About 10 days ago I posted a diary about rumors circulating in Chinese circles that the PRC’s paramount leader, Xi Jinping, had suffered some sort of health crisis and was either dead or would be resigning his positions at the upcoming 4th plenary session of the CCP’s 20th National Congress, set to begin on October 20.
Since no reputable media sources were able to confirm those rumors in a timely fashion, I decided to unpost that diary — and sure enough, even if Xi had been gravely ill, he was at least well enough to make a brief appearance at the UN International Women’s Conference in Beijing on October 13.
Then last week we were all treated to a rather bizarre set of escalations in the looming trade war between the US China, particularly over the supply chain for rare earths, and it looked like Xi was intent on reasserting his control over the direction the PRC would be following during and after the 4th Plenum.
Since at least the 3rd Plenum last year when rumors of Xi’s health problems had started taking off, the general consensus of many China watchers was that the party elders had grown tired of Xi’s continued adventurism in foreign affairs and attempts to consolidate his undisputed power over the CCP, and were trying to use his alleged ill-health to ease him out of power into an “honorable” retirement — perhaps keeping him on as a figurehead president of the PRC without any real power in order to maintain the facade of stability and “legality” that they deem essential in maintaining the CCP’s iron grip over the PRC.
Unfortunately, it doesn’t look like Xi has any plans to accept any diminution or dilution of his power, and was apparently planning to purge anyone he saw as a potential threat to his power at the 4th Plenum, so the person who had the most to lose in this coming confrontation, Zhang Youxia (one of the two vice chairmen of the CMC that actually controls China’s military), decided to strike first this past Friday when he essentially decapitated Xi’s control over the military by purging 9 generals that were Xi’s closest collaborators..
Most Western news sources and supposed “China experts” seem to think this purge was actually engineered by Xi himself to consolidate power. This report by UPI is typical:
Chinese President Xi Jinping has expelled nine of his top military generals from the People's Liberation Army for what China says is corruption, including the country's number two general.
Gen. He Weidong, one of the two vice-chairs of the Central Military Commission, was fired by Xi. He was the third in command of the PLA and a member of the Chinese politburo.
"The removal of He Weidong is one of the biggest shake-ups within the PLA in decades," said Lyle Morris, an expert on the Chinese military at the Asia Society Policy Institute, the Financial Times reported. "He was on a fast track to become the next senior vice-chair of the [Central Military Commission], possibly replacing Zhang Youxia, and skipped a grade when he was elevated to the CMC during the 20th Party Congress."
Another high-ranking official removed in the purge is Miao Hua, the army's top political officer. He had been suspended in November 2024.
A statement from Xi said those removed are suspected of "grave official misconduct, involving exceptionally large sums of money. The nature of their offenses is extremely serious, and the impact is profoundly detrimental," Newsweek reported.
Eight of the nine removed were members of the Central Committee, which is scheduled to meet next week to discuss the coming five-year development plan.
The problem here, which should be obvious, is that Xi had nothing to do with this purge, since those purged were all his own most loyal followers! The English language version of the non-CCP People News appears to have a much more realistic take on the situation:
On October 17, 2025, just two days ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session, the Ministry of National Defence of the Communist Party of China made a surprising announcement that sent shockwaves through both domestic and international circles, delivering a powerful political message.
In the afternoon of the 17th, spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang officially reported that the Central Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission had initiated an investigation into nine senior generals. These include He Weidong, a member of the Central Political Bureau and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission; Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and former Director of the Political Work Department; He Hongjun, former Executive Deputy Director of the Political Work Department; Wang Xiubin, former Executive Deputy Director of the Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutang, former Political Commissar of the Army; Yuan Huazhi, former Political Commissar of the Navy; Wang Houbin, former Commander of the Rocket Force; and Wang Chunning, former Commander of the Armed Police Force.
This news hit like a bombshell, instantly capturing the attention of the public both at home and abroad.
All nine generals are, without exception, core loyalists or trusted confidants of Xi Jinping within the military. Earlier, rumours had circulated online regarding the downfall of Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutang, Yuan Huazhi, and Wang Houbin. The official confirmation from the Ministry of National Defence not only validated these rumours but also indicated that the internal factional struggles within the party had entered a critical phase of intense confrontation just before the Fourth Plenary Session.
The entire article is well worth reading, and makes some very salient observations, among them:
He Weidong, the second vice chairman of the Military Commission and Xi Jinping's most trusted ally in the military, has been missing for over six months, leaving the public unaware of his fate. In a surprising turn of events, the military announced his corruption-related downfall, with the announcement made by a spokesperson from the Ministry of Defence, which is highly unusual. This suggests that the military has circumvented the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and party structures. The fall of former Military Commission member Li Shangfu was initially reported by Xinhua News Agency rather than the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, the incident involving Miao Hua was announced by a Ministry of Defence spokesperson on November 28, 2024, indicating that the military is now under the control of Zhang Youxia, who is targeting both Miao Hua and He Weidong as part of a broader effort against Xi Jinping.
...
Zhang Youxia, as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, effectively wields military power. He acted decisively, bypassing the Politburo's review process. Former Military Commission members Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu were expelled from the party only after the Central Politburo meeting on June 27, 2024, which reviewed and approved the Central Military Commission's report. In contrast, the expulsion of He Weidong and others was announced by a Ministry of Defence spokesperson, who stated that 'based on relevant party regulations and legal provisions, the Party Central Committee has decided to expel nine individuals from the party,' thus bypassing the Central Politburo meeting. This indicates that Zhang Youxia has broken free from the usual party constraints and is directly targeting Xi Jinping's inner circle. All of these officials who have fallen from grace were trusted aides promoted by Xi Jinping from the 31st Army, and their downfall signifies a complete disintegration of Xi Jinping's control over military power.
It somehow seems particular fitting that Zhang is using Xi’s old tactic of accusing those he wished to purge of corruption. A couple of videos worth watching for more background on the long running conflict between Zhang and Xi. From Beyond the great Firewall:
And from Lei’s Real Talk:
In any event, we should find out shortly during the 4th Plenum that starts tomorrow who really controls the Chinese military and the CCP. Or as Chairman Mao once phrased it:
Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun
