Inspired by the ongoing debate at CampusProgress.org between Ezra Klein and Adam B. Kushner
I wrote this last night as an explanation of why I support immediately creating a plan for withdrawing American forces from Iraq. Today I find, thanks to [elveta's diary http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/11/17/104735/82], that Rep. Murtha agrees with me, and along the same lines. So I feel validated, and with much quicker gratification than usual.
Since four posts do not a debate make (though I would like to thank both Ezra Klein and Adam B. Kushner for engaging the subject), I thought I might elaborate on the case for withdrawal in 2000 words or less. Specifically, I'd like to present what I think is a reasonable estimate of Iraq's prospects now and how those prospects change if we withdraw American forces. Please forgive some reductionism concerning the sectarian groups--I usually speak of powerful factions within these groups in language that may make them sound representative of every member of the group, though it is not my intention to imply such homogeneity.
First, let's look at Iraq today. As Adam Kushner noted, it is important that Iraqis had had several opportunities to vote since the Baath government was deposed. But what have those elections wrought?
Well, there is an elected government in place, and there is now a constitution in place, subject to alteration by the Parliament being elected in December. Both of those developments are positive, though they have had secondary effects that should be considered. The constitutional referendum had unprecedented Sunni involvement in the process--a promising sign, except for one small problem: despite the fact that Sunni turned out in full force to oppose the ratification of the constitution, it still passed. What sort of a message will Sunnis take from this, when they were united in opposition to a measure that still received ratification? If we wanted to give them a reason to participate in the process in future elections, perhaps showing them that, even united, they are ineffective as a bloc at stopping unfavorable measures from becoming law. In other words, the elections may have convinced Sunnis that they will be functionally disenfranchised when the actual selection of the government's officials and development of its policies is on the table. Knowing that the Shiite-Kurd alliance currently in charge has more than enough electoral support to maintain control for the foreseeable future, why would anti-government Sunnis elect to join that process over the insurgency?
Actually, anti-government Sunni have a great disincentive when it comes to joining the insurgency--our soldiers are very, very good at killing insurgents. Let's give this man's Army its due: never in the history of the world has there been a more professional, more effective and more fearsome fighting force than the United States military.
But wait! The US Military is the greatest fighting force in the history of the world (at least since the death of Achilles), yet after two and a half years they still don't have control of the insurgency, which grows more effective at killing our soldiers and important Iraqis by the month. We are unable to stop the flow of foreign jihadis across Iraq's porous borders. Insurgents and jihadis have developed the ability to launch coordinated attacks involving massive amounts of explosives (a la the recent Palestine Hotel attacks in Baghdad). IEDs are still being planted on roadsides, and our soldiers are still being killed and wounded by them daily.
Clearly, having the most dominant military force in history occupying the country is not enough to hold Iraq. As a tangent on that point, both debaters noted that it has been suggested that the thought of an indefinite presence of American forces is spurring recruitment for insurgent groups.
And, for what it's worth, the unemployment rates in parts of Iraq are astronomical.
This is the situation in Iraq today as it relates to the ongoing insurgency. There are all sorts of positive stories out there that are worth noting, but the simple fact is that those stories don't directly relate to the insurgency. My primary concern is how to minimize the impact of violent insurgent groups on the transition of the Iraqi state.
Now, for the second part, to consider the impact of the announcement of a timetable for withdrawal.
As noted above, the current military strategy of securing Iraq through an occupation by a force capable of dominance in any province or region is not effectively combating the insurgency, which has survived over two years and shows no sign of weakening.
Gen. Abizaid himself has said that the only solutions to the insurgency will have to come from the political process.
In testimony before Congress this autumn, General Casey reported to Senator McCain that, whereas there had been 3 Iraqi divisions a year before considered battle-ready, the number had since dropped to one division.
Again, as noted above, the presence of our troops could be spurring the insurgents' recruiting efforts. But let's keep statements conservative and simply say that, best intentions aside, the presence of American forces is destabilizing for the political process.
"But if our troops leave, there could be an open civil war!"
Indeed.
Which is why it's so important that Iraqi forces be made ready to take over the security for the nation. A condition that must be met for Iraq to succeed at maintaining some semblance of national unity during this period is that an independent Iraqi security force take charge of civil and national defense--nobody on either side seems to have a disagreement with that point.
Yet, as McCain found out, we're not getting those forces trained nearly fast enough. So far we've apparently never had more than three divisions up and running at level 1 readiness at one time.
So how do we light a fire under the asses of those putting together the Iraqi security forces?
We set a firm timetable for the Iraqis to take over certain operations from American forces, and we accordingly draw down troop levels.
