At the airport, citizens from the countries of the European Union check into the Prague flight and head to the security control area; all Ukrainian citizens are asked to wait. I can recognise the Ukrainians among the Czechs without looking at their passports or hearing them talk. We no longer look like tourists; we are all something else already: refugees, soldiers, or someone else in the middle. We don’t know who we are yet.
In the Prague airport, the border control officer, a young woman, glances at my passport and then stares at me. She seems to be more interested in the expression on my face than in my passport details. Perhaps she is new to the job and has not seen anyone whose country is being bombed. Maybe she is looking not at me but at war.
I am war. We Ukrainians all became a war. Nothing else about us matters now, only it – the catastrophe that has just begun. I buy train tickets to Poland; through worried Europe, I’m heading home to Ukraine. There I will be just myself at war, not war.
www.theguardian.com/…
On 27 June 2023, Victoria Amelina joined a delegation of Colombian authors to the Donetsk region. At the end of a long day, they were relaxing in a pizzeria in Kramatorsk. It was hit by a Russian missile, injuring 64 people and taking the lives of 13 others. One of the severely injured was Victoria. She died a few days later, in Mechnikov Hospital in Dnipro, from the injuries she had sustained.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 7 and 8.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 139 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[79]
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Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts
- Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
- Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
- The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
- The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.
https://t.co/Kn1pOpOVUL
Russian forces maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) amid ongoing activity in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, and Fanaseyevka and that Russian forces are clearing nearby forested areas.[19] Two Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, but another milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces both maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[20]
Russian-assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[21]
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The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[12] ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however.[13] A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.[14]
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