In one sense, Ukraine has already liberated itself. Not from Russia just yet, though I believe that is on its way, but it has liberated itself from Western imposed restrictions which were strangling Ukraine’s ability to wage this war in the manner best suited to Ukraine. And this has opened up a whole new theory of victory for Ukraine.
Western Paternalism
Ukraine has been at the mercy of both Russian aggression and also dependence upon western aid for this entire war. Please don’t get defensive on my critique of western aid here. It has been essential to the survival of Ukraine to get this far into the war. However, it has also never been provided in a volume and timeliness required for Ukraine to actually win this war outright even though the west (principally the US) has the resources required to do so. In addition, western aid has come with restrictions on the usage of specific equipment limiting Ukraine’s ability to strike in specific ways.
The tone of western media and analysts has also been frequently one of considering Ukraine a junior participant in this war with little to offer other than untrained soldiers. This ignores a decade of experience fighting against Russia and its proxies at a level of conventional combat no current Western power has, and this includes the United States. Ukraine is a Senior partner in this war, and really the only one that matters so long as the west treats Russia as “someone else’s problem”. Ukraine has been treated like a teenager asking for the keys to the car while the western powers reluctantly give the keys for an old 1980s chevy and demand it be home by 9 PM.
The paternalism hasn’t just been what Ukraine can do in Russia, but what Ukraine can do in Ukraine. The failed summer of 2023 offensive by Ukraine can in part be laid on the west (though Ukraine also made its own mistakes). Western equipment was slow in coming. An expectation in the media of a Ukrainian offensive was created and the it was portrayed as the future of Ukraine depended upon the success of that offensive (“Everything does not depend upon this next Ukrainian offensive.”). Further, Ukraine was pressed into a NATO style of warfare without being given many of the tools that NATO itself would use such as air power and long range strike capability.
Breaking out from the West
With its invasion of Russia itself, Ukraine has not just attacked Russia but has also broken free from some of the Western restraints. While some still remain in place and specific weapon systems are still denied, this attack is one of Ukraine’s choosing, planning, and execution. It has already far exceeded the gains of the 2023 Summer offensive which was done to appease the west. This attack, conducted despite the west, should force a reconsideration of Ukraine’s standing with regards to who is the adult in the room. This is Ukraine’s war. And we are seeing that Ukraine knows far better how to wage it than anyone in NATO does.
A New Theory of Victory
With this offensive comes a new theory of victory. Early in the war, a victory for Ukraine was merely short term survival. Once that was accomplished, there was a brief window of time where a victory using maneuver to collapse the Russian army was thought possible (by me). But after Russia was given time to build their defensive lines, as the summer of 2023 offensive showed such a victory was then off the table. Since that time Ukraine’s best “theory of victory” was to outlast Russia with the Western allies help. When there was hope that the West would continue to increase aid, that victory seemed more likely. But as western aid has plateaued (and US aid was even temporarily disrupted by US Republicans for 6 months) victory by outlasting Russia, while still possible, has become far more risky.
With the Ukrainian incursion into Russia, a new theory of victory for Ukraine is now possible. Ukraine’s incursion does three main things. First, it reintroduces maneuver warfare into the war creating several advantages which I will get into below. Second, it allows for acquisition of Russian land which due to it being (currently) poorly defended will be easier to acquire than liberating occupied Ukrainian land. This provides weight to negotiations. Third, it disrupts Russian society and more specifically weakens Putin’s political power.
“Peace” generally happens in one of two ways. Either one side completely conquers the other, or it is negotiated. In order to have a negotiated settlement, BOTH sides need to come to a place where continuation of hostilities is more painful than whatever settlement can be reached. So far in this war no peace has been possible because Russia wants all of Ukraine and Ukraine also wants all of Ukraine. Both sides have seen continuation of hostilities as preferable to giving the other side what it wants. So to win, Ukraine needs to get Russia, and specifically Putin, to a place where Russia NEEDS hostilities with Ukraine to stop badly enough that they are willing to stop fighting for occupied Ukrainian land.
The Kursk offensive, by making annihilation of the Russian army more possible, taking land with the potential of more land being taken, and weakening of Putin’s grip on power are all dynamics that will bring Russia to the peace table. Ukraine no longer will need to wait for the Russian war economy to hopefully collapse or hope for a Russian coup or revolt. Instead they can actively work towards pressures that could bring the war to a close sooner.
Maneuver Warfare is key to Ukrainian military superiority
Back in May of 2022 I wrote an article summarizing Captain Nicolas Fiore’s article on the Russian BTG (apologies, the former link to his article no longer seems to be working, but Forbes has a summary as well). If you can find the original, it’s worth a read. While the BTG no longer exists per the original incarnation pre-war, the basic pattern still does. Russia maintains two levels of soldiers. They have a concentrated core of higher trained specialists and elite infantry, and then they have a large volume of low quality troops meant to die easily and in large quantities. Combined with rigid Soviet era top down command structure where improvisation is discouraged by troops, the Russian force is at its best in relatively static positions. Russia is best when lines don’t move quickly so poorly trained soldiers can be herded to their deaths and inaccurate Russian artillery (and now glide bombs) can be used on Ukrainian soldiers who have little choice in holding their ground.
As Fiore’s article predicted and as we saw in Kharkiv in 2022, Russian doctrine does poorly when forced to move a lot. Because most of the Russian force is disempowered to make substantive decisions, forces move slowly and show little initiative. A mobile Ukrainian force can attack a Russian force and move before the Russian command structure can adequately respond. Further, even if Ukraine wishes to hold a position, Russia must assemble all the parts to their offensive machine which takes more time. The different types of troops need to get there. They need to be told exactly what to do when. The supplies need to arrive. This gives Ukraine plenty of time to prepare.
