In previous diaries, I have argued that the current protest movement is likely going to fail. In this diary, I am going to lay out my case for why (and how) the current clerical regime in Iran is going to fail.
To understand that, you have to go back to the clerical vision of Ayatollah Khomeini, and understand its inherent limits. From an outsiders perspective, we tend to think that this clerical vision was uniformly accepted by all the religious fundamentalists in Iran, or at least those of the Shia faith, but that was not the case. It was quite controversial to begin with, and remains disputed even today.
Let us start with the basics. Khomeini’s vision was laid out in a series of speeches given in Najaf (Iraq) in 1970, and is now available as a book called Vilayat-e-faqih (Islamic governance). Islamic Government argues that because Islamic law governs all of life, a just Islamic state must be ruled by qualified Islamic jurists who act as guardians of society in the absence of the Hidden Imam. But let us break it down into individual elements.
What is Islamic Governance
1. Islam is inherently political
Khomeini argues that Islam is not just a religion of personal ethics or worship, but that Islamic law (Sharia) governs all aspects of life. Therefore, an Islamic society requires an Islamic government. Separation of church and state (or mosque and state) is seen as a Western, or colonial concept. This part is not controversial; most previous Islamic Caliphates had combined Mosque and State.
2. Islamic law must be enforced continuously
Khomeini then argues that since God’s laws are eternal (i.e. not limited to the Prophets time) and applicable to all (not just to the faithful), and since law requires enforcement, there must be state authority to enforce this. Importantly, the state must then also endeavor to spread this to the non-believer (i.e. it must evangelize). A secular, or monarchic system cannot do this.
3. Who should rule? The Islamic jurist
Therefore, (and we are now getting to the crux of the argument), the only one who can rule in the absence of the Hidden Imam (the 12th Imam) is a qualified Islamic Jurist who knows Islamic law deeply, is morally upright, and is capable of governance.
This is quite clever, if you think of it. He has set it up so that he should be the one to rule. He knows Islamic law deeply. Furthermore, while there are other clerics who can also claim to know Islamic law, he is the only one who is also morally upright (and courageous), and capable of governance.
4. Rejection of monarchy and secularism
Based on this clever rationale, Khomeini explicitly rejects the Monarchy (as un-Islamic), and Western style Democracy (as lawmaking by humans and not by God) and Nationalism (all people are supposed to obey the rule of God).
5. The role of the people
In this system, the people do not create the ruler; God does. The people are simply there to obey God’s rule. The people may participate in the administration of God’s rule (i.e., if you behaved well, then you could be rewarded with a suitably high ranking and suitably well compensated position).
6. Clerical rule is a duty, not a privilege
And then we get into the clear BS domain. While clerical rule is mandated by God, clerics must rule reluctantly as an obligation. Clerics must not seek this rule, or hang on to it.
What is missing are any discussions on checks and balances. A cleric who is implementing God’s rule does not have checks and balances, obviously. What is also missing are any discussions on minority rights. God does not recognize minorities and majorities, so such discussions would be insulting to God’s rule.
But let us put all that aside, and examine Khomeini’s rationale. This position was controversial (will get to that down below), so he could not just pull it out of his rear end. He needed some justification from the Islamic canon: the Quran and the Hadiths. And his justification was also quite controversial,
The Hadiths vs the Quran.
A little background may be warranted here. The Quran is the word of God, as narrated to Prophet Mohammad, his primary disciple. It was written down during the time of Prophet Mohammad. The Hadiths is about the life of Mohammad, the primary disciple of God, and was written down starting about 150 years after Mohammad’s death. So you should see one problem right away: the Hadiths are sourced very poorly, and rely on memories passed down over several generations. By contrast, the Quran is better sourced.
But there is a second problem. Under Mohammad, Islam was a small cult that was not guaranteed survival, But when the Hadiths were written, Islam was an Imperial religion, and the Islamic empire stretched beyond anyone's imagination. So, in a sense, the Hadiths were written to justify Imperial rule; to bestow divine grace on the Emperor (and all his shenanigans).
As one example of this, consider the widely repeated smear that Prophet Mohammad was a child molester (or child rapist) because he took a 6 year old bride. The story is bullshit (I describe why below); but is based on the Hadiths. In one of the Hadiths, the scholar Sahih al-Bukhari writes, circa 850 AD (i.e. more than 200 years after Mohammad’s death in 632 AD) quoting Ayesha: “The Prophet married me when I was six, and I was admitted to his house when I was nine”
This is controversial because, as per the Quran, marriage can only happen between consenting adults; and a 6 (or even 9) year old is not an adult who can give consent. So, for the story to be true, the Prophet Mohammad would have been a world class hypocrite, and God would have been a doofus for selecting such a hypocrite for his primary disciple, We know the claim is not true because there are contemporaneous primary sources from Mohammad’s time (from allied Jewish tribes), so we know quite a bit about Mohammad’s character (and also about Ayesha, the supposedly 6/9 year old in question). We know that Muhammad would have been judged a morally upstanding man, even by modern standards.
