is that I predicted things would happen here. I was wrong. My rationale was that pushing here makes sense. That must be why Russia didn’t really put its back into it. It makes too much sense. Russia took just under 3 sq km of wooded land and Ukraine took back one.
Tabaivka:
Tabaivka
There was some back-and-forth here as well. Russia advanced towards the town and seemingly got control of most of it for a short period. If they did actually take it, Ukraine took it back (the town only) a few days later. The net result was Russia gained about 13 sq km E of town which is mostly farmland with one stretch of highway running through it and a tiny hamlet of 1-2 dozen houses.
AREA W OF KREMINNA:
Area W of Kreminna
Russia continued its slothful advance towards the towns of Tierny and Yampolivka. There seemed to be attacks here almost daily for a while, though most did not move things forward. In six months, they have moved a total of about 5-6 km (linear) which is 100 ft per day. Thus, they have captured about 14 sq km this quarter, similar to last quarter’s total. They have paid for this with the loss of at least 60 armored vehicles in 90 days including several T-90M tanks (at least 8 and undoubtedly more), probably their best tank, as well as many older models. Unbelievable.
This area now sticks out noticeably in a box about 8 km wide and 6-7 km deep of nothing but farmland. And it still doesn’t seem to accomplish anything of tactical, operational, or strategic significance.
Bilohorivka:
Bilohorivka
You may recall this as the town where Russia attempted a river crossing just N of town a couple of times with truly disastrous results (small white arrow on map). Ukraine has recaptured wooded areas N of the town/river to the edge of that abortive crossing point (just under 5 sq km) and the two sides are pushing back and forth with tough fighting and lines shifting regularly in the area of the town itself on the S side of the river. Currently, Russia has advanced just over 2 sq km, a trivial result. In a place about 6 km S of there, Russia took another minor 2 sq km as well.
The end result is that Ukraine controls much of the N bank that Russia was trying to cross FROM and Russia controls much of the S bank the Russia was trying to cross TO, so, they have somewhat reversed positions.
Irony, thou art truly a bitch.
berestove/vesele:
Berestove/Vesele
In a total capture of about 5 sq km across a broad very shallow front, the Russian commander here has almost succeeded in enveloping the eastern portion of… a marsh!!! In doing so, he mostly (only mostly) secured the rubble of the dozen or so houses that used to be Vesele.
This is likely the same local commander who (you may recall from last quarter), for some reason, attacked 1700 meters up a railroad track to make a name for himself. This quarter’s advance makes the same amount of sense, militarily. BTW, he continued up that same RR track another 1000 meters. Now they can run their train for 2.7 km!!!
BAKHMUT AND VICINITY:
Bakhmut and Vicinity
Russia managed to cross that 2.5 km I mentioned last quarter to engage Ivanivske and occupy a portion of that small town. Their goal is to take Chasiv Yar, which is a worthwhile objective, but is a couple of km further along to the W. And at their current rate of advance, they will reach the edge of that town … sometime in 2025.
Ukraine took small amounts of ground 8 km N and S of Bakhmut (about 4 sq km total between the two) and Russia took about 15 sq km in between.
AVDIIVKA AND VICINITY:
Avdiivka and Vicinity
As with last quarter, people on DKos are surely well informed on this one, so I won’t go into detail. Total this quarter is about 119 sq km for Russia. Add this to last quarter’s results and the total area taken is about 142.5 sq km. That’s roughly the size of the 50st largest (out of 60) US National Park: Bryce Canyon in Utah. Russia likely suffered something like 3-400 casualties for every sq km, perhaps more. Figure probably 1-1/2 soldier per acre. I wonder where that half soldier is buried.
Small Meaningless Spot: Between Avdiivka and Mar’inka, last quarter Ukraine took a small swath of field N of Staromyhailivka. Well, Russia took it back plus another small bit, so that’s 8-1/2 sq km of what seems to be empty field going to Russia this quarter. Let’s see where that field ends up next quarter. No map here to show it and only mentioned because it is over the 2 sq km threshold I mentioned at the start.
MAR’INKA/NOVOMYKHAILIVKA:
Marinka/Novomykhailivka
I treated these two separately last quarter. This quarter, they are beginning to affect each other, so they are combined.
