The standard definition of electability for a Democrat goes something like this:
Governor
White
Socially moderate to conservative
Non-ideological to hawkish on foreign policy and the use of armed force
NOT a liberal by any means
Well, throw out that old paradigm, because the country wants something different. Here's what the new picture of electability looks like:
Let's see:
Not a governor.
Not white.
Not a Southerner.
A social liberal.
Resists hawkish mainstream thinkiing
Pretty much liberal down the line, when one disregards the rhetoric
Surely, this guy would get fried in the polls though, right? I mean, he can appeal to the liberal base with those positions, but he'll lose independents and unify the Republicans.
No.
According to a recent Pew Poll, Obama has an astounding +34% favorable/unfavorable rating (67/33) amongst independents. In contrast, Hillary Clinton has a mere +6% (53/47).
But, the Republicans will line up around the block to vote against this guy, right?
No.
According to a very recent Gallup Poll, Obama polls at 39% approval amongst Republicans. Not great, you say. Well, that is over twice as high as Clinton's approval-19%. The approval/disapproval for Obama is minus 22%; for Clinton it is almost three times higher at minus 62%.
But, sure, you say-they barely know the guy. Once they get to know him and his positions, look for those negatives to go way up.
No.
According to a poll in Illinois, Obama enjoys 55% approval ratings with 33% strong approval ratings in Illinois. Amongst Republicans.
That, my friends, is crossover appeal.
But, a lot of folks--especially in the Netroots--find this guy blah and uninspiring. The reason that he enjoys what support he does have is because he doesn't inspire strong feelings. This guy simply won't excite the base like others would.
No.
Though the Clinton campaign dismisses young people as the "Facebook crowd," they are not only our future Democratic majority, but also present the opportunity for a present one. If voters <35 had voted in the same numbers that older voters did, Kerry would have defeated Bush. Young voters favored Democrats over Republicans 60%-38% in 2006. The more we boost youth turnout, the greater our margin of victory.</p>
And no one is reaching these younger voters and involving them in the process like Obama's campaign. Indeed, it's generally acknowledged that if young people vote with the same frequency as older voters in Iowa, he walks away with that state on January 3. Also, increasing African-American turnout by only a modest margin could flip states like Florida. Whether we like identity politics or not, the chance to vote for the first black president would boost African-American turnout.
But what about down-ticket races? How does Obama play in purple states?
This is where Obama's theme of unity pays more dividends than Clinton's polarizing tactics. A Quinnipiac pollfrom October 31 shows us just why national numbers don't tell the whole story of electability.
In this match up, Clinton narrowly trails Giuliani 43-45%, while Obama narrowly beats the Ghoul 43-42. So, it appears to be a very slight advantage for Obama.
Until we break the numbers down by Red, Blue, and Purple states.
In Blue States:
Clinton vs. Giuliani: +12 (50-38)
Obama vs. Giuliani: +10 (48-38)
In Red States:
Clinton vs Giuliani: minus 9% (40-49)
Obama vs. Giuliani: minus 6% (39-45)
So, we see that Clinton is slightly more polarizing. But, here's the real key:
Purple States:
Clinton vs. Giuliani: -6% (41-47)
Obama vs. Giuliani: +1% (43-42).
Clinton loses Purple states to Giuliani, Obama wins them. Remarkably, Obama does as well in Red States as Clinton does in Purple states.
A similar story is told with regard to independents:
Clinton-Giuliani: Dead even (41-41)
Obama-Giuliani: +5% (43-38)
Obama does better amongst Republicans, Independents, and in Purple battleground states than does Clinton.
Clinton's structural disadvantage is thus masked by her ability to run up the score in early polling in blue states. In key battleground states--the states we need to recapture, Obama represents a superior avenue to changing the electoral map.
So, a candidate with a more progressive/liberal record and platform somehow manages to represent a greater opportunity to win over independents and Republicans, and to change the electoral map in our favor than the more centrist, DLC candidate.
How that his possible will be the subject of the second part in this series.