And we also know that wider Islamic society under the Abbasid Caliphs at the time of this Hadith practiced child marriages. The Caliphs themselves took young “concubines” (often enslaved girls of defeated enemies) as sex slaves. So the Hadith was likely just a backhanded way to justify child marriages, given the Quranic prohibition against it.
I am narrating this story for a reason: a lot of what you will see in the Hadiths is quite controversial (i.e. it is complete BS), and Islamic scholars know that. They just cannot say it too openly… or at all. If you are familiar with Christian (or Jewish, or Hindu) scripture, you can see the parallels.
But Shia scholars do reject this particular Hadith (Sunni scholars accept it, but will re-interpret the dates to put Ayesha’s age at about 14 when the marriage is consummated). I am not an Islamic scholar, so I can give you my opinion: the whole set of Hadiths are just Imperial propaganda. And that is what Khomeini is basing his arguments on.
Khomeini’s justification in the Hadiths
So now, let us go back to how Khomeini justifies his vision. He relies on a small set of Hadiths that are actually quite controversial within Shia scholars, and then interprets them very generously.
1. The “jurists as rulers” hadith (maqbūla of ʿUmar ibn Ḥanẓala)
The Sixth Imam, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, says that when the faithful (i.e. followers of Ali, or Shiʿa) have disputes, then they should not go to unjust rulers. Instead, they should go to those who know the Imam’s teachings, and has been appointed by the Imam as a ḥākim.
A hakim refers to a judge, or an authority; and the Hadith probably uses the word in that context. But hakim can also be used to refer to a medical Doctor, or anyone with expertise on a particular topic. I have very limited Persian, but even I knew this, and I was totally not surprised by what Khomeini did next.
Khomeini’s interpretation was that hakim refers to general authority, including political rule.
Other Shia scholars responded that hakim in the Hadith reefers to judicial authority only, and not to political rule, but Khomeini’s argument persuaded enough people. And furthermore, this particular Hadith commands you to avoid unjust rulers. But it does not specify whether all rulers are unjust.
2. The “ulama as heirs of the prophets” hadith
The Hadith’s state that “the scholars are the heirs of the prophets”. Khomeini’s interpretation of this line is that since the Prophet Mohammad exercised political authority, (earlier Prophets, including Jesus did not exercise political authority, but let us ignore this for now), if the scholars are heirs of the prophets, then they must also inherit governing responsibility
Other scholars responded that as per a classical reading of the line, scholars are meant to inherit knowledge, and not power; and that most Prophets were not rulers.
3. Hadiths on obedience to just authority
The Hadiths emphasize obedience to just leaders (as you would expect of a document meant to serve the cause of an Imperial religion), and the risk of chaos without obedience. But Khomeini finds this line useful because only jurists can guarantee justice (see above), so logically only jurists can command obedience.
Critics’ response is that the Hadiths do not specify clerics in the context of the just rule, and that this line is meant just to justify authority and not to define the holder of this authority.
4. Delegation during the Occultation (niyāba)
This is where things get very controversial.
Shiʿa Islam has two related but different ideas (and a third one, also going back to tradition):
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Quietist Shiʿa tradition – this was the default approach for centuries
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Delegation during the Occultation (niyāba / wilayat al-faqih al-nasabiyya) – the principle Khomeini uses. Call this Khomeini-ism.
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Niyāba in Classical Shiʿa,
In the Quietist Shia tradition, during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam, no one can claim full political authority, because only the Hidden Imam is fully legitimate. Therefore, clerics should focus on legal issues (fatwas), religious courts, collection/distribution of taxes (zakat), and religious teachings. Direct governance from the clerics was not required, or even desirable; therefore direct governance should be left to others.
In Classical Shia, Niyaba was to include political governance only when necessary. Khomeini’s interpretation would be that it is always necessary; but you can see that this was not without controversy.
5. What Khomeini does not have
In the US, we have debates on the Constitution, with various Constitutional scholars who debate what the founders may have meant, when they documented various clauses, and how that applies to the modern world. What did they mean by “well regulated militia”, for instance. Consider this analogy when you consider the debate within Shia Islam, for it is actually very very similar. Except replace the Constitution/Federalist papers with the Quran/Hadiths. And just like most arguments for, or against, what the founding fathers may have meant are complete bullshit, so too are all such arguments within Shia Islam.
But you still have to take them seriously.
Importantly, there is no Hadith that says “During the Occultation, clerics must rule the state.”. There is no Quranic verse that even justifies this. Instead, it is all down to various interpretations and asserted rationales (“aql”). Just like there is no Federalist paper that says that a wife-abusing alcoholic is entitled to an AK47 because he is a member of a well regulated militia.
You can make the case that it was necessary to accept the Classical Shia position on Niyaba in the 1970s. The 1970s were a time of a Monarchy going wild, with celebrations of 2500 years of Iranian Monarchy at the same time as rampant unemployment and inflation). You can make the case that this Classical Shia position, combined with the Monarchy’s antics, made it easier for the Iranian public to accept Khomeini’s argument on “clerics must always rule because it is always necessary for clerics to rule”. But you can also see why that argument is self-limiting. Eventually, it must run its course, and Iran must revert back to its Quietist Shia tradition.