This area has been an EXCEPTIONALLY slow plod. At the extreme top of this map (red and blue arrows pointing in opposite directions), Russia advanced along a very narrow front W from Mar’inka at the blistering pace of less than 60 feet per day capturing the strategically important N bank of THE FISHPOND!!! And then just two days ago, the Ukrainians took the N bank of the fishpond back. So the blistering pace is once more back to zero.
The more interesting movement is the 7 km (linear) push into the fields to the SW of Mar’inka to Pobjeda. When it first happened in mid-Feb, this appeared to be an attempt to move SW to flank/ bypass the Ukrainian positions at Novomykhailika (I still have to check the spelling on that one every time). Novo… has been a problem for Russia for months. However, that flanking attack would likely work only if they followed through quickly before Ukrainian forces to the S could react. “Quickly” doesn’t appear to be in Russia’s vocabulary. As that didn’t happen, I believe this push amounts to … not much. It will likely continue, though, at a slow Russian pace.
The advance into Novomykhailika itself across a very broad front from the S and E is moving at approximately the same pace as the move to take that key fishpond. This tiny unspellable hamlet has stood for a very long time and cost Russia lots and lots of soldiers and “stuff.” The town of Kostyantnivka (another spelling to learn) about 3-4 km W has slight high ground on its N side to allow overlook and direct fire fields to the S and E and another fishpond to wrangle over making approaching the town from the S or E difficult. So, it appears to be an excellent next defensive position as long as it remains unthreatened by the Russian Pobjeda “flanking” attack mentioned above.
Overall, Russia took about 31 sq km across this entire 18 km wide area, so an average 1700 meter advance in 90 days.
STAROMAIORS’KE AREA:
Staromaiors’ke Area
A big nothing-burger. Russia simply widened what it did last quarter 5 km W of town to the tune of about 8 sq km. They did not turn E to threaten Staromaiorske itself as some mappers thought they would last quarter. The purpose of this attack is unknown (to me).
ROBOTYNE ENCLAVE:
Robotyne Enclave
Again, more back-and-forth here with a fair amount of activity. The net result is shown.
On the western side, Russia pushed toward the town from the S and W. At one point, they entered the town to about the half-way point and seemed to make a serious effort at it. At this point I made a really bad call. I was wrong. The Russians got pushed back. Then they pushed forward again to the southern edge of town and got pushed back AGAIN, but only a bit. Back and forth. The town is vulnerable from the W in particular, but not much is happening as things have settled down.
Over by Verbove in the E, Russia has successfully pushed Ukraine out of the ex-Russian defensive line system that was one of the few Ukrainian achievements last summer.
Overall, in the last two quarters, Russia has taken back about half the area of the summer Robotyne attack axis, give or take a bit. This quarter was about 27 sq km.
KAM’YANS’KE/LOBKOVE:
Pretty dead. One minor advance of less than 1 sq km.
DNIPRO LEFT BANK:
Whereas last quarter, it was hard to gauge movement since the changes were mostly in swamps and/or water, this quarter was easy because, well, there were almost no changes. Russia took a 2-1/2 sq km chunk to the NE of Krynky compressing the small Ukrainian force into a few square blocks (about a sq km of dry land). That’s it.
We see reports of cross-Dnipro landings and “bridgeheads” by Ukraine with appropriate fanfare, but they are into areas that Russia has previously ceded to Ukraine. Other than artillery/mortar fire, drones, and the occasional bomb, Russia seems unserious about the Dnipro riverbank itself. While that may change in the future (reports of Russia boats coming in), that is the situation now. They do continue to attack Krynky, though, but in relatively small numbers.
So where does that leave us?
Most of what I wrote last time still applies.
- Overall, since 31 Dec, Russia has captured about 257 sq km and Ukraine has captured about 9.5 sq km for a net change of about 247.5 sq km. If you add the numbers in the diary, you won’t get that because of rounding and me not bothering to show/write-up the small stuff.
- While Russia’s pace did pick up by a factor of about 2.7 overall, the amounts of land listed here for both sides are, once again, trivial compared to the overall task (see Ukraine Eye Test below). Most areas that have changed hands are of no apparent import strategically and operationally. Some are of little use tactically as well, though there are some exceptions to this. The main effect is likely political. “Russia advances.” What doesn’t get mentioned often in those headlines is that these advances are at a crawl, and they seem to get their asses shot off while crawling.