Maneuver Warfare on Enemy Terrain is so much better
Part of why Ukraine hasn’t been able to take advantage of Maneuver warfare very much is that Ukraine is correctly reluctant to cede territory to Russia. Maneuver warfare can frequently involve falling back before an enemy strikes a position such that the enemy strike hits nothing. For example, Ukraine takes a small town. Russia prepares a counter attack with significant amounts of glide bombs and artillery. Ukraine could voluntarily retreat from the town (preferably without Russia realizing this) and then all those explosions are for nothing. That Ukrainian force could then move to flank the Russian infantry coming in and achieve surprise by attacking from an unexpected direction. In the era of drones, such maneuvers are more likely to be seen. But Ukraine seems to have been able to, at least for the moment, use sufficient electronic warfare (EW) to reduce the constant surveillance to a point where they can move like this.
But when fighting on your home ground, every retreat means more people exposed to Russia’s brutality and another town reduced to rubble. The attack into Kursk negates this disadvantage. Ukraine has the ability to pop up and retreat from any place in Kursk they can quickly reach. Ukraine doesn’t necessarily need to hold any particular part of Russia. So they can wait for a big concentration of Russian forces to build up, then disappear and go attack elsewhere confident that they are not leaving Ukrainian civilians to Russian brutality. If Russia chooses to inflict such brutality upon their own people it is not Ukraine’s responsibility. Russia could end this war any minute by leaving occupied Ukraine.
Quoting Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” is somewhat cliche but I find it unavoidable here:
“Be extremely subtle even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of the opponent's fate.”
By operating in Russia, Ukraine has fewer key places to defend. Should Russia find enough troops to retake Kursk, so what? Ukraine could attack into Belgorod, or further North. Ukraine can dance around like Mohamed Ali landing crushing blows and being gone before the counter attack comes. They can keep the slow Russian command apparatus paralyzed by appearing to be in one place and disappearing when it suits them. They can also unexpectedly hold strong should Russian undercommit to an attack. Ukraine can be formless on the attack in a way not available to them in Ukraine where the defense of the locals is so important.
Expect to continue to not have any clue as to what Ukraine is doing in Kursk
As I wrote here back in May of 2022, us not seeing a clear plan by Ukraine is actually a good thing. Being unpredictable is valuable in a combat context. So long as Ukraine is causing Russia major problems and inflicting more damage on Russia than Ukraine is receiving, everything is going according to “plan”. Don’t expect Ukraine to have a specific goal. They can have a list of many possible targets and goals which may or may not come into play depending entirely upon what opportunities Russia presents.
Ukraine took a small bit of Belgorod oblast roughly 50 miles south of the current action. That might be nothing. It might be planned to be nothing. But should Russia commit too many troops farther north that little bit could be suddenly reinforced by Ukraine and turn into a major advance. That advance could then melt away as Russia responds and a new advance start elsewhere. Ukraine doesn’t need to hold specific territory.
Which is not to say that they won’t have any plans. As I wrote a few days ago, certain towns like L’gov will have importance based upon logistic needs. Ukraine taking L’gov would cut off supply for Russia to the west, but also enable Ukrainian movements to the North and East. On my map in that article I missed the rail line headed north out of L’gov. So Ukraine could safely supply a strike further north into Russia by holding it.
Going through Russia to avoid the major fortifications
Even though Kursk is a fair distance from Luhansk, it doesn’t mean this all doesn’t relate. I wrote previously about “The road to Donbas runs through Russia” in April of 2022 as a means of skirting the pre-2022 fortifications already in the Donbas. Way too far ahead in thinking as it was even before the Kharkiv offense. I also wrote about “Ukraine doesn't have to cut the Belgorod-Luhansk rail line at Starobilsk. Urazovo is closer.” in December of 2022 where I talked about how the best way to move east would be cutting into Russia.
With the Kursk offensive breaking the Russian territory taboo, Ukraine can totally skirt the major fortifications. That is a long way from where they are now and Russia will attempt to counter this. But if Ukraine can continue to beat Russia in Kursk and open up Belgorod oblast as well, then all of the fortifications in occupied Ukraine are in danger of being flanked.
To be clear, Ukraine doesn’t necessarily need to penetrate deep into Russia to do this. Ukraine also wouldn’t stretch their supply lines far around and leave them open. Rather they can flank the first bit of fortifications in Luhansk south of Urazovo and then encircle the Russians or force their retreat. That evens out the lines and then Ukraine can try the next bit. Russia will certainly attempt to block Ukraine from doing this, possibly even by constructing new fortifications, but fortifications take some time. If Ukraine can keep things moving Russia may not be able to react appropriately in the right time frame.
But if Ukraine can roll up the Russian lines in such a manner it could break the back of the Russian military. Such a massive defeat would severely weaken Putin, the Russian economy as they tried to replace men and material, and could tip the calculus for Russian giving up on taking Ukraine.
The End
Is this the end? Who knows? Probably some time still to go. Russia gets a big say in what goes down. Ukraine still needs to execute and avoid what mistakes it can. But I’m certainly the most hopeful for Ukraine I’ve been in quite a while. Ukraine is taking the initiative and trying to make this war about those things which Ukraine has an advantage in. Ukraine is taking a risk and the US and Europeans can do their part to make this all less risky. The allies can FOLLOW Ukrainian leadership in this and provide those things Ukraine is asking for.
Slava Ukraine.