The limits
If you think through Khomeini’s rationale, you will quickly accept what happens next. There are no checks and balances on the clerics vision. Importantly, the clerics rule is about spreading God’s domain over all of humanity, Therefore:
1. The State’s Foreign policy goals becomes untethered from available resources
This is where you have the “Axis of Resistance”. This Axis is not primarily about liberating Palestine (although it is secondarily about that), but about spreading God’s domain. It does not matter that Iran, as a state subject to severe sanctions and war, does not have the resources to be carrying out such foreign policy. It does not matter that Tehran has a severe water crisis. God’s rule comes before all that.
2. The STATE’S LEADERS BECOME COWARDLY IN BOTH DECISION MAKING AND IN PERSONAL SAFETY
I have a lot of criticisms for Ayatollah Khomeini, as you can probably tell. But I would never accuse him of lacking courage and in letting personal safety affect his decision making. His strategic decisions were always sharp and decisive; and he carried on despite significant risks to his own life. And he was personally willing “to drink from the poisoned chalice” (as he put it, to end the IRan-Iraq war). But when you must have clerics who are both reluctant to rule, but who are simultaneously the only ones qualified to rule, then you will eventually default to clerics who are cowardly in both decision making and personal safety.
And you saw that during the 12 day war with Israel. Ayatollah al-Khameneii was hiding in a bunker, and afraid to take critical decisions that might further risk his life. What you did not see was any videos of him touring the bombed out remains of a hospital, or apartment buildings destroyed by Israeli missiles. By contrast, you can find videos of Netanyahu in this context of an apartment destroyed by an Iranian missile. Go back to when the PLO was defeated in Beirut, and you will find plenty of pictures of Yasser Arafat in bombed out buildings.
This cowardice reflects in decision making as well. One strategic opening for Iran was on Oct 8. A strong, sustained salvo of Iranian ballistic missiles on Israel may well have produced an Israel willing to negotiate a Palestinian state on Oct 9. Instead, Khameini dithered, and slowly lost all of his proxies one by one.
Or, on the nuclear question. Khameini’s novel clerical vision is that Iran should show a better way to the world by documenting an ability to produce nuclear weapons, without actually producing one. To say that this is strategically stupid would be an understatement. A strong decisive leader would have either gone nuclear (and obtained the escalatory deterrence that comes with it), or abandoned it altogether (and obtained sanctions relief). Again, he dithers...incapable of taking any decision.
While Khomeini was willing to drink from the poisoned chalice, Khameini does not seem to be able to drink from any chalice at all.
Since we are talking about indecision and Iran, I will quote from 12th century Persian philosopher al-Ghazali, who wrote about indecision. Al‑Ghazali viewed indecision as a natural problem that arises when reason alone cannot determine the best course of action, especially in moral or ethical dilemmas. He argued that relying solely on rational calculation can lead to paralysis of the will, and that overcoming indecision requires turning to divine guidance, moral principles, and sincere intention (niyya). Prayer, reflection, and attention to conscience help clarify priorities, and even when two options seem equally good, taking decisive action is spiritually preferable to remaining stuck. Al-Khameini’s paralysis in decision making would suggest that he has lost his faith. In reality, the ability to take decisions in critical settings comes from having practiced taking decisions in less critical settings. The cauldron of politics throws up people who can take sharp decisions and are rewarded for it. Khomeini came up in that cauldron, and could take decisions. Trump has also come up in that cauldron, and can take decisions. Khameini cannot.
Al-Ghazali’s indecision is often narrated as the parable of “Buridan’s donkey/ass”. In this parable, a donkey who is presented two attractive bales of hay would starve to death because he would be unable to choose between them. My grandfather’s take on Buridans donkey was that a donkey who gets fat in the summer because he would look at the field, and see that it was empty of grass; and assume that he had eaten it all. By contrast, my grandfather’s donkey would starve during the monsoon because he would look at the fields and assume that he had not eaten anything at all. Well, Al-Khameini reminds me of both Buridan’s donkey, and my grandfather’s donkey (caveat: my grandfather always closed his story with the reminder that donkeys are actually very clever animals).
The path forward
The Quietist Shia tradition is not incompatible with democracy, with the important caveat that the democratic rule must not violate Sharia law. In that sense, the Quietiist Shia tradition does enable a form of governance that we Americans can recognize: participatory democracy in which the 10 commandments is supreme, But someone has to make that case.
It turns out that there are clerics who are making that case. The Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani of Iraq, for example, has been making this very case. And he does have followers in Iran. As the leading Shiʿa marjaʿ taqlid (highest authority for emulation) in the Twelver Shiʿa world, many Shia across the Middle East follow his religious rulings and guidance, and Iranian pilgrims who visit Najaf and Karbala often become his supporters after returning home. And on a purely religious matter, Al-Sistani would outrank both Khomeini and Khameini (the current Ayatollah in Iran) because Najaf is considered to be the center of religious scholarship.
So, in my view, the path to modernity requires increased contact (via religious pilgrimages) between Najaf and Iran. Eventually, Iran will revert back to the Quietist Shia tradition.