- As with last quarter, the Bakhmut and Robotyne axes may perhaps be of some tactical use. Add to these this quarter that Mar’inka/Novomykhailyvka is starting to become slightly interesting from a purely tactical standpoint, but it is doing so at an INCREDIBLY SLOW pace even for the Russians. Actually, all three of these are progressing slowly if at all.
- As expected, no breakout occurred at Avdiivka and none will (opinion). While small chunks continue to change hands, that area is likely to settle down now that the “pocket” has been reduced. While reducing this pocket is an achievement (Russia’s only achievement in well over six months), the taking of the equivalent of a very small national park at the cost of several 10s of thousands of troops and hundreds of vehicles is nothing to write home about. Having said that, we do not know the damage Ukraine suffered defending it. I do know that quite a few Bradleys and some Leopards were lost and the Abrams don’t seem to be doing very well.
- Over the past three months, Russia has been much less aggressive attacking up and down the line than last quarter with the sole exception being Avdiivka. With activity being reduced everywhere but there, Russia seems to have lost some steam. The Kupyansk area has died down. Robotyne was busy for a while, but also has died down. Similar pace elsewhere. Weather may be a factor, but wasn’t early in the quarter. Maybe Russia just doesn’t have the juice to push in more than one place. We’ll see.
- As with last quarter, most of Russia’s attacks are in places where they lost ground during the summer with the obvious exception being Avdiivka. I still believe the intent is to “undo the counteroffensive” to make as if it never happened from a political standpoint. This would be more showing the West that Russia will do anything to keep going. Again (still), this is a guess.
- As I said at the outset, this does not seek to examine what this is doing to the two forces (men, equipment, supply, etc.). I will add that, as before, Russia SEEMS to be losing its ass, but does not act like it.
- KEY TAKEAWAY: At the very time when Ukraine seems the most vulnerable (HELLO HOUSE REPUBLICANS!!! Looking at you, Mike Johnson!!!), Russia seems to lack the ability to press the advantage. RIGHT NOW IS WHEN THEY SHOULD BE ATTACKING WITH EVERYTHING AND THEY AREN’T REALLY (though weather affects this right now). That is good news for Ukraine and I hope I am not wrong in that pure speculation. No Russian collapse seems imminent, but Ukraine is weathering the
storm drought.
- My only other conclusion I will put forth along those lines (and it is unsupported by numbers and in-depth analysis) is that I believe it may be time (past time, actually) for Ukraine to get more serious about upping its manpower. This is particularly true if the West once more gets serious about providing the tools with which to fight. Russia’s spring conscription drive will happen in a few weeks and those fresh troops will arrive in Ukraine a few weeks later. Some Ukrainian units are sucking for replacements. I am not proposing that Ukraine needs to field new units. I am suggesting that many existing units need to be made whole again.
- All of this could change tomorrow. This is looking backwards at the past three months only along with some comparisons and references to the previous three.
The Ukrainian Eye Test
One Last Map: This below is all of mainland Ukraine (minus Crimea (Ukraine!), which wouldn’t fit on the screen). The red is what Russia has captured in the last 6 full months of intense effort. I’ll spot you Avdiivka. How much other Russian progress do you actually see?
Ukraine, Minus Crimea
This gives you an idea of the scale of Russia’s total failure. And 2-3 months of this was while Ukraine lacked ammunition. It’s pretty sad when you can’t beat the other guy when the other guy isn’t able to punch you back much.
I wonder. If you took all of the destroyed, damaged, and expended Russian tanks, howitzers, missile/rocket launchers, armored vehicles, rail cars, trucks and trailers, cars, planes, helicopters, drones, ships, docks, burned refinery equipment, bridges, missiles, artillery shells and rockets, cans of ammo, soldiers killed & wounded, other military equipment, buildings, etc. and lined them up next to each other, would they even fit within the small area they have captured in those six months? That’s one GIANT parking lot needed for that much stuff.
Of course it would fit, but it’s food for thought.
Ciao, until next quarter.