- The 57 countries forming a coalition that has pumped more than $122 billion in aid to Kyiv must continue no matter who sits in the White House, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy pleaded.
- Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 8 to 9 and on the afternoon of January 9.
“I will get it settled before I even become president,”
Two European officials told the Financial Times that discussions with Trump’s incoming team in recent weeks revealed they had not yet decided (!) on how to solve the conflict, and that support to Ukraine would continue after the US president’s inauguration on January 20. www.pravda.com.ua/...
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 70 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of January 8 to 9.[76] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 46 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts; that 24 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that falling debris from downed Russian drones damaged residential homes in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Cherkasy oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Russian Iskander-K cruise missiles targeting Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the afternoon of January 9.[77] Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against a civilian enterprise in Nemyshlianskyi Urban Raion, Kharkiv City during the afternoon of January 9.[78] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on January 9 that the Russian glide bomb strike against Zaporizhzhia City on January 8 killed 13 and injured at least 116, an increase from the 63 injured reported on January 8.[79]
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Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Russian Iskander-K cruise missiles targeting Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the afternoon of January 9.
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 46 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts
Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9. Austin announced a new US military aid package for Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) valued at approximately $500 million.[4] The package includes AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M air defense missiles; air-to-ground munitions; F-16 support equipment; and small-arms ammunition.[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of IRIS-T air defense missiles.[6] Polish Deputy Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz announced that Poland is also preparing a new aid package for Ukraine.[7] UK Defense Secretary John Healey and Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds jointly announced that the drone coalition, including the UK, Latvia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, will provide Ukraine with 30,000 drones at an unspecified future time after the coalition signed contracts worth 45 million pounds ($55.4 million).[8]
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- Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9.
- Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9.
- Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war.
- High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations.
- Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance.
- Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future.
- A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Voronezh Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.
- The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
- The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sudzha.
- Russian officials continue to indicate that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and Russian society in the long term.
Russian forces recently intensified offensive operations aimed at retaking the remainder of Kursk Oblast and advanced during a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault northwest of Sudzha on January 9. Geolocated footage published by a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast on January 9 indicates that Russian forces seized Leonidovo and Aleksandriya and advanced northwest of Nikolskyi and west of Vikotorovka (all northwest of Sudzha) during a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault.[27] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the attack reported that Russian forces conducted the assault in six waves and that Russian forces used 50 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and civilian vehicles in the attack.[28] The brigade reported that it destroyed an unspecified number of Russian vehicles during the assault. Additional geolocated footage published on January 8 and 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in Pogrebki (northeast of Sudzha at the northernmost point of the Ukrainian salient) and marginally advanced in Makhnovka (east of Sudzha).[29] ... Russian forces reintensified assaults in Kursk Oblast on January 5 and have conducted assaults throughout the salient over the last four days after mainly focusing on advancing east of Sudzha in recent months.[32] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo (east of Sudzha).[33] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the Chechen Akhmat "Kashtana" Spetsnaz detachment are reportedly operating near Berdin and elements of the Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz detachment are reportedly operating near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye.[34] Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Nikolayevka (further northwest of Sudzha).[35]
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Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance. Russian elites' reported focus on mobilizing more Russian personnel indicates that the Russian elites likely view a lack of manpower as Russia's largest constraint to achieving rapid success on the battlefield rather than the ineffectiveness of frontline Russian forces, poor campaign-planning abilities of Russian commanders, and significant armored vehicle shortages that Russian forces are currently suffering.[13] Russian forces have recently demonstrated that they are able to make slow, grinding gains through infantry assaults in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, but their inability to conduct rapid, mechanized maneuver has prevented Russian forces from converting these tactical gains into deep penetrations into Ukrainian rear areas.[14]
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Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are struggling to restore maneuver to an increasingly transparent battlefield, but the Russian military will also have to address critical shortcomings in its ability to train frontline commanders and plan military operations if Russian forces aspire to conduct the type of rapid, mechanized maneuver that characterized the first few months of the full-scale invasion in early 2022.[15] Ukrainian military officials recently reported that Russian forces are fielding fewer armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — the two operational directions with the highest intensity of fighting and where Russia has the densest concentrations of its forces — in favor of highly attritional, infantry-led assaults.[16] Russian forces have suffered high and unsustainable armored vehicle losses and have struggled to protect these vehicles from Ukrainian drones on the frontline over the last year, forcing Russian forces to increasingly limit and prioritize where and when to field armored vehicles and conduct mechanized assaults.[17] Dedicating a significant amount of additional Russian manpower to infantry assaults on critical areas of the frontline would likely allow Russian forces to at least sustain or possibly slightly increase their current pace of advance, but only as fast as Russian infantry can travel on foot — far short of the rapid gains, deep penetrations, and significant battlefield victories that the Russian elites likely desire.
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