"But won't that embolden the insurgency to simply wait us out and attack the less-prepared Iraqi security forces instead of the American forces?" Sure, why not? But here's the thing: those insurgents, without a doubt, are going to be around for at least another decade in some form or another. Sooner or later we have to accept that the Iraqi forces we leave in place are going to spend a lot of time fighting insurgents.
So we'd better make sure the Iraqi troops get trained up and ready--Congress should be working to make sure the appropriations for materiel for Iraqi forces are sufficient and ready to go, and the President should be negotiating to get Iraqi troops trained by European states that have offered their services. Hell, if France wants to train Iraqi troops, why the hell not let them?
Now where are we? Iraqi forces are in control of Iraqi security, and American soldiers are leaving the theater of operations by the thousands. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the worst case scenario ensues and a sectarian civil war breaks out openly.
If there's a professional Iraqi security force still in place, it will probably keep Kurds and Shiites working cooperatively. But if the forces fracture along sectarian lines, expect the Shiites to control the aftermath. Not only are the majority of the Iraqi troops Shiite, and not only are Shiite soldiers abusing Sunni detainees, and not only are there now reports that government forces are taking their actual marching orders from clerics, but the potential for the Mahdi Army (the militia of Moqtada al-Sadr, a prominent and popular Shiite cleric) to rise up again still exists. And if Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani decides to issue a fatwa calling on Shiites to rise against the government or oppose any attempts to lessen Shiite political power, there's no telling what happens afterwards. So we should be concerned that reports suggest he's considering such an edict.
So in an open civil war, I would expect that, if a victor ever does emerge, it will likely be the Shiite-backed forces.
That's not to say that there wouldn't be a hell of a fight. Iraq may become an even bigger battlefront for al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalist radicals, as they might perceive an opportunity to create a fundamentalist state in the heart of the Gulf countries. Sunni insurgents would likely wreak an incredible amount of havoc on the rest of Iraq's people. If there are problems in Kurdish areas, expect Turkish Kurds to enter the fray. And if the Turkish government sees the Kurds militarizing or acting belligerent, there's a good chance Turkey will become directly involved. Plus let's remember that the border works both ways: insurgents in Iraq could launch attacks inside neighboring states (like Jordan, for instance). But even with this array of forces, I'd have to guess that the Shiites would hold onto functional control in most of Iraq.
The worst-case scenario with withdrawal, then? We leave, and the Shiites eventually win a civil war that could last for over a decade, probably creating a stable regime in the process at the expense of democratic values.
What's the best-case withdrawal scenario? We leave, the Iraqi security forces ably take over the responsibilities of our troops, and a stable liberal democracy takes root in Iraq.
What's the best-case if we stay? The same as if we leave-- the Iraqi security forces ably take over the responsibilities of our troops, and a stable liberal democracy takes root in Iraq.
What's the worst-case scenario if we stay? Our troops and Iraq's civilians continue to die and suffer, we continue to see little-to-no improvement in the Iraqi government's competence to control the country, the insurgency continues unabated, and a civil war breaks out that either the Shiites win or nobody ever wins. (This isn't taking into account the possibility that Sistani issues a fatwa against the occupation itself: if that happens, the entire "coalition of the willing" will be tripping over itself to get their troops the hell out.)
Considering the potential for the rise of nationalist, charismatic leaders and the possibility of a military force overthrowing an unstable government, and the current state of affairs in Iraq (among other potential hazards inherent in democratization), I'd say the odds of a stable, free Iraqi democracy emerging and thriving are around 10:1 against. In any case, it's regrettably not the most likely outcome at this point. I sadly think that we're more likely to see a state built on Islamic law with a minimal regard for personal liberty than a liberal democracy.
But the best way to promote the chances of a stable, free democracy (the best outcome for Iraqis and the most difficult to achieve, in my opinion) is to ensure that the development of an Iraqi security force is accomplished. With the prospect of an indefinite American military presence, however, that development has been slow going, and the progress is lackluster to say the least. With the motivation provided by a firm drawdown timetable and assistance in training from other nations, however, it is possible that the Iraqi security forces can be established in a reasonable time frame. But without the motivation to achieve such results provided by the withdrawal, why would the Iraqis worry about speeding up the creation and training of these fighting divisions? They're losing steam on this course: something must be done to hasten the process.
Set a timetable, elect a Parliament in December, train Iraqi forces, and let their political process take care of the insurgency over time while their security forces defend the people against insurgents in the short run. That seems to be the most likely way to consolidate an Iraqi democracy and salvage some good from this misadventure.
Our occupation is hurting Iraq more than it is helping right now. Whatever you might think of progressivism, I've always considered it a pragmatic movement, dedicated to providing the greatest potential benefits to the greatest potential amounts of people: if the policy in effect is counterproductive to the greater good, then keeping it in place cannot be a Progressive position.
Late-night thoughts from the Waffle House in Sarasota, Florida on Thursday, November 17, 2005.
